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Abstract 
Following the seminal work of Ibboston and Jaffe (1975) and then Ritter (1991) 
several studies, using different sample sets and different periods of time, have 
documented that initial public offerings (IPOs) are both underpriced and are 
underperforming market index reference portfolios. A growing body of literature has 
been trying to develop an explanation for the IPO anomalies. The involvement of 
venture capitalists in the public offerings has been regarded as empirical evidence to 
test the underpricing and the long-term underperformance. As such, it is argued that 
venture capitalists can affect both the pricing of the offering and the performance of 
the shares following the IPO. The common claim of these explanations is that 
companies backed at the IPO by venture capitalists are regarded by potential 
investors as lower risk, and hence issuers do not need to underprice to attract 
investors. Similarly, companies backed by venture capitalists are expected to exhibit 
a positive abnormal return in the long-term. 
To assess whether the above claim holds on the U.K. initial public offering market, a 
sample of venture capital backed IPOs that went public in the period 1992-1996 was 
matched with a sample of non venture capital backed IPOs. Consistent with the 
prevailing belief that venture capitalists reduce the uncertainty at the offering, 
venture capital backed IPOs are found to be less underpriced than the non venture 
capital backed IPOs. The comparison of the long-term performance of VC-backed 
and non-VC-backed IPOs yielded mixed results depending on the method used to 
compute the abnormal returns. The cumulative average returns show that venture 
capital IPOs are underperforming market portfolios whereas non-venture backed 
IPOs have relatively outperformed the market portfolios at the end of the 36'*^  month 
after floatation. On the other hand, a rather contrasting result was found using the 
buy and hold method as a measure of the abnormal returns. Both venture capital and 
non venture capital IPOs appear to outperform the market portfolios. Similar results 
were also documented by Shah (1995) and Allen, Morkel-Kingsbury et al. (1999) 
where IPOs on average outperformed the market indices. Based on these results it is 
hard to state that VC-backed IPOs have outperformed non-VC-backed IPOs, or vice 
versa, at the end of the 3 year period after floatation. However, the results of the 
ni 
long-term returns provide further evidence that the abnormal returns are highly 
sensitive to the methodology employed. Segmentation of the returns according to the 
market floatation showed that IPOs floated on the AIM market are more underpriced 
and more underperforming than IPOs floated on the LSE market. Finally, contrary to 
the expectation, the survival analyses showed that VC-backed IPOs have a lower 
probability of survival than comparable non-VC-backed IPOs. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
Venture capital is often regarded as one of the main sources of share capital for 
unquoted companies at many stages of their life. As such it can be defined as 
investment by professional investors of long-term, risk equity finance in new firms 
where the primary reward is an eventual capital gain, supplemented by dividend 
yield (Wright and Robbie (1998)). The growing success of venture capital backed 
companies in the last decade has led to a mounting recognition of the importance of 
venture capital financing to the economic development. Given this, it is not 
surprising that venture capital has emerged as a topic of increased interest and 
research effort. 
A review of venture capital literature indicates that venture capitalists provide much 
more than money to their portfolios. As pointed out by Sahlman (1994) venture 
capitalists, through their experience and active involvement, help unquoted 
companies to grow and perform better. It is argued that their role is to provide 
financial and business advice, to monitor, to assist venture managers in developing 
strategy, to act as a sounding board for the firm, and to provide social networks, 
customers and suppliers (MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989); Fried and Hisrich (1995) 
and Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996)). This is similar to saying that venture 
capitalists take a long-term view of returns in the form of capital gains and allow 
managers to focus on long-run issues more than is the case with other investors who 
might constantly call for short-term assessments of performance (Lam (1991); 
Bygrave and Timmins (1992) and Fried and Hisrich (1995)). Consistent with this, is 
the image associated with venture capitalists which lends credibility to the portfolio 
firm and sends positive signals to employees, customers and suppliers regarding the 
ongoing viability of the firm (Cornell and Shapiro (1988)). 
Early attempts to quantify the value that venture capitalists provide beyond capital to 
their respective investments have tended to be descriptive. As such, researchers often 
seek to determine the value added by surveying entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
for their perceptions and then extrapolating as to the possible effects on performance 
13 
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(see among others, Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996); Rosenstein, Bruno, et al. (1990) 
and MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989)). The results emanating from this approach are 
ambiguous and contrasting. For instance, Sapienza (1992) attempted to measure the 
value added by venture capitalists by surveying venture capitalists and the CEOs 
about the intensity of their interaction as well as the performance of the venture over 
a one-year period. The results showed that the level of innovation pursued by the 
venture company and the style of interaction have a significant impact on the value 
of venture capitalists involvement. This has led the author to conclude that the 
provision of money is a necessary but far from sufficient condition to promote 
economic growth. In an other study, Rosenstein, Bruno et al. (1989) surveyed 198 
venture capital-backed firms and the results showed that CEOs of these firms did not 
perceive that venture capitalists on their boards added more value than did other 
board members. Similarly, MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989) examined the relation 
between venture capitalist involvement and venture performance. The results showed 
that some activities with a high degree of involvement, such as negotiating 
employment terms or serving as a sounding board, are associated with high 
performance; whilst other activities such as recruiting top management are 
associated with poor performance. 
These studies rely on the perceptions of the CEOs and venture capitalists, where bias 
and inaccuracy are potential threats whenever perceptual measures are used. 
Moreover, these studies looked only at firms that received backing from venture 
capitalists. What about the relative performance of firms that did not receive venture 
capitalist financing? In other words, little is known about the performance of firms 
that were not backed by venture capitalists in the literature. According to Gompers 
(1998) many firms take an active policy of avoiding venture capital because they feel 
that the terms imposed by venture capitalists are too costly for the company. Amit, 
Glosten et al. (1990) take an even more critical stance, questioning whether the 
venture capital industry fosters the most promising firms. Based on the fact that 
venture capitalists face adverse selection problems when taking an investment 
decision, they argued that venture capitalists cannot accurately assess the skill level 
of entrepreneurs. As a result, most able entrepreneurs/managers wil l not find the 
price offered by venture capitalists to be sufficiently attractive and wil l choose to 
develop their projects without venture capital participation. Is this the case? Do firms 
14 
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with better opportunities really avoid venture capital? In other words, do companies 
backed by venture capitalists perform better than ones that were not? 
The purpose of this study is to assess and compare the post-performance of firms that 
received and did not receive financing from venture capitalists at the initial public 
offerings market. The initial pubhc offering (IPO) is chosen as the context for this 
study for a number of reasons. Prior research efforts to assess the value added by 
venture capitalist involvement have been constrained because measures of 
performance outcomes for private firms are difficult to gather across firms. 
Evaluating the effects of venture capitalists involvement in firms at the initial public 
offering provides a unique opportunity to gather consistent economic performance 
measures across firms. In addition to that, existing knowledge on the performance of 
venture capitalists is largely derived from studies on the U.S. venture capital market. 
Thus, there is the danger of projecting the U.S. findings to other regions of the 
world. As pointed out by Bygrave and Timmins (1992) the venture capital industry 
takes different forms around the world, reflecting differences in economic and social 
structures, legal and fiscal environments. For instance, venture capitalists in the U.K. 
tend to invest in late stage companies whereas U.S. venture capitalists invest in early 
stages and seed companies. That is also to say that U.K. venture capitalists invest in 
less risky companies than do their counterparts in the U.S.. 
This study does not stop at only comparing the post-performance, it also goes on to 
analyse the survival and the risk profile of venture capitalist backed and non-venture 
capitalist backed companies. In so doing, this is the first study to the author's 
knowledge in the U.K. to attempt to conduct such analyses and hence traverses 
uncharted territory in the prospects of making a contribution to knowledge. 
By investigating performance of the initial public offerings this study also aims at 
contributing to the IPO literature. Following the seminal work of Ibboston and Jaffe 
(1975) and then Ritter (1991) several studies, using different sample sets and 
different periods of time, have documented that initial public offerings (IPOs) are 
both underpriced and underperforming market index reference portfolios. The 
involvement of venture capitalists in the public offerings has been regarded as 
empirical evidence to both irregularities, underpricing and long-term 
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underperformance (see for example Barry, Musceralla et al. (1990); Megginson and 
Weiss (1991); and Brav and Gompers (1997)). Venture capitalists are seen as a 
factor that can affect both the pricing of the offering and the performance of the 
shares in the post IPO. It is argued that IPOs backed by venture capitalists are 
considered less risky than the ones that are not backed by market traders, and hence 
issuers do not need to underprice to attract investors. In addition to that, venture 
capitalists bring firms in their portfolio to the initial public offering market on an 
ongoing basis. Therefore, they have a strong incentive to establish a trustworthy 
reputation that will allow, in the future, access to the IPO market on favourable 
terms. Moreover, a reputation for trustworthiness will help the venture capitalist to 
establish a strong relationship with all participants in the offering (auditors, 
underwriters, pension fund managers and institutional investors). This suggests that 
companies backed by venture capitalists should exhibit a positive abnormal return in 
the long-term. This assertion stems from the fact that venture capitalists usually 
provide much more than financing to their portfolio. 
To assess the above claims, an event study methodology was adopted whereby 
venture capital IPOs are treated as the event group and non-VC-backed IPOs as the 
non event group. In other words, this study compares the stock performance of two 
distinct groups; the first set consists of companies that have received financing from 
venture capital whilst the second set consists of firms that did not receive financing 
from a venture capital prior to the EPO. Stock performances of the two groups were 
compared over two periods (windows). The first window refers to the initial return 
and it is defined from the offering day to the first closing day of trading, whilst the 
second refers to the long-term returns and it is defined as the period between the end 
of the first month and the 36"^  anniversary after the floatation. 
To compare the survival and the risk profile of VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed 
IPOs, techniques for examining survival were adopted. First, the survival and the 
hazard functions of both samples were estimated. Second, the impact of venture 
capitalists on the survival of IPOs was tested using the Cox hazard regression model. 
The initial sample consisted of 574 IPOs listed on the London stock exchange and 
the Alternative Investment market between 1992 and 1996. According to the British 
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Venture Capital Association 231 firms from the initial sample were backed by 
venture capitalists. After excluding companies for which data was not available, the 
final sample consisted of 191 VC-backed companies. 
Several empirical studies have documented that returns are affected by the size of the 
issue (see, for example Drake and Vestsuypens (1993); Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
and Mikkelson, Partch et al. (1997)). In these studies the size of the issue is 
measured as the proceed of the capital raised at the floatation. Conversely, many 
empirical studies conducted in different countries and at different periods of time 
have documented that IPOs are underpriced at floatation and that the price of the 
issue tends to adjust in order to reflect the market value within the first few weeks of 
trading. Following this, it is argued that the size of the company would be better 
measured as the market capital of the ordinary share at the end of the first month of 
floatation. Similarly, the sector to which the IPO belongs has also been seen as an 
empirical factor that could affect the abnormal returns. For instance Ritter (1991) 
argued that the level of returns tends to be clustered by industry; and Brav and 
Gompers (1997) claimed that matching firms to industry portfolios avoids the noise 
of selecting individual firms and can confrol unexpected events that affect the returns 
of the entire sector. 
Thus, in order to conduct a comparative study, all IPOs that were floated on the 
London stock exchange between 1992 and 1996 and were not named on the list 
provided by the British Venture Capitalists Association' were classified as non 
venture capital backed IPOs. From this sub-sample a sample of non venture capital 
backed IPOs was matched according to the size and industry classifications of the 
VC-backed IPOs. Following this procedure 141 non-VC-backed IPOs were matched 
to 191 VC-backed IPOs. 
This research provides an empirical test that examines the relationship between the 
involvement of venture capitalists at the initial public offerings and the firm 
performance. In so doing, it relies on venture capital literature (e.g. Gorman and 
Sahlman (1989), Bygrave and Timmins (1992) and Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996)) 
' British Venture Capitalist Association compiles a yearly list of all firms backed by a venture 
capitalists and floated on the market. 
17 
Chapter I Introduction 
on the one hand and finance hterature on the other hand (e.g., Ritter (1991), Barry, 
Musceralla et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Brav and Gompers 
(1997)) to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of venture capitalist involvement 
on firm performance. 
The remainder of this dissertation consists of six chapters. The next chapter provides 
an overview of venture capital activities. The first section examines the various 
stages of the venture capital life cycle with special reference to the risk associated 
with each stage of financing, whilst the second section reviews the activities of 
venture capital investment and the process by which venture capitalists select their 
ventures. This process appears to be long and complex and consists of two main 
parts. The first part of the process consists of the following stages, screening, 
evaluating and structuring where it is argued that venture capitalists receive a large 
number of investment proposals and only a few of them make it to the final stage. 
The second part of the process is related to post-investment activities that consist of 
increasing the probability of success of the investment. The third section discusses 
the possible exit routes for venture capitalists and focuses mainly on the two 
principal types of exit routes, namely trade sale and initial public offering, where 
advantages and disadvantages of both exit strategies are summarised. The last 
section of chapter two discusses the current trends and characteristics of the U.K. 
venture capital industry. The discussion suggests that, in the U.K., venture capitalists 
prefer to invest in capital expansions, management buy-outs (MBOs) and buy-ins 
(MBIs) rather than to invest in seed capital, start-ups and other early stage 
companies. This is due largely to the additional risk that is associated with early 
stage ventures and the time and costs involved in financing smaller deals compared 
with the benefits. 
As stated earlier, the initial public offering is the context chosen in this study to 
evaluate the effect of the involvement of venture capitalists on the performance of 
their respective investment portfolios, thus the purpose of chapter three is to review 
and discuss the different existing theories and evidence in this area. The review 
focuses mainly on studies that have been subject to considerable academic research, 
namely underpricing and long-term EPO performance. Underpricing refers to the 
high initial first day return where it is argued that the offering prices of new issues 
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are significantly lower than the market prices on the first day of trading. In other 
words, the shares of new issues are offered to investors at prices considerably below 
the price that they subsequently trade at on the stock market. Subsequently, many 
studies have documented that these IPOs are underperforming other quoted 
companies in the stock market in the long-run. The findings documented in these 
studies suggest that investors would lose money by buying and holding shares of 
companies that recently went public. Consequently, many researchers have 
attempted to develop an explanation for these irregularities. The second section of 
the chapter discusses the main theoretical explanations regarding IPO underpricing. 
These explanations are categorised in the following broad areas: 
1) theories focusing on informafional asymmetries; 2) explanafions based on the 
reputation of the firm as well as the underwriter of the issue; 3) explanations based 
on signalling and share allocation theories. The empirical evidence regarding long-
term IPO underperformance is reviewed in the second section. Similarly, with regard 
to the long-run IPO underperformance, researchers have also come up with varieties 
of explanations, ranging fi-om the effect of investors' behaviour and the effect of 
factors such a ownership structure and the reputation of the issuer, to problems with 
the models used to compute and test the significance of the average abnormal 
returns. These are discussed in the last section of chapter three. 
Chapter four reviews the literature surrounding the impact of the involvement of 
venture capitalists on the firm performance. The first part reviews the early attempts 
undertaken by researchers to gauge the role of venture capitalists in the venture they 
fund. As mentioned earlier, theses studies tend to be descriptive and as such they 
survey both entrepreneurs/managers and venture capitalists on their perceptions of 
value added. The second part discusses the empirical studies that assess the effects of 
venture capitalist involvement on the initial public offerings of firms. More 
specifically, it looks at the relationship between the underpricing phenomenon and 
the venture capitalist as well as the effects of venture capitalists on firm performance 
following the initial public offerings. The last part discusses the few studies that have 
attempted to assess the impact of venture capitalist on post IPO survival. 
Chapter five presents the research methodology and provides a justification for the 
approach adopted throughout this thesis. It also describes the data sources and 
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highlights the main difficulties that this study faced regarding data collection. The 
second part of this chapter describes the event study method used to test the 
hypotheses presented in chapter four and discusses the main arguments regarding the 
measurements of the long-term abnormal returns by contrasting the common 
methods used to measure the long-term returns, namely cumulative average returns 
(CARs) and the buy and hold returns (BHRs). Moreover, it presents the statistical 
tests used to test for the significance of both the underpricing and the long-term 
abnormal returns. The survival analysis techniques used to compare the survival and 
the risk profile of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs are described in the last part 
of the chapter. 
The description of the sample and the empirical findings of the analysis are 
presented in chapter six. The dissertation concludes with chapter seven and a 
discussion of the study's findings, their implications, limitations of the research and 
implications of the research for further studies. 
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C H A P T E R TWO VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
IN THE U.K. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter the aim of this research is to assess the impact 
of the involvement of a venture capitalist on the firm's performance at the inifial 
public offering. In doing so it is important from the outset to define venture capital 
and give an overview of venture capital activities. In the last decade venture capital 
has became one of the main sources of share capital for unquoted companies at many 
stages of their life, partly due to the growing success of venture capital backed 
companies both in the U.S. and U.K.. This has led to a mounting recognition of the 
role of venture capital in innovation, job creation, economic growth and industrial 
renewal and has increased its importance as an area for academic research (Mason 
and Harrison (1999)). Thus, it is necessary to have a sound knowledge of what 
venture capitalists do in order to gain grater insights into the context in which 
venture capitalists operate and what impact they have on the performance of their 
respective portfolio investments. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to 
describe and discuss the size and the structure of the U.K. venture capital industry 
and the ways in which venture capitalists work. In undertaking such a task it is 
important to identify what is distinctive about venture capital. 
Venture capital can be defined as an investment by professional investors of long-
term, unquoted, risk equity finance in new firms where the primary reward is an 
eventual capital gain, supplemented by dividend yield (Wright and Robbie (1998)). 
In other words, venture capital is a method of financing the start-up, development, 
expansion or purchase of a company. In following this process the venture capitalist 
acquires an equity stake of the company in return for providing the funds. As active 
shareholders in the business, venture capitalists receive their return through 
participation in increasing levels of profit and on the eventual sale of the investment. 
A comparison between finance raised from venture capital and finance raised from a 
lender indicates that the two methods of investments have different characteristics. 
The major difference between borrowed money and venture capital share capital 
relates to asset security. Lenders are rewarded by interest and capital repayment and 
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the amounts borrowed are usually secured either on the business assets or the 
individual shareholder directors' personal assets. As a last resort, a lender can 
bankrupt a business i f the business defaults. Albeit, venture capitalists may provide 
debt finance, in some cases, equity finance is by far the most type of finance that 
they provide. As such venture capitalists share the risk of failure with other 
shareholders. To compensate for the risk undertaken venture capitalists require an 
appropriately high rate of return. In other words, venture capitalists must offset the 
risk by confining their investments to ventures exhibiting potential above average 
return on equity. 
The overall consensus from U.K. studies is that, on average, (see Dixon (1991), 
Murray and Lott (1995) and Wright and Robbie (1996)) the internal target return of 
ventiu-e capitalists is around 30 percent and this return may vary according to the 
stage of the investment, the size of the firm and the degree of technology involved in 
the project. A study by the Brifish Venture Capital Association (1995) analysed the 
returns of venture capital funds launched in the U.K. between 1980 and 1990 and 
reported that the average annual return to end-December 1994 was 12.1 percent with 
large MBOs generating the highest returns at 23.1 percent on average, and early-
stage deals the lowest, at only 4.0 percent on average. One should note, however, 
that these figures are heavily influenced by the recession of the late 1980s. More 
recent statistics are more encouraging, perhaps not surprisingly given that they cover 
a period of uninterrupted real economic growth. Net returns for private equity funds 
raised between 1980 and 1999, measured to the end of December 1999, were 33.6 
percent, 31.1 percent, 27.2 percent and 20 percent over periods of one year, three 
years, five years and ten years, respectively (British Venture Capital Association 
(2000)). 
The present chapter is structured as follows. The next section examines the various 
stages of the venture capital life cycle with special reference to the risk associated to 
each stage of financing. The third section reviews the activities of venture capital 
investment and the process by which venture capitalists select their ventures. This 
process is somewhat lengthy and complex. The first part of the process consists of 
the three subsequent stages, screening, evaluating and structuring where venture 
capitalist receive a large number of investment proposals and only a few of them 
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make it to the final stage. The second part of the process is related to post-investment 
activities that consist of increasing the likelihood of success and improving the return 
of the investment. The possible exit routes for venture capitalists are discussed in 
section four. This secfion focuses on the two principal types of exit routes namely 
trade sale and initial public offering; advantages and disadvantages of both exit 
strategies are summarised. Based on statistics from the British Venture Capital 
Association (BVCA), section five gives an overview of the U.K. venture capital 
industry. This section provides a brief history of the growth and development of the 
industry. It discusses also the current trends and characteristics of the industry. The 
discussion about the U.K. venture capital industry suggests that the providers of 
venture capital funds are more eager to invest in capital expansions, management 
buy-outs and buy-ins than to invest in seed capital, start-ups and other early stage 
companies. This is due largely to the additional risk that is associated with early 
stage ventures and the time and costs involved in financing smaller deals compared 
with the benefits. In essence, it may be that venture capitalists are more willing to 
provide development capital than early stages financing. 
2.1 Investment Stages 
There are different stages in corporate development, each of which has distinct 
characteristics. The venture capital industry recognises these different stages to the 
extent that most funds specialize in one or more. Stages range from an investment 
that may take up to eight years or longer for realization (seed capital) to one which is 
considered as bridge finance (mezzanine). The following section summarises the 
different stages of venture capital investment. 
2.1.1 Seed capital 
Seed capital is investment into the research and development of a business idea 
before it is actually launched into the market. For instance it may involve producing 
a prototype product or the design of a package for a service industry. It may also 
include initial research in order to assess the size and scope of potential markets. 
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Unlike well-established companies, seed enterprises do not have a developed product 
and share of the market. Moreover this stage is characterised by extreme uncertainty 
concerning the emergence of a viable enterprise. That is to say, i f the entrepreneurs 
or managers do not have the right kind of experience and a proven track record in 
business development, the risk for the potential fiinding partner rises still fiirther. 
Consequently, many venture capitalists avoid such early stage financing. 
2.1.2 Start-up 
Start-up capital is the second stage in the life cycle of an enterprise. It is the stage 
where the idea or product prototype has been fUlly developed together with a 
business plan. In other words, the enterprise is in the process of being set up, staff 
are recruited, company premises are to be equipped and a distribution network is to 
be established. 
Similar to seed capital investment, it is unlikely that either the product or the 
enterprise can be assumed to have proven themselves commercially. Hence, the risk 
for the investor is a high one and many venture capital providers prefer to avoid 
start-up projects. 
2.1.3 Early-stage finance 
According to the British Venture Capital Association, early stage finance is 
investment to initiate commercial manufacturing and sales for companies that have 
completed the product development stage, but are not yet generating profits. Like the 
abovementioned stages, this stage is not popular with the mainstream venture capital 
providers in the U.K. since it still involves an essentially unproven product or 
company. It is regarded as a high-risk area for investment. 
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2.1.4 Later-stage financing 
At this stage the company is already established with one or more products in the 
market and requires further financing to expand its activities. That is to say, to 
expand its production capacity, recruit extra staff, extend its marketing or product 
development program or acquire additional working capital. The management team 
is supposed to have some level of experience. This kind of investment is therefore 
considered to be significantly less risky than the earlier stages and, as such, it attracts 
venture capital much more easily. 
2.1.5 Development capital 
Development capital is widely regarded as forming a separate category in terms of 
entry levels. At this stage, financing is required to develop an alternative product or 
to expand by acquiring one or more already established companies. I f a company in 
this position has a good performance record, a project of this kind wil l be regarded 
by venture capitalists as being on a par with expansion funding as far as risk is 
concerned. 
2.1.6 Management buy-outs (MBOs) 
Management buy-outs create an independent business by separating it from its 
existing owners (e.g., a family-controlled business). This separation is often the 
result of the acquisition of the business by the existing management team or 
employees. In other words, management buy-out funding is sought to enable the 
existing operating management, and possibly also new investors, to acquire a 
business (or the shares of a business) that is already established and working. As it 
deals with established business, such a project is regarded as a relatively low risk in 
venture capital terms and MBOs have in fact been growing in popularity among 
venture capitalists in the last decade, mainly in the U.K. and continental Europe. 
This rise to prominence has, at least in part, been driven by business refocusing and 
subsequent disinvestment by large organisations. 
25 
Chapter I I Venture Capital Investment in the U.K. 
2.1.7 Management buy-ins (MBIs) 
Unlike management buy-outs, a management buy-in involves bringing a new 
management team, to acquire the existing company with the support of venture 
capital. At this stage the business is assumed to be well established and the new 
management team to have an appropriate level of operating experience. MBIs are 
also generally regarded as a relatively low risk propositions by venture capitalists. 
However, given that the management team wishing to acquire the company is less 
familiar with it than managers bidding for a MBO, in this respect the M B I is more 
likely to be regarded by venture capitalists as a less attractive proposition than a 
MBO. 
2.2 Venture capital investment process 
As mentioned earlier venture capital differs from other methods of funding a new 
venture in many ways. This section explains the fundamentals of venture capital 
investment and the process by which venture capitalists select their ventures. Figure 
2.1 shows the classic venture capital investing cycle (Bygrave and Timmins (1992)). 
It describes the process from the establishment of a fund to the exit of the 
investment. 
Besides providing capital, venture capital provides also contacts, managerial and 
general business knowledge. As pointed out by Bygrave and Timmins (1992) 
venture capitalists add most value by actively involving themselves in the prosperity 
of the enterprises in which they invest. 
What distinguishes venture capitalists is that they usually invest in companies where 
there is a substantial element of risk relating to the future creation of profits and 
generation of cash flows. Thus the success or failure of any given venture depends 
on the efforts and skills of the people involved as well as on certain factors outside 
their control (macroeconomic variables, for example). This makes the evaluation of 
the venture difficult and venture capitalists cannot rely simply on traditional 
evaluation methods (for instance, discounted cash-flow analysis, IRR, etc). They also 
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Figure 2-1 Investment process 
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have to rely on a subjective, as pointed out by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), assessment 
procedure based on the business plan presented to them. 
As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the primary reward of venture capital 
investment is capital gain rather than interest income or dividend yields. This is to 
say that venture capital investment is risky. To offset this risk venture capitalists 
select only investments that exhibit above-normal returns. According to Fried and 
Hisrich (1994) venture capitalists follow the subsequent procedure (see figure 2.2 ) 
before making a decision on whether to invest or not. 
Figure 2-2 Venture capitalist process 
Deal Origination 
• 
VC finn-specific screen 
Generic screen — • 
First phase evaluation 
Second-phase Evaluation 







Soutce: IWed «nd Hisrich (1994), somn*slnM)difi*d,p51 
2.2.1 Screening 
It is argued that venture capitalists receive a large number of business plans, far more 
than they can invest in. Therefore a screening procedure is required to reduce the 
number of proposals to a manageable number to be evaluated in-depth. As pointed 
out by Dixon (1991) only 10 percent of the business plans received pass the 
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screening process. Several studies have attempted to look at venture capitalist 
investment criteria or, more precisely, at the factors that venture capitalists think are 
important when screening proposals. These studies can be categorised in two groups, 
those that surveyed venture capitalists specialising in financing early stages (seed 
and start up investments) and studies that focus on late stages. The former studies 
argue (see for instance MacMillan, Zemann et al. (1987)) that the most important 
criteria used by venture capitalists in screening business plans are entrepreneurial 
personality and experience. Fried and Hisrich (1994) analysed the process, adopted 
by venture capitalists financing late stages, in screening investment proposals. The 
results of the investigation suggest that venture capitalists take into account the 
following criteria before proceeding to the evaluation stage: the viability, integrity 
and novelty of the project, the record and leadership skills of the management team 
and the possibility of high return at the exit. In one other study, Wright and Robbie 
(1996) argue, using a U.K. sample of venture capitalists, that the latter place most 
emphasis on a very detailed scrutiny of all aspects of the business, including 
sensitivity analysis of financial information, discussions with personnel and access to 
considerably more information of an unpublished and subjective kind. 
2.2.2 Evaluation 
The second step consists of evaluating business plans that have passed the initial 
screening. This evaluation process is crucial as a means to avoid making bad 
investments. Evaluating a new venture is somehow difficult and several researchers 
have studied the criteria that venture capitalists use for this purpose (see for example 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984); MacMillan, Siegel et al. (1985) and Fried and Hisrich 
(1994)). Murray (1991) argued that internal rate of return (ERR) is the most common 
measure of evaluation and that the process of evaluating involves numerous 
iterations, based on assumptions about the fiiture trend in performance, to assess the 
robustness of the proposed investment projects that meet an acceptable ERR. 
However by examining a sample of 30 U.K. venture capitalists Dixon (1991) 
reported that little scrutiny of information is considered when assessing risk and 
adjusting for an IRR target. According to Wright and Robbie (1996) venture 
capitalists apply more than one valuation technique in evaluating their investment 
29 
Chapter I I Venture Capital Investinent in the U.K. 
projects, yet in the U.K. and particularly among later stage investments they usually 
place most emphasis on valuations based on price-earnings. This suggests that each 
venture capitalist firm can develop its own set of evaluation techniques and methods, 
and these can be either objective, subjective or both. The valuation adopted wil l 
depend, of course, on factors such as the experience of the venture capitalist, the 
stage of financing and the type of the project or company. 
2.2.3 Structuring 
This is the final stage where the deal has to be structured in order to make sure that 
entrepreneur/management team and the venture capitalist are in agreement. A closer 
look at the deal structuring approval between the venture capitalists and the investee 
company highlights the agency relationship where the venture capitalist is the 
principal and the management team is the agent. Sahlman (1990) showed that the 
process of financial contracting in the venture capital deal is focused primarily on 
allocating cash, allocating risk and providing appropriate incentives for both parties. 
The contract that governs the interaction between venture capitalist and firm 
portfolio includes features such as the amount and timing of the investment^, 
composition systems directly linked to firm value creation and mechanisms for the 
venture capitalist to monitor the firm. 
The purpose of the deal is to provide strong controls and appropriate incentives for 
the new venture managers to behave in the best interests of the firm. Through its 
many protective covenants, the agreement is specifically designed to ensure that the 
portfolio bears a disproportionate share of the risk of poor performance. For 
example, the use of convertible preferred stock ensures that the venture capitalists 
hold liquidation preference should the firm fail. Perhaps, most importantly, as 
pointed out by Sahlman (1990) the agreement stipulates that the management team 
receive lower cash compensation and greater long-term compensation in the form of 
incentive stock options or, as they are known in the U.K. 'equity ratchets' that vest 
^ Venture capitalists typically invest more than once during the life of a company and the amount 
invested often increases with each round. They expect the capital invested at each point to be 
sufficient to take the company to the next stage of development, when it will require additional capital 
to make further progress. 
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over time. Hoskisson, Hitt et al. (1989) argued that such market based compensation 
plans are more effective than bonus plans based on accounting measures (i.e, profit 
sharing, gain sharing, etc) at tying executive wealth to shareholder wealth. It is often 
argued that ownership creates strong individual incentives. 
2.2.4 Post-investment agreement 
After the investment decision is made and the deal consumed, it is in the interest of 
the venture capitalists to make sure that the venture succeeds by generating capital 
gain. Therefore, venture capitalists now become actively involved in managing the 
companies they fund. Involvement may include all activities of the company, from 
strategic planning to operational matters such as helping recruit managers, working 
with suppliers and customers, and raising additional capital. It is argued (see for 
example Megginson and Weiss (1991)) that venture capitalists enjoy a close relafion 
with investment banks who can assist companies going public or merging with other 
companies. Several studies (see for instance, MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989); Fried 
and Hisrich (1995) and Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996)) have shown that venture 
capitalists can be influential board members and take an active part in shaping 
operating business strategies. Yet, the degree of involvement after the investment 
varies depending on the venture capitalist and the situation in the company. A l l the 
above activities are designed to increase the likelihood of success and improve return 
on investment. 
2.3 Exit routes of venture capitalists 
Usually before the deal is struck venture capitalists and the company wil l agree on 
the exit method. The method ultimately chosen wil l impact on the venture capitalist, 
the investee company and its management. There are four methods by which venture 
capitalists can exit their funding portfolio. 
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2.3.1 Trade sale 
A trade sale consists of selling the shares of the venture capitalists to another 
company already operating - or proposing to enter - the relevant business sector in 
return for cash, shares of buyer or other assets. According to the British Venture 
Capital Association (1992) trade sale is the most common exit used by U.K. venture 
capitalists. 
The deal is usually conducted through a financial adviser who has knowledge of the 
unquoted market and has both credibility and experience in selling companies. 
Depending on the size of the business the financial adviser may be an investment 
bank or a firm of accountants. The financial adviser is supposed to have contacts 
within the specific market sector in which the business operates. He is also supposed 
to assist in the preparation of an information memorandum to be submitted to 
potential purchasers. In order to maximise the exit value the financial adviser invites 
the potential buyers to make a bid on the offer. This auction process is likely to last 
three to four months. Once this period is over the final negotiations are conducted, 
with the highest bidder, to strike a deal. Table 2-1 surmises briefly the advantages 
and disadvantages of this strategy. 
2.3.2 Initial public offerings (IPOs) 
An initial public offering is an offering of shares to the public, normally followed by 
the listing of the shares on the stock exchange. Usually the body regulating the stock 
exchange considers the venture capitalists as insiders. Therefore, the latter will be 
typically restricted in selling or liquidating their holdings into the public market at 
the date of the public offering. Rather, securities wil l be sold into the market over a 
period of months or even years following the public offering. Alternatively, after the 
offering the venture capitalist firm may dispose of its investment by making a 
dividend of investee firm shares to the venture capitalist's owner (subscribers to the 
fund). 
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Table 2-1 Advantages and disadvantages of the trade sale 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Management and investors may sell their 
entire shares. 
Management opposition because it may lose 
control to the acquiring firm. 
Trade sale can be carried out for any size of 
company. 
Confidentiality. In most cases the best 
candidate-buyers are often close competitors. 
The memorandum contains some 
confidential information which, 
notwithstanding good confidentiality 
agreements, is transferred to the competition. 
Timing is flexible. Business may face restructuring at the hands 
of the trade buyer. 
A buyer can rectify commercial 
management problems. 
Contractual arrangements can cover specific 
difficulties. 
Trade sales can command higher values i f a 
specific buyer places a high value on the 
business. 
Source Strang (1998) (modified, p20) 
The British Venture Capitalists Association reported that 45 percent o f the 93 initial 
public offerings floated on the London main market in 1995 were venture backed 
(see table 2.2). In 1995, 29 venture-backed firms went public raising 56 percent o f 
the total fund raised. 
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Table 2-2 Summary of U . K . venture backed floatation on L S E from July 1992 
Total no. No of % o f Total funds Funds % o f 
of issues venture total raised £m raised total 




1992 26* 16 62% 1,189.522 1,130.930 95% 
1993 118 45 38% 2,531.198 1,391.608 55% 
1994 175 73 41 % 5,752.235 1,716.603 30% 
1995 64 29 45% 1,770.524 991.495 56% 
1996 87 39 45% 8,748.518 1,223.773 14% 
1997 106 33 31 % 6,383.130 976.310 15% 
1998 81 24 30% 5,301.020 1,163.120 22% 
1999 50 10 20% 4693.87 587.81 12% 
Total 707 269 38% 358257.33 9,0880.94 25% 
(Figures from the British Venture Capital Association) 
* It includes only companies that were floated on the third and fourth quarter of the year 1992. 
Figures exclude companies that were transferred from USM. Investment trusts, reverse takeovers and overseas companies are 
also excluded. 
Table 2-3 Summary of U . K . venture backed A I M fund raising floatation from 
June 1995 
Total no. No of % o f Total Funds raised % of total 
of issues venture total funds by VC- funds 
backed issues raised £m backed raised 
issues issues £m 
1995 11 3 27% 69.49 7.16 10% 
1996 93 26 28% 471.73 122.92 26% 
1997 78 18 23 % 321.43 67.62 21 % 
1998 53 10 19% 264.45 34.02 13% 
1999 57 2 5% 280.846 17.518 15.5 % 
total 302 59 19.5 % 1407.946 249.238 17.7 % 
(Figures from the British Venture Capital Association) 
Figures exclude companies that were transferred from USM. Investment trusts, reverse takeovers and overseas companies are 
also excluded 
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To enable small and medium size companies to raise funds the London stock 
exchange has established the Alternative Investment Market ( A I M ) with less 
restrictive conditions than the main exchange, which replaced the Unlisted Securities 
Market in many ways. In 1996, 28 percent o f 93 IPOs on A I M were venture backed. 
Yet, the number o f venture-backed companies floated on the A I M is still relatively 
small i f compared to the number o f venture-backed floatation on LSE. For instance 
in 1996, 45 percent (see table 2.2) o f the companies that went public in the LSE were 
backed by venture capitalists. The fact that 45 percent o f the IPOs in 1996 were 
venture backed is hard evidence that venture capitalists in the U.K. prefer to invest in 
established companies rather than investing in early stage finance deals. Table 2-4 
summarises advantages and disadvantages o f initial public offerings. 
Table 2-4 Advantages and disadvantages of IPOs 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Popular with the managements, as it allows 
them to remain in place and in control. 
Less than full exit. VCs are only allowed to 
sell a portion of their holdings. 
Finance available for expansion. 
Market risk. Illiquidity of the markets or 
unexpected downturns may result in IPO 
being aborted. 
Liquid market for market shares. 
Floatation may be available only to larger 
companies. 
Enhanced status and public awareness. 
Increased scrutiny from shareholders and 
media. 
Increased employee motivation via share 
incentive schemes. 
Significant regulatory requirements and 
commitments. 
Public recognition for the company. 
Source Strang (1998) (modified, p 23) 
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2.3.3 Refinancing 
Venture capitalists may also exit by means o f a sale o f their shares to a third party. 
The latter can be either an other venture capitalist or an institutional investor such as 
an insurance company or a pension fund. This type o f exit differs from a trade sale in 
that only the shares o f the venture capitalist are sold to the third party. 
Refinancing or, as sometime it is referred to, secondary buy-out is becoming more 
common, although it still accounts for a relatively small percentage o f exits. Reasons 
for selling the holdings to a third party may include the need to increase or maintain 
liquidity; it may otherwise be that the investee has passed from one stage o f growth 
to another where the venture capitalist no longer feels it can add value to the venture 
or maintain the sfream o f earnings realised early on. 
2.3.4 Purchase of own shares or buy-back 
Another exit route is the buyback, through which the entrepreneur/manager 
repurchases the shares held by the venture capitalist. Usually the price o f the share is 
negotiated between the venture capitalist and owner-manger of the firm. This kind o f 
exit is likely to be encountered in circumstances where the business has not 
performed well and the exit is not being made voluntarily. 
2.4 U.K. venture capital industry 
In the above sections we firstly identified the different stages o f the venture capital 
l i fe cycle. Secondly, we explained the venture capital investment process in selecting 
potential investee firms and thirdly we described the exit routes available to venture 
capitalists. In what follows attention is turned to providing a brief history o f the 
growth and development o f the U.K. venture capital industry. A review and 
discussion is provided o f the industry characteristics, trends during the last decade, 
the provider o f funds and investment by industry sector. 
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Venture capital in the U.K. originated in the late 18th century, when struggling 
entrepreneurs began to obtain patronage from wealthy individuals to back their 
projects. This informal method o f funding became known as venture capital 
financing in the beginning o f the 1930s when Charterhouse was launched as the first 
modem professionally managed specialist fiind, providing risk equity capital for 
growing small and less established companies (Lorenz (1985) p41). However the 
real development o f the venture capital industry in the sense in which it is 
understood today did not begin until the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to the 
B V C A there are now over 100 active venture capital firms in the U.K. , which 
provide several bi l l ion pounds each year to unquoted companies mostly located in 
the U.K.. 
The growth o f the U.K. venture capitalist firms during the past two decades has been 
the results o f a combination o f structural, political, social, fiscal, economic and 
investment factors. As a result o f this combination, the U.K. venture capital industry 
is considered as the largest and most developed in Europe. According to a recent 
report by the Bank o f England (2001), in 1999, U.K. venture capital investment 
accounted for 46 percent o f the total amount invested in the whole o f Europe by the 
European venture capital industry. In terms o f size, the U.K. industry is second only 
to the U.S., and per capita it is actually the largest in the world. In the period 
spanning 1984 and 1999, B V C A members have invested, in total, around £35.5bn 
across over 19,000 companies. Figure 2.3, shows a low level o f investment in the 
early 1990s and this may be due to the worldwide recession that occurred during this 
period. On the other hand, in the late 1990s the funds invested have increased 
dramatically. For instance, in 1999 the total fund invested by the B V C A amounted to 
£7.8bn (see table 2.5) and this represents a 60 percent increase f rom the previous 
year. These funds were provided to more than 1473 new and developing business 
and management buy-in and buy-out companies. 
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Table 2-5 British venture capital investment 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Number of BVCA members 107 103 105 117 155 
Total amount invested (£ bn) 2.535 3.239 4.184 4.919 7.8 
Number of companies financed 1,163 1,200 1,272 1,332 1473 
Source BVCA 
2.4.1 B VCA investment by financing stage^ 
Investments have been categorised by three main financing stages, namely early 
stage, expansion and M B O / M B I . From the total fimd raised only a small amount is 
allocated to early stages finance. Although in 1999 the total o f early stage 
investments in U.K. companies increased by 20 percent fi-om 1998 and by 60 percent 
fi-om 1989 (see figure 2.4), the total amount allocated was only 0.35bn. The number 
o f companies backed by venture capitalists was wel l down on a decade earlier (260 
compared with a peak o f 521 in 1989). 
Figures in this section (2.4.1) are taken from the report pubhshed by the Bank of England, 2001 and 
titled "Financing of Technology-based Small Firms". 
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Figure 2-4 Early stage finance in the U . K 
£ millions Number of companies 
1987 1989 1991 
Value 
1993 1995 1997 
• Number of Companies/ Financings 
1999 
Source BVCA, cited in Bank of England (2001), plO. 
In contrast to the early stages, figures 2.5 and 2.6 respectively show clearly the 
increase in the U.K. venture capital industry involvement in M B O / M B I investment. 
In 1999, 75 percent o f the total amount invested went to M B O / M B I activities. This 
fiirther shows the preference o f venture capitalists to later stages investment. 
However, a closer glance at figure 2.5 shows that there has been an increase in 
investment size within each financing stage. For instance, the average value o f early 
stage financing deals went up by 71 percent over a decade to 1998 (from £0.34mn to 
£1.2mn). 
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Deal sizes can be used to explain why late stage investments have become such an 
important activity in the U.K. venture capital market. The recent increase in the 
value o f funds together wi th the deal size reflect the fact that the typical venture 
capital fund does not always possess the time to evaluate and monitor a relatively 
large number o f small investments. This suggests that the economies o f scale are 
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becoming ever more important in the venture capital industry and that smaller fiands 
are less likely to generate genuine return due to relatively high operating costs. As 
pointed out by Murray (1999) U.K. venture capital success has been made at the 
expense o f excluding early stage investments from the market place because o f their 
small size. 
Figure 2-7 Average deal of B V C A members 
• Early Stage 
•AH Private Equity 
• Early Stage (Constant Prices) 
• All Private Equity (Constant Prices) 
(a) 
£ millions 
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
(a) 1984 constant prices 
Source BVCA, cited in Bank of England (2001), pl2 
More crucially perhaps, in the U.K. venture capitalist prefer lower risk investments, 
largely because late stage companies are already established businesses and have a 
performance record. 
2.4.2 Type and sources offiinds 
Venture capital funds can be divided into 5 categories, according to their ownership 
and sources o f fiinding. 
2.4.2.1 Clearing bank captive fund 
These funds are generally established by commercial banks to invest in businesses 
that do not meet their loan criteria and are managed by the Bank's venture 
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investment management teams. Funds are open ended, i.e., the amount o f capital 
available to them for investment is not fixed. The provider o f this kind o f fund often 
prefers investments that generate part o f their return in the form o f dividends. Wi th 
comparison to independent funds, captive funds have a larger debt element in their 
investment. 
2.4.2.2 Institutional captive funds 
These venture fixnds are part o f banks or insurance companies and are usually close 
ended. Investments are financed mainly through equity, although they may make 
some debt investment. Recent funding development shows that former captives now 
raise funds f rom external sources as wel l , in this case they are known as semi-
captives. In the U.K. institutional captive and semi-captive funds are often viewed as 
investing primarily in later stage projects such as development capital and 
management buy-outs and buy-ins. 
2.4.2.3 Independent funds 
Independent funds raise their capital from different sources. This is to say that single 
investors do not dominate the funds. These funds usually make equity investments in 
projects and they are typically funded through limited l ife closed ended funds, wi th 
funding coming from pension funds, foreign investors, etc., and are more committed 
than captives in generating returns for investors by realising a capital gain Wright 
and Robbie (1998). Independent funds usually invest in particular industries, such as 
computer and high-tech business, medical and pharmaceutical industries. 
2.4.2.4 Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) 
They were set up by the government to replace the Business Expansion Scheme 
(BES) and to encourage investors (business angels) to invest in certain types o f 
smaller unquoted U.K. companies. A company has to meet the EIS criteria in order 
to attract investors. 
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2.4.2.5 State-owned agencies 
Agencies like the Welsh development agency, the Scottish development agency and 
English estates are state run investment schemes, set up to regenerate and revitalise 
some particular regions or industries by encouraging, advising and helping local 
businesses. These schemes are sponsored through central government grants. 
Figure 2-8 Source of B V C A private equity 
— Pension Funds 
— Banks 
— Corporate Investors 
— Insurance Cos 
Private Individuals 






1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Source BVCA, cited in Bank of England (2001), pl4 
The graph 2.8 shows that B V C A members raise their fiinds from different sources. 
According to the British Venture Capital Association (2000) pension funds have 
long been the main source, accounting for 39 percent o f investment o f B V C A 
members between 1987 and 1998 and have become increasingly important since 
1995. Gompers (1994) argued that the increasing dependence o f the venture capital 
industry on institutional and especially pension fund capital has had adverse effects 
on the willingness o f venture capitalists to provide early-stage finance. This may be 
due to the allegedly short horizons o f pension fund managers resulting from the 
short-term performance pressures associated wi th a quarterly evaluation o f funds. In 
other words, pension funds regard the investment in early stages as not profitable 
business since it absorbs a huge amount o f management time and effort without the 
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likelihood o f providing returns commensurate wi th the risks involved. Early stage 
funds tend to incur greater unit costs while having smaller total funds over which to 
defray costs than later stage development capital or M B O / M B I funds. As venture 
capital fund sizes increase, the attractiveness o f investing small amounts in early 
stage companies falls. This could also explain why venture capitalists in the U.K. 
prefer to invest in MBOs/MBIs and development/expansion capital in which the 
investor's returns are realised much earlier. However a glance at table 2.6 shows that 
the contribution from U.K. institutions has declined. For instance, in 1986, U.K. 
pension funds were the largest single source o f investment in U.K. venture capital 
firms, contributing nearly 41 percent o f all funds (see Bovaird (1990), p8). In the 
years, 1996 and 1997 the absolute level o f U .K . pension funds contributions fe l l by 
15 percent and 11 percent respectively. According to the National Association o f 
Pension Funds'* U .K. pension funds allocate only 0.53 percent o f their assets to 
venture and development capital funds. In contrast U.S. pension funds are estimated 
to allocate some 5.4 percent o f assets to private equity, o f which 1.4 percent goes to 
early-stage and expansion finance and 4 percent to leveraged buy-outs. 
On the other hand a closer look at the statistics concerning the value o f funds 
invested by overseas investors in the U.K. venture capital industry indicates that the 
proportion o f funds is increasing, particularly from the U.S.. For instance, in 1998 
the value o f flinds raised from the U.S. for investment in U.K. private equity funds 
exceeded those raised in the U.K.. Capital provided from the U.S. accounted for 51 
percent o f the total investment in U.K. private equity funds in 1998, whereas U .K . 
investment fell in absolute terms and accounted for just 27 percent. It is argued that 
the reason o f the increase in U.S. inflows is related to the high returns realised in the 
buy-out market in the U.K. , which have outperformed those in the U.S. and Europe 
over the past five years. In a survey conducted by the British Venture Capital 
Association (1998), 76 percent o f respondents claimed that good returns were a 
major attraction o f the U.K. market. They also regarded U.K. funds as a gateway into 
the growing European venture capital market. 
"* Reported in British Venture Capital Association (1998). Why should you invest in venture capital. 
London, BVCA. 
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Table 2-6 Investment bv investor type 
Type of source Amount raised (£m) % of amount raised 
1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
U.K. 553 622 734 10 10 30 
Pension funds Overseas 1,875 1,397 519 34 21 21 
Total pension funds 2,428 2,019 1,253 44 31 51 
U.K. 152 1,160 221 3 17 9 
Insurance companies Overseas 193 505 104 3 8 4 
Total insurance companies 345 1,665 325 6 25 13 
U.K. 83 376 29 1 6 1 
Corporate investors 
Overseas 432 428 51 8 6 2 
Total corporate investors 515 804 80 9 12 3 
U.K. 383 238 68 7 4 3 
Banks Overseas 640 467 153 11 7 6 
Total banks 1,023 705 221 18 11 9 
Govemment agencies and U.K. 5 10 56 7 0 2 
academic institutions Overseas 434 234 82 8 4 4 
Total government agencies 439 244 138 8 4 6 
and academic institutions 
U.K. 157 164 68 3 3 3 
Private individuals Overseas 152 142 108 3 2 4 
Total private individuals 309 306 176 6 5 7 
U.K. 182 228 207 3 4 8 
Other sources Overseas 329 525 45 6 8 2 
Total other sources 511 753 252 9 12 10 
Total from U.K. sources 1,515 2,798 1,383 27 43 57 
Total from overseas sources 4,055 3,698 1,062 73 57 43 
Grand Total 5,570 6,496 2,445 100 100 100 
Source BVCA 
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2.4.3 Venture capital investment by industry 








invested (f m) 
% of amount 
invested 
1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 1998 1997 1996 
Resources 18 19 24 1 2 2 100 47 95 3 2 4 
Mining 4 6 4 — 1 — 12 17 22 — 1 1 
Oil & Gas 14 13 20 1 1 2 88 30 73 2 1 3 
Basic industries 81 72 84 7 6 8 227 234 148 6 7 5 
Chemicals 23 25 31 2 2 3 65 32 64 2 1 2 
Construction & building materials 48 47 44 4 4 4 117 193 73 3 6 3 
Forestry & paper 6 9 1 — 1 17 9 II — — — 
Steel & other metals 4 0 0 — 0 0 28 0 0 1 0 0 
General industrials 233 220 244 21 20 23 505 576 619 13 19 23 
Aerospace & defence 5 0 0 1 0 0 13 0 0 — 0 0 
Diversified industrials 0 2 11 0 — 1 0 20 47 0 1 2 
Electronic & electrical equipment 60 67 81 5 6 8 111 183 107 3 6 4 
Engineering & machinery 168 151 152 15 14 14 381 373 465 10 12 17 
Cyclical consumer goods 65 73 82 6 6 8 163 172 188 4 6 6 
Automobiles 14 14 21 1 1 2 65 18 37 2 1 1 
Household goods & textiles 51 59 61 5 5 6 98 154 151 2 5 5 
Non-cyclical consumer goods 173 150 135 15 14 12 469 432 308 13 14 11 
Beverages 3 2 2 0 — — 4 1 — — — 0 
Food producers <& processors 48 39 55 4 4 5 186 127 100 5 4 4 
Health 51 52 45 5 5 4 127 77 142 3 3 5 
Packaging 11 13 13 1 1 1 60 41 38 2 1 1 
Personal care & household products 3 2 0 — — 0 1 24 0 — 1 0 
Pharmaceuticals 57 42 20 5 4 2 91 162 28 3 5 1 
Tobacco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cyclical sen'ices 321 393 364 28 35 35 1,799 1,197 1,140 48 40 40 
Distributors 68 78 85 6 7 8 223 139 147 6 5 5 
General retailers 27 42 35 2 4 3 163 171 180 4 6 6 
Leisure, entertainment & hotels 32 41 42 3 4 4 367 332 150 10 11 5 
Media <6 photography 63 83 61 6 7 6 620 198 211 17 6 8 
Restaurants, pubs & breweries 24 24 18 2 2 2 83 50 123 2 2 4 
Support services 84 87 95 7 8 9 232 170 156 6 6 6 
Transport 23 38 28 2 3 3 111 137 173 3 4 6 
Non-cyclical services 13 23 17 2 3 1 14 114 23 — 3 1 
Food & drug retailers 5 16 13 1 2 1 2 42 19 — 1 1 
Telecommunications services 8 7 4 1 1 — 12 72 4 — 2 — 
Utilities 5 3 1 — — — 44 2 — 1 0 — 
Electricity 5 3 1 — — — 36 1 — 1 — — 
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Gas distribution 8 1 — — — 
Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Financials 28 59 35 3 5 4 108 86 188 3 3 6 
Banlis 0 4 0 0 — 0 0 — 0 0 — 0 
Insurance 7 23 5 1 2 1 41 50 95 1 2 3 
Life assurance 0 3 0 0 — 0 0 — 0 0 0 0 
Investment companies 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 — 0 0 
Real estate 5 13 11 1 1 1 33 8 35 1 1 
Speciality & other finance 12 16 19 1 2 2 32 28 58 1 1 2 
Infijrmation technology 185 104 74 17 9 7 346 206 97 9 6 4 
Information technology hardware 28 15 22 3 1 2 70 44 24 2 1 1 
Software <6 computer services 157 89 52 14 8 5 276 162 73 7 5 3 
Total 1,122 1,116 1,060 100 100 100 3,775 3,066 2,806 100 100 100 
Notes: The sector definitions have been based on the FTSE Actuaries Industry Classification System, 
Source BVCA 
A glance at the actual number o f companies backed shows that venture capitalist 
investments have shifted fi"om manufacturing and industrials to technology 
companies (mainly computer, pharmaceuticals and communications related). 
Venture capitalists backed more companies f rom this group o f industries than any 
other industry grouping. In 1998, they received £707 mil l ion (representing 19 
percent o f the total—up 19 percent on 1997) was invested in 351 companies. In 
1998, the greatest increase in the number o f companies backed was information 
technology sector, where 185 companies were backed, up by 87 percent on the 74 
companies backed in 1996. 57 pharmaceutical companies were backed in 1998 and 
this represents an increase o f about 65 percent o f companies backed in 1996. 
However, when the amount invested is considered, cyclical services have attracted 
the most investment in 1998 (48 percent o f the total amount invested), up by 8 
percent fi-om 1996. The next most important industry in terms o f amount invested is 
media and photography-£620 mi l l ion was invested representing 17 percent o f the 
total invested in 1988, up by 11 percent f rom 1996. Support business was the next 
most active sector with 84 companies receiving £232 mil l ion in 1998. One other 
sector benefiting f rom high investment levels is engineering and machinery where 
168 companies (accounting for 15 per cent o f the total) received £381 milhon 
(representing 10 per cent o f the total). 
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In short, the above table shows clearly that many companies operating in computer 
related industries have been backed by venture capital, yet the amount o f money 
received is still negligible i f compared with the amount received by manufacturing 
and consumer related companies. This represents further evidence that the U.K. 
venture capital industry tends to prefer financing late stage companies where risk is 
low. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
L I T E R A T U R E 
All firms need to raise capital at some point during their life cycle to finance new 
projects or expand their operations. One way of raising capital for less established 
companies is to make new stock offerings in the capital market. The aim of this 
chapter is to present and discuss the literature in the field surrounding initial public 
offerings (IPOs)^. Rising capital through an IPO has always been regarded as a 
critical decision to make for any company. As such, the efficiency of the IPO process 
and the performance of companies subsequent to their floatation in the market has 
been the subject of considerable academic research. Since initial public offerings are 
the context chosen in this study to evaluate the effect of the involvement of venture 
capitalists on the performance of their respective investment portfolios, the author's 
intention is to provide an overview of different existing theories and evidence in this 
area. Within this chapter is the methodical backbone of the present dissertation. This 
chapter does not claim to cover the whole literature regarding IPOs, yet the major 
contributions are highlighted. The focus is, of course, on the two anomalies that have 
generated much research, namely initial underpricing (setting the offering lower 
than it is worth) and long-term underperformance 
Underpricing refers to the high initial first day return anomaly^. It is argued that the 
offering prices of new issues are significantly lower than the market prices on the 
first day of trading. In other words, the shares of new issues are offered to investors 
at prices considerably below the price that they subsequently trade at on the stock 
market. Following the seminal work of Ibboston and Jaffe (1975) and then Ritter 
(1984) several researchers have documented, in different countries and at different 
periods in time that, on average, new issues (companies that recently went public) 
are underpriced. 
Several studies have also documented that the shares of new issues, are 
underperforming other quoted companies in the stock market in the long-run. 
' The first sale o f stock by a company to the pubHc. 
Usually defined as the difference between the offer price (as published in the company prospectus) and 
the first day trading closing price. 
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Researchers usually compare the returns of the new issues following their entrance to 
the market, for a period of 3 years or 5 years, with the returns of a reference portfolio 
or a market index. Though with different magnitude, these studies report that new 
issues are underperforming the market (or benchmark portfolio) in the long-run. The 
findings suggest that investors would lose money by buying and holding shares of 
companies that recently went public. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured in the following way: the next section 
highlights the main theoretical explanations, put forward by academics, of the 
underpricing phenomenon. These explanations can be categorised in the following 
broad areas: 
1) Theories focusing on the informational asymmetries that occur between the 
different parties (issuing firm, underwriter and investors) involved in an IPO; 
2) Explanations based on the reputation of the firm as well as the underwriter of the 
issue; 
3) Explanations based on signalling theories; 
4) As data on market-structure start to become available in a number of countries, 
some studies have investigated the way in which the shares are allocated to investors 
to give explanations to the IPO underpricing. 
Section two, on the other hand, reviews the empirical evidence suggesting the 
existence of "hot issue " markets in which average initial returns are unusually high. 
Many studies argue that there are periods when underpricing appears to be 
systematically larger than in other periods and they are characterised by a large 
number of offerings. Section three of the chapter reviews and discusses the empirical 
studies regarding long-run performance. While the final part highlights the main 
explanations, put forward in the literature, of the long-run underperformance. 
3.1 Underpricing 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, several studies have reported, in different 
countries and at different periods in time, that companies appear to underprice their 
shares as they go public. Table 3-1 compiles some of the international evidence on 
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IPO underpricing. Early evidence comes from the USA, while studies of other 
countries emerged in the 1980s. Many companies (small and medium size) went 
Table 3-1 International evidence of IPO underpricing 
Country Authors Sample Sample size Initial 
period return ( 
percent) 
Brazil Aggarwal, Leal et al. (1993) 1979-90 62 78.5 
Brazil Leal (1998) 1979-92 66 74.1 
Canada Jog and Srivastava (1996) 1971-92 254 7.4 
Chile Aggarwal, Leal et al. (1993) 1982-90 19 16.3 
Mexico Aggarwal, Leal et al. (1993) 1987-90 37 33 
USA Ritter(1991) 1974-85 1,526 14.3 
USA Ibboston, Ritter et al. (1994) 1960-92 10,626 15.3 
Austria Aussenegg (1997) 1984-96 67 6.5 
Belgium Manigaret and Rogiers (1992) 1984-90 28 13.7 
France Jacquillat(1986) 1972-86 87 4.8 
France Vandemaele(1999) 1984-95 228(Second 20.9 
Marche) 
France Derrien and Womack (1999) 1983-98 448 9.5 
Germany Ljungqvist(1995) 1970-93 180 9,2 
Greece Kazantzis and Thomas (1996) 1987-94 129 51.7 
Hungary Jelicand Briston (1999) 1990-98 25 44 
Italy Cherubini and Ratti (1992) 1985-91 75 29.7 
Netherlands Buijis and Eijgenhuijsen (1993) 1982-91 72 7.4 
Poland Aussenegg (1999) 1991-98 149 35.6 
Portugal Alphao(1989) 1986-87 62 54.4 
Spain Fernandez, Abascal et al. (1992) 1985-90 71 35.4 
Sweden Rydqvist(1993) 1970-91 213 39 
Switzerland Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) 1983-89 42 35.8 
U.K. Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) 1983-86 143 10.7 
U.K. Levis (1993) 1980-88 712 14.3 
China Datarand Mao (1999) 1990-96 226(A-share) 38.8 
China Su and Fleisher (1997) 1987-95 57(B-share) 37.1 
Hong Kong McGuinness(1992) 1980-90 80 17.6 
Japan Jenkinson (1990) 1986-88 48 54.7 
Japan Kaneko and Pettway (1994) 1989-93 37 12 
Korea Dhatt, Kim et al. (1993) 1980-90 347 78.1 
Taiwan Chen (1992) 1971-90 168 45 
Thailand Wethyavivom and Smith (1991) 1988-89 32 58.1 
Thailand Allen, Morkel-Kingsbury et al. 1985-92 150 63.49 
(1999) 
Australia Finn and Higham (1988) 1966-78 93 29.2 
Australia Lee, Taylor et al. (1996) 1976-89 226 11.9 
Malaysia Dawson (1987) 1978-83 21 166.6 
New Zealand Vos and Cheung (1992) 1979-91 149 28.8 
Nigeria Ikoku(1995) 1989-93 63 19.1 
South Africa Page and Reyneke (1997) 1980-90 118 32.7 
Source updated from Jenkinson and Ljungovist (1996) 
Initial returns may be measured between the (first) subscription day and the first trading day, or some day 
starts. They may be initial returns (raw returns) or initial market adjusted returns . Generally, results are 
return adjustments and choice of time. 
soon after trading 
robust to market-
public during the 1980s and the 1990s partly as consequence of the privatisation 
schemes that took place in many countries and the development of the Second 
Markets that are characterised by less rigid listing requirement. In most countries 
new issues are undepriced and therefore initial first day returns are positive. For 
example buying new issue stocks that were floated between 1978 and 1983 in the 
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Malaysian stock exchange at the offer price and selling at the first trading day would 
yield an average return of 166.6 percent. Investing on IPOs that were floated on the 
Austrian stock exchange between 1984 and 1996 would generate an abnormal return 
of 6.5 percent. 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the underpricing anomaly of new 
issue markets. The following section summarises the most important theoretical 
models. 
3.1.1 Adverse selection theory 
The central hypothesis of the adverse selection theory is information asymmetry. 
Based on this Rock (1986) first assumed that both the issuing firm and the 
investments bank involved in the underwriting do not know the real value of shares 
offered. Then he posited that investors are differentially informed about the true 
value of the new issues. Rock divides investors into two categories, informed and 
uninformed. In his model, the informed investors know the true value of the IPO 
while uninformed investors do not. He argued that uninformed investors are 
confronted with a winner's curse as a consequence of the information asymmetry 
that occurs between informed and uninformed potential investors. Thus, uninformed 
investors are more vulnerable to subscribe to overpriced issues. 
The situation that faces uninformed investors in making decisions about buying new 
issuing firms is similar to Akerlof (1970) well-known argument on the market for 
lemon cars. Uninformed investors are not able to distinguish between good quality 
issues and lemons. The latter are described as very risky and poor quality firms that 
investors should try to avoid buying at floatation. As a consequence of the 
information asymmetry that occurs between informed and uninformed investors, 
issuers rationally underprice new issues because uninformed buyers wi l l withdraw 
fi-om the market i f they do not have a substantial premium to overcome their 
informational disadvantage. In other words, Rock's model claims that companies 
intentionally underprice their shares as a rational behaviour in order to induce 
uninformed investors to participate in the market and thereby raise the demand for 
the issue. This has led Rock to suggest that investors face an ex-ante uncertainty. 
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That is to say uninformed investors who subscribe to the offer cannot be certain 
about the value of the offering before it starts trading in the market. 
To examine Rock's (1986) claim, Ritter (1984) used two variables as proxies to 
measure ex-ante uncertainty. The annual sales of the issuing firm prior to the official 
listing and the volatility of its stock returns after floatation. The author argued that 
firms with low annual sales volume are more risky than the ones with high annual 
volume sales. In doing so, he first, categorised 1028 firms that went public over the 
period 1977-1982 according to their annual sales and examined whether there is a 
relation between the expected initial return and the annual sales. As an alternative to 
the first measure of risk, Ritter also split 926 issues into six equal-sized risk groups 
according to their standard deviation of returns in the period after floatation. The 
results showed that there is a positive correlation between the degree of underpricing 
and the measures of ex-ante uncertainty. They also indicate a significant correlation 
between these variables and the amount underpriced. This has led Ritter to conclude 
that the more uncertain the market is about the true market value of the issuing firm, 
the higher the discount the company must offer to the uninformed investors to 
submit bids. 
Later Beatty and Ritter (1986) (B & R) developed and tested Rock's (1982) winner's 
curse explanation for IPO underpricing by introducing underwriters into Rock's 
argument. They proposed the following two claims. First, there is an equilibrium 
relation between the ex-ante uncertainty and the degree of underpricing; that is to say 
that the magnitude of underpricing depends on how risky the IPO is. Second, the 
investment bank underwriting the issue imposes the equilibrium. To explain their 
propositions B & R argued that there is a conflict of interest between issuing firms 
and uninformed investors. As mentioned by Rock (1982) and Ritter (1984) 
uninformed investors will only submit purchase orders if, on average, the initial 
public offering is underpriced. On the other hand, issuing firms are not willing to 
leave "money on the table" (underprice) as they go public only once during their 
business cycle. According to B & R the only way to overcome this conflict is to have 
an intermediary between the abovementioned two parties with an incentive to 
appropriately price the shares. The intermediary is of course the investment bank that 
manages the offer. The authors argue that investment banks can fulf i l the role of 
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setting an appropriate price because they are constantly in the business of 
underwriting. As result of this the investment banks build and develop a reputation 
and earn a return on this reputation. Thus, it is in the interest of the investment banks 
to impose an underpricing equilibrium while setting the offering price. In other 
words, investments banks have to enforce imderpricing equilibrium; otherwise, they 
will lose underwriting commissions in the future. I f they underprice too much, they 
will lose business from issuers^, while i f they underprice too little, they wil l lose 
business from investors^. Using Ritier's (1984) sample and conducting regression 
analysis B & R look at the relationship between uncertainty and underpricing. 
Consistent with Ritter's (1984) work, Beaty and Ritter found a significant positive 
relationship between the level of underpricing and the degree of ex-ante uncertainty. 
To test the proposition whether underwriters enforce the equilibrium, the authors 
assessed the relation between the mispricing (by investment bankers) and the 
subsequent change in market share. The market share is defined as the fraction of the 
number of initial public offerings that investment banks manage and co-manage. To 
determine whether there is a mispricing, they computed the absolute standardized 
average residual. The latter is defined as /?, ( c r . / ^ / ^ ) , where is the average 
residual (is the difference between the initial return of the issue managed by the 
underwriter and the expected initial return before floatation^), and a; is the standard 
deviation of the residuals. The mispricing is measured by the absolute standardized 
average residual. The higher it is, the more the underwriter mispriced the issue. 
Consistent with their argument the results show that underwriters who misprice their 
offering saw their market fall subsequent to the period of mispricing. 
3.1.2 The Principal-agent theory 
Unlike Rock's model which relies on information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors. Baron (1982) model relies on another information asymmetry, 
that between issuing firm and the underwriter managing the floatation. Baron's 
' I f an investment bank underprices its offer ing too much, potential issuers w i l l turn to other 
underwriters and cease dealing wi th the investment bank. 
^ I f an investment bank does not underprice its offer ing enough, uninformed investors, who are 
subject to winner's curse w i l l cease buying shares underwritten by the bank. 
'The expected ini t ial return before floatation is obtained from the regression analysis conducted to test 
the relation between uncertainty and ini t ial returns proposed by Ritter (1984). 
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model assumes that issuers do not know the real value and underwriters have 
superior information about potential demand for the issue. Therefore, issuers 
delegate the offer price decision to the underwriter and hence cannot perfectly 
monitor the underwriter. He argued that the underwriters have an incentive to 
underprice in order to minimise their risk in selling the entire amount committed to 
outside investors. Though Baron's model does clearly define an inverse relationship 
between the true value of the firm and the magnitude of underpricing, one may argue 
that it does not take into account competition in the imderwriting business. Issuing 
firms could choose the underwriter that it is offering the best deal (i.e., the 
underwriter who is not willing to underprice significantly the shares of the firm). 
Moreover, Baron does not take into consideration the fact that the investment bank 
would be concerned about supporting its own reputation and therefore have 
additional incentive to produce truthful information. 
Muscarella, Vetsuypens et al. (1989) tested Baron's model by examining 38 
underwriters (investment banks) that went public between 1970 and 1987. The 
sample included only investment banks that marketed their own shares at floatation. 
According to the authors, as the underwriters market their own shares and there is no 
information asymmetry in this case, there should not be any underpricing. In other 
words as the issuers are themselves the underwriters, the argument put forward 
above by Baron (1986) that underwriters tend to underprice the issues in order to 
reduce the risk of not selling the entire amount committed to potential investors are 
expected not hold true. In contrast to the expectation of the authors, the results 
showed that that shares are underpriced even without information asymmetry. Thus 
their finding does not support Baron's theory of underpricing. This has led them to 
conclude that underpricing is a persistent phenomenon that could not be explained 
merely by information asymmetries that occur between issuing firms and 
underwriters. However, one may note that the conclusions of this study are drawn 
upon a small sample sized of 38 banks where caution has to be made. 
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3.1.3 Reputation hypotheses 
This section discusses further explanations put forward in the literature to explain the 
widely reported (see table 3-1) phenomenon of underpricing. In contrast to the 
previous models that focused on information asymmetries that occur between the 
different parties involved in the initial public offerings, the hypotheses highlighted in 
the present section are based on reputation building. Three hypotheses are considered 
and presented. The first hypothesis refers to the legal insurance hypothesis that was 
developed in the U.S. The supporters of this hypothesis argue that in the U.S. issuing 
firms and underwriters deliberately underprice their offer in order to insure against 
Iliture lawsuits from investors disappointed with the performance of shares. The 
second hypothesis asserts that the reputation of underwriter managing the offering 
could influence the price of the issue at floatation. That is to say, investors are not 
aware of the real value of the new issue, therefore they rely on the underwriters to 
communicate the value of the shares. In doing so, issuing firms prefer renowned 
underwriters to market their shares. This is to insure that the selling price of shares is 
not underpriced. The third and final hypothesis proposes that the presence of venture 
capitalists in an initial public offering could also affect the price of the issue. For 
example i f the issue is backed by a venture capitalist this would assist the investors 
in ascertaining the real value of the shares. Hence the reputation of the venture 
capitalist is at stake as it is frequently involved in listing its investments in the stock 
market. 
3.1.3.1 Legal liability 
First, Louge (1973) and Ibboston and Jaffe (1975) suggested that underpricing is an 
efficient form of protecting agents (issuers and underwriters) involved in a public 
offering against lawsuits from investors. Tinic (1988) developed and tested the 
implications of this hypothesis looking at U.S. IPOs that were issued before and after 
the Securities Act of 1933 -The Act holds liable the parties involved in any kind of 
false or inadequate information presented in the registration statement. An investor 
in IPOs, thus, is entitled to sue every party who signed the registration statement, 
including the underwriter associated with the offering, to receive a compensation for 
the loss incurred. According to the author, underpricing may provide the issuer and 
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the underwriter with protection against legal liabilities. Tinic first suggested that 
underpricing may serve to reduce potential statutory legal liabilities and then 
hypothesises that, i f true, the IPOs issued after the 1933 Act should exhibit 
substantial larger initial excess return than the ones issued prior to it. The results 
presented showed that the Act had a significant impact on the behaviour of 
underwriters and on the pricing of IPOs. Though the initial excess returns of the IPO 
sample issued prior to 1933 were significantly positive, the degree of underpricing 
was less than the excess returns generated by the IPOs sample issued after 1933. 
In one other study, Drake and Vestsuypens (1993) tested the abovementioned 
hypothesis put forward by Lougue and Ibbodton over the period of 1969-1990. They 
analysed 93 IPOs which were sued for misstatements in the IPO prospectus or 
registration statement. Though the results have to be interpreted with caution'^, they 
showed that these 93 IPOs are not overpriced, on average, but are as underpriced as 
other IPOs of similar size. Drake and Vestsuypens claimed that underpricing an IPO 
is not a very efficient way of avoiding future lawsuits as, at least in this sample, it 
did not appear to protect them fi-om being sued. The authors showed also that the 
purchasers of the underpriced issue are just as likely to sue, in the U.S., as purchasers 
of overpriced ones. Furthermore firms that are sued are not more or less underpriced 
than comparable companies that are not sued. According to Alexender (1993) the 
lawsuits avoidance explanation to underpricing as advanced by Louge (1973) and 
Ibboston and Jaffe (1975) is based on a misleading assumption about actual legal and 
financial liability for underwriters and issuers. She argued that underwriters do not in 
reality bear the full costs of litigation. In addition to that, underwriters have no 
incentive to insure themselves further by undepricing the issue because they are 
already insured. Therefore, i f it happens that there is a settlement that has to be paid 
to the investors as consequence of their lawsuit (against the parties involved in the 
IPO), insurance companies wi l l then take the responsibility of compensating 
investors. That is to say those underwriters do not need to insure further by 
underpricing because, in the majority of the cases, they hold insurance from 
insurance companies. It would have been more sensible to say in this situation that 
The study includes only firms which were published in legal databases (see (Drake and Vestsuypens 
1993)) 
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underwriters are concerned about their reputation rather than striving to avoid legal 
liabilities. Underwriters who provide misleading information about issuing firms to 
investors may damage their reputation. Underwriters could also lose the business of 
underwriting as consequence of their past behaviour. Further, Alexander contended 
that underpricing would offer only limited protection because it is irrelevant in suits 
brought under the 1933 Securities Act. Thus, she concluded that undepricing carmot 
be seen as efficient and effective means of gaining insurance against securities law 
violations. 
3.1.3.2 Underwriter's reputation 
As mentioned earlier the second hypothesis claims that the offer price of a new issue 
is affected by the prevailing reputation in the market of the investment bank 
underwriting the EPO. Louge (1973) suggested that the choice of a prestigious rather 
than a non-prestigious investment bank might influence the price which investors are 
willing to pay for the shares sold. This statement reflects the belief that when a firm 
sells shares for the first time its true value is imperfectly known by investors and that 
the reputation of the investment bankers chosen by the firm's owner provides 
information to the market about the firm's true value. 
Titman and Trueman (1986) developed a model that can be applied to any high 
quality outsider who can provide information about the issuing firm. It is claimed 
that this model can explain how the quality of the investment bank chosen can 
rationally be used by investors in valuing new issues. Titman and Trueman argued 
that an issuing firm with more favourable private information about its own value 
wil l choose a higher quality investment bank than will an entrepreneur with less 
favourable private information. In other words, issuing firms have an incentive to 
choose the quality level of the investment bank that correctly reveals their private 
information to investors. Their model predicts that the higher the quality of the 
underwriter, the more favourable will investors infer the information to be and so the 
higher will be the price at which the new issue can be sold. The authors did not 
provide empirical evidence to support their claim, yet they suggested the use of some 
proxies that can be used in empirical studies to measure the quality of underwriters 
for future research. 
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Carter and Manaster (1990) examined the effect of the reputation of investment 
banks on the initial performance of IPOs. They argued that underpricing is costly to 
the issuing firm and low risk firms have an incentive to reveal this characteristic to 
the market. In order to fu l f i l this, issuing firms prefer to select underwriters who are 
well established and occupy a prestigious status in the market. Thus, issuers use the 
reputation of the investment bank to reveal to the investors that the issue is less risky 
and fairly priced. Carter and Manster developed a theoretical model in which 
prestigious underwriters are, on average, associated with IPOs of low dispersion 
firms, i.e., less risky firms. They also provided empirical evidence that low 
dispersion firms are seen to use prestigious underwriters to signal to the market that 
they are in fact low risk firms. In a follow up study Carter, Dark et al. (1998) 
assessed the significance of the 3 proxies used as measures in the past studies to 
assess the reputation of investment banks and their association with initial returns. 
The first measure of the underwriter's reputation is given by Carter and Manaster 
(1990) (CM) and it is derived from its position in "tombstone announcements"". The 
ranking scale is established by comparing tombstone announcements listed on The 
Wall Street Journal. The second measure (JM) is just a slightly modified from the 
(CM) measure, since in the Johnson and Miller (1988) study the underwriters are 
further classified into four categories. The third measure is derived from Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) (MW). The (MW) measure uses the relative market share of the 
underwriters as a proxy to measure the reputation. In other words, the quality of each 
underwriter is measured as percentage of the total proceeds of the IPOs managed at 
the offering. The higher is the percentage the higher is the quality. To test the 
underwriters reputation the authors used a sample of 2292 U.S. IPOs that went 
public over the period 1979-1984. The results showed that the reputation proxies are 
significantly related to initial returns only when they are examined separately, i.e., 
using univariate regressions. However, the (CM) measure is significant when used in 
a multivariate regression along with the two others proxies. Thus, the latter result 
indicates that the (CM) underwriter reputation proxy has relatively greater 
explanatory power and explains more of the variation in the initial returns than the 
two other proxies. Finally, the authors claimed that the better the reputation of the 
underwriter, the less is the underpricing. 
' ' A tombstone announcement is a listing o f a pending public security offerings 
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3.1.3.3 Venture capital reputation 
The investment of venture capitalists in firms going public was also seen, in the 
literature, as a factor that affects the price of an IPO. Like investment banks, it can 
be argued that investors regard the presence of venture capitalists in a public offering 
as a certification that reduces the risk of the issue. Venture capitalists certify the 
quality of the issue through their reputation and financial investment. As mentioned 
earlier the presence of venture capitalists in an initial public offering could affect the 
price of the issue. Established venture capitalists bring firms in their portfolio to the 
initial public offerings market on an ongoing basis. Therefore, venture capitalists 
have a strong incentive to establish a trustworthy reputation that, in the fliture, wil l 
allow access to the IPO market on favourable terms. Moreover, a reputation for 
trustworthiness wil l help the venture capitalist establish a sfrong relationship with all 
participants in the offering (e.g., auditors, underwriters, large pension fiind managers 
and institutional investors). 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argued that venture capitalists can perform the 
certification fimction and reduce the uncertainty of a firm's true value. They 
compared a sample of venture capital backed IPOs with a control sample of non-
venture capital backed IPOs matched by industry and offering size from 1983 to 
1987. They found that firms certified by venture capitalists experience on average 
lower underpricing at public offerings. Gompers (1996) also developed a venture 
capitalists hypothesis. He suggested that venture capitalists (as they are repeatedly 
involved in IPOs) do not want to be associated with IPO failure since they want to 
maintain their prevailing reputation in the market, as consequence, they are less 
likely to overprice the issue. 
In an attempt to explore whether capital markets recognise the monitoring role of 
venture capital in the initial public offering, Barry, Musceralla et al. (1990) 
examined a set of IPOs backed and non-backed by venture capitalists over the period 
from 1978 to 1987. They argued that venture capitalists can benefit the issuing firms. 
Investors do not have reliable information about the issuer's assets and investment 
opportunities. As a consequence investors rely on venture capitalists to provide 
information because the latter are repetitively involved in the capital market and their 
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reputation is at stake. The authors provided empirical evidence supporting the notion 
that venture capitalists' experience and capability in monitoring investments can 
send vital signal to investors at the time of an IPO. This has led to the suggestion that 
venture capitalists share at least some of the private information (with the issuing 
firm) about prospects of the firms they back. Therefore, the authors speculated, 
venture capitalists may have an even greater incentive to build a reputation for 
backing good firms. 
3.1.4 Signalling theories 
These theories stem from the assumption that the issuer of the stock has perfect 
information about its intrinsic value while investors are uninformed. IPOs are 
characterised by a great deal of uncertainty about their real value because of the 
scarcity of public information at the time of initial offering. To reduce this 
uncertainty and information asymmetry (between issuers and investors), high quality 
issuers set the offering lower than it is worth (underprice) to enable investors to 
distinguish them from low-quality issuers. In doing so, high-quality issuers are 
providing a signal of the quality of the IPO to the investors. While low-quality 
issuers carmot afford to underprice because, unlike high quality issuers, they would 
not be able in the post EPO, to recoup "the money left on the table" in future issuing 
activity. The latter is defined as the difference between the market value of the 
offering in the after market and the gross proceed raised at floatation (offering price 
times the number of shares issued). In other words, the underpricing is deliberately 
and voluntarily conducted by issuing firms to signal their true value. Thus, the 
offering price provides a signal to the investors of the quality of the IPO 
Ibboston (1975) argued that new issuers underprice in order to "leave a good taste in 
investor's mouths so future underwritings from the same issuer could be sold at 
attractive prices"'^. Several studies formalised this statement and modelled a 
signalling game in which underpricing is the key-element. As mentioned above these 
models have in common that the firm's owner-managers know the true value of the 
'^See Ibboston (1975, p 264) 
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firm whilst potential investors do not. The underpricing is deliberate and voluntary to 
signal the true value. 
Following Ibboston's (1975) proposition, Welch (1989) developed a signalling 
model in which he assumed that low-quality firms must incur a cost when trying to 
imitate high-quality firm. He also argued that issuing firms are rational and have 
superior information about the futxire cash flows than are investors and underwriters. 
In his model, Welch showed that high quality firms can afford to underprice because 
they are able to recoup the money left on the table. According to Welch high quality 
firms follow two-stage sales. The first stage refers to the initial public offerings 
where high quality firms issue only a portion of the total amount of shares they 
intend to offer to the public. The price of this portion does not reflect the real value 
of the high-quality firm because it is underpriced. The remaining shares wil l be sold 
later in seasoned offerings. In doing so, high quality firms are able to recover the loss 
incurred in the initial public offering because the price of the seasoned offering is 
much higher than the offering price at the EPO. On the other hand, poor quality firms 
could not follow the above procedure because investors in the market may discover 
the real quality of the firm between the initial public offering and any seasoned 
offering. Therefore it is not worthwhile for poor quality firms to imitate high quality 
firms by underpricing their issue as they would not be able to recover this cost later. 
Thus, Welch suggested that underpricing is a credible signal of good firms because it 
is costly for bad firms to imitate. 
Further, Welch tested the central hypotheses that EPO firms substantially reissue (i.e. 
conduct seasoned offerings), and that the proceed raised is higher than the proceed 
realised at initial public offering. In doing so, he used a sample of 1028 firms that 
went public over the period 1977-1982 and reported that within the first three years 
after the IPO, issuing firms do indeed reissue in seasoned equity. The mean of 
seasoned equity proceeds is three times higher than the IPO proceeds for the 
reissuing firms. This has led the author to conclude that the timing of the seasoned 
equity offerings is related to the initial public offering and that EPOs could have been 
used as means to advertise future issuing. 
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Similar to the above model Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989) presented a generalisation of Leland and Pyle (1977) model, in which they 
assumed that issuing firms are more informed about the firm's future value than 
investors are. To reduce the information asymmetry between the above two parties 
the authors argued that the managers-owners signal the true value by retaining a 
fraction of the shares of the new issue and by offering the shares at a discount. This 
is to say that, issuers are signalling both the expected return and variance of future 
earnings (risk of future investments) to the investors. Thus, according to Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989), firms use the fraction retained by the owners and underpricing as 
signals to the quality of the shares. By retaining some of the shares, owners are 
effectively sending a signal to the investors that future cash flows wil l be higher and 
so it is worth investing in their stocks. The reason why the owners hold onto the 
shares would be to sell them later in seasoned offerings at a higher price. Conversely, 
the owners of low quality firms, in Grinblatt and Hwang's model, would prefer to 
sell as many shares as possible to acquire the maximum capital before the firm's real 
value is discovered by investors who translate this by valuing the shares at a lower 
share price in the market. As pointed out by Allen and Faulhaber (1989) bad quality 
firms are deterred from imitating good quality firms because they are less likely to 
experience high future cash flows and therefore are less likely to pay high future 
dividends. As result of this Allen and Faulhaber argued that investors can rationally 
interpret future dividends more favourably for firms that underprice at their IPO. 
From what has been said above it is clear that signalling models have little practical 
importance i f companies do not follow a multiple-stage sale policy of an initial 
offering followed by subsequent equity offerings or insider sales. Jegadeesh and 
Welch (1993) tested the signalling hypothesis empirically by assessing the likeHhood 
of a seasoned equity offering (SEO) as a function of the EPO-underpricing. They 
found small explanatory power of IPO-underpricing for likelihood of SEOs, which 
cast doubt on the signalling hypothesis. In one other study, Garfinkel (1993) tested 
the signalling hypothesis by looking at whether the likelihood of insider selling 
increases as a function of underpricing. He found no correlation, casting fiirther 
doubt on underpricing signalling. 
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Jenkinson and Ljungovist (1996) pointed out that the signalling models described 
above have been designed mainly for the U.S. primary market where the majority of 
the issuing firms are young start-ups. Conversely, in the U.K. and possibly in 
Europe, issuers are mostly large and well-established firms. In addition to that, initial 
public offerings are primarily sell-outs by existing managers and owners, rather than 
capital-raising by the firm (as it is the case in the U.S.). This is to say that in the U.K. 
and Europe owners of issuing firms regard the initial public offerings as a way to 
transfer the ownership from a private entity to a public company. Thus, the primary 
aim of the original owners is to realise a certain amount of cash at floatation not at 
subsequent equity offerings. 
i.7.5 Share allocation theories 
Recent research on IPOs underpricing, mainly in the U.S., has been oriented toward 
understanding the basis on which shares are allocated to investors; specifically, when 
the offer is oversubscribed. It is argued that in the situation where excess demand 
exists, underwriters tend to ration the quantity of the shares, rather than ftirther 
adjusting the offering price or increasing the amount of shares to meet the demand. 
The most common method to obtain a listing in the U.S. market is the bookbuilding 
procedure Comelli and Goldreich (2001). This procedure can be described as 
follows: first, the investment bank and the issuing firm set a price range for the IPO; 
then, the investment bank goes on a "road show" to market the issue, investors are 
invited to evaluate the issue and make a bid for a quantity of shares. During this step 
the investment bank constructs a demand curve for the issue from the preliminary 
indication received from investors. Once this stage is over, the investment bank 
prices the issue at the level where demand exceeds supply'^ and allocates the shares 
to investors at its discretion. The main characteristic of this offering mechanism is 
that the investment bank does not have to disclose the procedure in which the 
offering price is set and how the shares are allocated to investors. 
See ( Comelli and Goldreich 2001) 
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Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argued that, during the "road show", investors reveal 
their behef about the value of the issue to the investment bank. In order to 
compensate investors who reveal information, the investment bank wil l favour them 
when allocating shares. In a later study, Benveniste and Busaba (1997) compared the 
commonly used methods for floatation in the U.S., namely, the fixed-price offering''' 
and bookbuilding procedure. The result of the analysis showed that the bookbuilding 
method of offering generates higher proceeds and reduces average underpricing to 
issuers. 
Most recently, as detailed data, on the U.S. market, become available some studies 
have attempted to assess whether underwriters prefer institutional to individual 
investors when allocating shares. Sheman and Titman (2001) attempted to assess 
why investment banks market IPOs only to a certain number of investors. They 
argued that investment banks face a trade off when deciding to increase the number 
of investors, and that the degree of underpricing depends on the cost of the 
information'^. When information is costless the number of investors participating is 
large and underpricing tends toward zero. When information is costly, the desire for 
information determines the degree of underpricing. In one other study Aggarwal, 
Prabhal et al. (2002) examined whether underwriters favour institutional investors in 
allocating shares of EPOs by using a compiled dataset of U.S. offerings. In other 
words, the authors tried to find out whether institutions are allocated more 
underpriced issues than individuals. They argued that underwriters prefer 
institutional investors because they, by their scale, are more likely to be better 
informed, are more important clients, and usually commit to buying additional shares 
in the after market. Moreover, underwriters exchange large commissions in 
subsequent trading with institutional investors. In order to carry out the investigation 
Aggrawal, Prabhala et al. (2002) relied on information given fi-om nine investment 
banks about IPOs in which they served as lead managers. The sample consisted of 
174 IPOs that went public between May 1997 and June 1988. The results were 
consistent with the assumption, underwriters favour institutional clientele. The 
findings showed also that institutions are allocated about three quarters of the shares 
Unlike the book building procedure fixed price offerings are priced without soliciting investors 
interests. 
Private information concerning the issuing firm. 
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that shoot up (i.e. shares of IPOs that have a high first day return), about three times 
the allocation to individual investors. Furthermore, the authors showed that 
institutions have received the most underpriced issues and stayed away from the 
overpriced ones. Thus, underwriters appear, at least in this study, to favour 
institutional investors by allocating more shares in IPOs with strong pre-market (pre-
IPO) demand, which typically have higher initial first day return. This is consistent 
with bookbuilding theories in which institutions receive more shares when an issue is 
oversubscribed as an exchange for indicating to the underwriters favourable pricing 
information. 
Other studies (see for example Brennan and Franks (1997); Mello and Parsons 
(1998); and Stoughton and Zechner (1998)) argued that issuers prefer to allocate 
their share to a wide range of investors rather than allocating them to only a few 
institutional investors. It is also argued that, having a large number of small 
shareholders will create liquidity and hence it is a kind of defence from take-overs to 
the issuers. This is to say that owners of the issuing firms do not want to allocate 
their shares to few institutional investors because the latter are more likely to take 
over the control of the management of the firm. Issuing firms underprice deliberately 
in order to create excess demand (i.e., issues are oversubscribed). This excess of 
demand allows issuers to ration the allocation of shares and to discriminate between 
investors. In doing so, issuers are reducing the individual size of each holding. As 
pointed out by Breiman and Franks (1997) the dispersion of holdings reduces 
incentives for the new shareholders to monitor the incumbent management. 
To test whether the argument that ovraers of issuing firms underprice in order to 
create excess demand and therefore retain the control of the company, Brerman and 
Franks (1997) examined a sample of 69 firms that went public in the London Stock 
Exchange over the period 1986-1989. In doing so, the authors posited that the 
owners of the IPO firm wish to maintain control of their company after the IPO, to 
avoid the possibility of being taken-over. Therefore, underpricing the issue could 
reduce the risks of a take-over since underpricing wil l lead to over-subscription and 
rationing. This will allow the issuing firms to discriminate between investors. 
Consistent with the argument the results showed that underpricing is related to over-
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subscription, and over-subscription is frequently related to discrimination against 
large shareholders in the allocation process. 
3.2 Hot issue markets 
As mentioned at the outset of this document, the second section of the present 
chapter deals with studies related to hot issue markets. These studies argue that there 
are periods when underpricing appears to be systematically larger than in other 
periods. Empirical evidence suggests the existence of "hot issue markets" for IPOs. 
The hot issue markets are generally defined as periods in which large numbers of 
new issues are floated and the average abnormal returns are high. Shi Her (1990) and 
Ritter (1991) argued that during these hot issue periods many poor quality IPOs are 
floated on the market, taking advantage of the market over-optimism. Ibboston and 
Jaffe (1975) found that the underpricing phenomenon occurs only during particular 
periods in the U.S. IPO market. At the beginning and end of the 1960s new issue 
markets were hot in the sense that there was significant underpricing. In the interim, 
however there was no evidence of underpricing. Ritter (1984) examined a sample of 
1082 U.S. IPOs that went public over the period 1977-1982. Following Rock's 
explanafion for underpricing (see section 3.1.1, adverse selection theory, p52) Ritter 
assumed that hot issue markets occur during the periods where there are higher 
proportions of high-risky firms in the IPO market. As advanced by Rock the more 
risky is the issuing firm, the more the offering is underpriced. Thus high-risk issues 
should exhibit higher average returns because there is more uncertainty about their 
initial return. Conducting a time-series analysis Ritter identified a hot issue market 
between January 1980 and March 1981 and reported that the average return from the 
offer price to the first day after market price is more than forty-eight percent for 
IPOs in 1980 and 1981, while the average initial return for the period 1977-1982 is 
about sixteen percent. Consistent with the assumption, the results showed that there 
is a significant relationship between the risk of the issue and the initial return. Higher 
risk companies have higher average initial return. A further investigation of higher 
risk issues indicates that underpricing is concentrated in particular industries, such as 
new issues by oil and gas firms (natural resource issues). The results showed an 
average initial return of 110.9 percent for natural resources during the hot issue 
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period and 18.3 percent during the cold period (not hot period), a difference of 92.6 
percent. While for non-natural resource issues the average initial return is much 
smaller during hot issue period; it is 21 percent and otherwise is 15.8 percent, a 
difference of only 5.2 percent. Ritter argued that the last result regarding the natural 
resources is inherently unstable and can last forever, because natural resources issues 
had been subject to a monopsony exploitation during the hot issue period. This 
monopsony is defined as the fact that underwriters intentionally underprice the issues 
in order to earn profits. The latter are earned by allocating issues to favoured 
investors. 
According to Allen and Faulhaber (1989) the hot issue market for natural resource 
firms around the period 1980 is due to the exogenous shock of the 1979-1980 oil 
crisis. During this period the price of oil doubled which resulted in substantially 
increased prices for petroleum products all over the world. This led to an increase in 
the demand of natural source shares in the stock market because of the prospect of 
high profit as result of the increase of the price of products derived from oil. Thus 
underwriters saw this period as a good opportunity to bring new natural resource 
firms to the market. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argued that this prospect of highly 
profitable energy may have been the impetus for the 1980-1981 hot issue market in 
natural resource companies, characterised by both underpricing and over 
subscriptions as reported by Ritter. 
3.3 Empirical studies on long-term underperformance 
Researchers have been further puzzled by the long-run performance of IPOs. Several 
studies have documented with different magnitude that IPOs underperform the 
market. The setting of the offer price of an issue is an important informational event 
because it indicates the extent to which the assessment by the market deviates fi-om 
it. The evidence of empirical studies shows that all price adjustments occur in the 
first trading days. This suggests that the IPOs market in the short-run is quite 
efficient. On the other hand, Aggarwal, Leal et al. (1993) explained that the 
abnormal returns occurring to IPO investors may only be interpreted as evidence of 
underpricing by underwriters i f it is shown or assumed that the after market for IPOs 
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is efficient. Thus, they indicated the importance of the long-term price behaviour of 
IPOs. 
Ritter (1991) invesfigated a sample of 1,526 IPOs that went public in the U.S. during 
the 1975-84 period. He showed that in the 3 years after going public these firms 
significantly underperformed a comparison group. The comparison group was 
constructed from stocks floated on the American Stock Exchange (Amex) and the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and matched by size and industry. The results 
showed that the average abnormal return for the sample of IPOs is 34.47 percent 
over a 3-year holding period, while the return of the control sample is of 61.86 
percent over the same holding period. This is to say that investing 1$ in new issues 
and holding for 3-years would have yielded about 1.34$. On the other hand investing 
the same amount of money in the control sample would have generated 1.62$. In 
other words the IPOs underperformed the market by 27.39 percent. The U.S. long-
run underperformance was also documented by Aggarawal and Rivoli (1990). They 
documented a negative abnormal return of -13.73 percent in the first year subsequent 
to the inifial offering for 1435 IPOs over the period I979-I984. Ritter argued that 
there is a tendency for firms with high initial returns to have the worst aftermarket 
performance. This tendency is stronger for smaller issues than larger ones. In 
addition to this, younger companies do even worse than average. The empirical 
evidence presented in his study also showed that there is a substantial variation in the 
underperformance year to year. For example, the average market returns after 3 years 
are positive for 1975-1980 IPOs and negative for 1981-1984 IPOs, across industries. 
He interpreted these results by claiming that (1) investors are periodically 
overoptimistic about the earning potential of young growth companies, and (2) firms 
take advantage of these "windows of opportunity". 
Loughran (1993) compared a sample of 1,656 initial public offerings conducted 
during the period 1967-1987 to the NASDAQ equally-weighted index. He found 
that, on average, IPOs underperform the NASDAQ index during the six-calendar-
years after going public. The results showed that the average six-calendar- year 
holding period return for IPOs is 17.29 percent, while the average six-calendar-year 
holding return for the NASDAQ index is 76.23 percent. Thus IPOs underperformed 
the index by 58.94 percent. In a later study, Loughran and Ritter (1995) assessed 
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long-term trends in stock returns of security issuance. The results indicated that 
companies issuing stocks from 1970 to 1990, whether an IPO or a seasoned equity 
offering (SEO), significantly underperformed the non-issuing firms for five years 
after the offering date. These findings also showed that the average annual return 
during the five years after issuing is only 5 percent for firms conducting IPOs, and 
only 7 percent for firms conducting SEOs. Investing an equal amount at the same 
time in a non-issuing firm with approximately the same market capitalisation, and 
holding it for an identical period, would have produced an average compound return 
of 12 percent per year for IPOs and 15 percent for SEOs. 
Servaes & Rajan (1997) examined IPOs from 1975-1987 and documented a five 
years raw return of 24 percent. Then, by comparing the raw returns to three different 
benchmarks namely, the smallest deciles from the NYSE/AMEX index, the 
NYSE/AMEX and firms matched by size and industry, they found that IPOs are 
underperforming respectively 47 percent, 17 percent and 41 percent the benchmarks. 
Levis (1993), using a method similar to Ritter and Chopra (1990), examined 712 
IPOs listed on the London stock exchange over the period sparming from 1980 to 
1988. He used three different benchmarks (Financial Times Actuaries A l l Share 
Index, Extended Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index and a specially constructed 
Al l Share Equally Weighted Index) to compute the first day initial return and 36 
months returns following the IPO. The resuhs showed a posifive 14.3 percent initial 
return and indicate the existence of long-run underperformance of the London Stock 
exchange. This underperformance varies from 8 to 23 percent depending on the 
benchmark used to compute the long-run adjust returns. 
Espenlaub, Gregory et al. (2000) attempted to examine the robustness of U.K. long-
term underperformance of initial public offerings documented in Levis's work by 
using a wide range of benchmarks and models to compute the long-term abnormal 
return. In doing so, they examined a sample of 588 IPOs during the period 1985-
1995. They first compared returns using the following benchmarks: the CAPM, Size 
Control Portfolio, Value Weighted Multi-Index; Fama-French (1996) Value-
Weighted Three Factors model using Hoare Govett index and RATS. After 
computing the cumulative returns, they reported, irrespective of the benchmark, a 
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substantial negative abnormal return to EPOs following 60 months after the 
floatation. However, the magnitude of the underperformance depended on the 
benchmark employed. For instance, the cumulative returns measured relative to 
Hoare Govett model over the 60 months is slightly negative and insignificant with 
comparison to the other benchmarks. As suggested by Fama and French (1995) the 
selection of the benchmark is very critical, when using the event study methodology, 
because it affects considerably the scale of the abnormal return. In other words, 
abnormal return is very sensitive to the benchmark used. Furthermore Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) argued that presence of cross-correlation in the contemporaneous 
returns, and the t-statistics tests used to assess the significance of the abnormal 
returns are likely to be overstated because the tests assume that the observations are 
independent. To control for the cross-correlation problem Espenlaub, Gregory and 
Tonks used the calendar-time approach developed by Jaffe (1974) and then 
Mandelker (1974). This approach consists of calculating the armual return by 
compounding monthly returns of IPOs that took place within the calendar-year. The 
results of the latter approach showed that the underperformance is less significant 
across all benchmarks. Consistent with Fama (1998) conclusion, they argued that 
long-term underperformance of IPOs is crucially depended on the choice of the 
benchmark and the methodology adopted to compute the abnormal return. 
The underperformance is not limited to the U.S. and U.K. markets. Uhlir (1988) 
investigated the German market. He documented an underperformance of 7.4 percent 
after one year of going public over the period between 1977and 1987. Finn and 
Higham (1988) examined a sample of 93 Australian IPOs that went public between 
1966 and 1978. They found that buying an issue at the end of the listing month and 
holding to the end of the first year wil l yield a return of 6.52 percent below the 
indices. Keloharrju (1993) showed that the average Firmish IPO lost 22.4 percent 
from the first market frading to three years later, versus 1.6 percent average decline 
for the market index. Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) examined a sample of 42 Swiss 
IPOs between 1983 and 1989 and document an underperformance of 6.1 percent 
respectively. 
The underperformance phenomenon has also been documented in emerging markets. 
Dawson (1987) examined the one-year abnormal returns for IPOs in Hong Kong, 
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Singapore, and Malaysia during 1978-1984. Though the abnormal returns are 
statistically insignificant, they reported an underperformance of 9.3 percent in Hong 
Kong, 2.7 percent in Singapore and, in contrast, an overperformance in Malaysia of 
18.2 percent. The author explained the Malaysian abnormal return by nothing that 
the benchmark used in his study was not a market wide one, but an industrial one. In 
an other study, Aggarwal, Leal et al. (1993) examined new issues in three Latin 
American markets, Brazil, Chilli and Mexico. They reported respectively an 
underperformance of IPOs following three years after floatation in the three markets 
of 47 percent, 23.7 percent and 19.6 percent. 
Unlike the aforementioned studies. Shah (1995) found, by examining a sample of 
2056 Indian IPOs fi-om 1991 to 1995, that Indian IPOs on average outperform the 
market index for the first 200 trading days. He also reported that, then, the IPOs 
decline and after 400 days they are approximately at the level of the first trading day. 
The same controversy was reported by Allen, Morkel-Kingsbury et al. (1999) in 
analysing the long run performance of 150 Thai initial public offerings floated 
during 1985-1992. The IPOs outperform the market index by 10.2 percent at the end 
of the 3'^ '' year anniversary. 
3.3.1 Long-run underperformance explanations 
Most of the IPO long-term studies, documented above, indicate that IPOs all over the 
world are underperforming the market index or reference portfolios in the long-run. 
This underperformance or irregularity as it is sometimes referred to in the literature, 
has been the concern of many researchers who attempt to give somehow rational 
explanations. These studies have come up with all sorts of explanations: Irom the 
effect of investors behaviour, the effect of factors such us ownership structure and 
the reputation of the investment bank underwriting the issue, to the problems with 
models used to compute and test the significance of the average abnormal returns. 
Thus the remaining of this section reviews briefly some explanations put forward for 
the long-run underperformance. 
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3.3.1.1 Behavioural explanations 
Miller (1977) argued that underperformance might be due to heterogeneous 
expectations, concerning the valuation of the firm, by optimistic and pessimistic 
investors. As time passes the divergence of opinions decreases, as more information 
becomes available, and this causes prices to drop. According to Ritter and Welch 
(2002) this argument is consistent with the lockup period; the interval of time after 
the floatation during which original owners of an IPO can not sell their shares. This 
period of time is determined by the underwriter and usually last 180 days in the U.S.. 
They argued that at the end of this period the share prices fall because more public 
shares become available in the market. Shiller (1990) posited that investors in the 
market are irrational and are subject to fads because they value IPOs beyond fair 
value, so that prices wi l l drop over time as information on the true value becomes 
available to the market. This implies that firms could time IPOs strategically and 
could predict when investors' over-optimism is likely to occur and a favourable offer 
price can be obtained. As suggested by Miller, prices fall as information on the true 
value becomes widely available, investors adjust their initial overvaluation, which 
leads long-run returns to fall. 
Rajan and Servaes (1997) attempted to examine whether the long-run 
underperformance of initial public offerings is due to over-optimism on the part of 
investors. They made the assumption that brokerage house analysts drive the 
investor's expectation. In doing so, they gathered a sample of firms issued between 
1975 and the second quarter of 1987 fi-om databases compiled by Ritter (1991), 
Barry, Musceralla et al. (1990) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). The results showed, 
first, that highly-underpriced issues attract larger numbers of analysts. Analysts then 
systematically overestimate the earnings of these companies, with forecast errors 
averaging 5 percent of the firm's stock price. As the forecast window increases, so 
does the forecast error. Thus, analysts are more overoptimistic about a firm's long 
tenn prospects than its short term prospects. These forecast errors are low, but they 
still remain significant after size and market adjustment. This indicates that 
overoptimism of analysts for IPOs is only partly a reflection of their overoptimistic 
in general. 
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Second, the authors reported a positive relation between the number of IPOs coming 
to market in a given industry, in a given quarter, and several measures used by 
analysts to assess the long-term growth earnings projections for recent IPOs in these 
industries. Since these growth projections are overly optimistic, they interpreted this 
result as consistent with the window of opportunity argument and investor 
behaviour. 
Third, the results regarding the relationship between analysts' long term growth 
projections and aftermarket stock price performance of IPOs indicate that the firms 
with the highest projected growth substantially underperform three benchmarks (the 
NYSE/AMEX value weighted index, the smallest decile of the NYSE/AMEX 
indices and size and industry matched firms). However the firms with the lowest 
growth projections outperform these benchmarks. This finding indicated that 
investors appear to believe the inflated long-term growth. 
As mentioned earlier, some researchers have attempted to gauge whether the long-
term IPOs performance could be affected by factors such as ownership structure, the 
presence of venture capitalists and the reputation of the underwriters. In what 
follows empirical studies regarding the ownership structure and underwriter 
reputation are summarised whereas the venture capital effect is reviewed in the 
chapter IV. 
3.3.1.2 Ownership Structure 
Jain and Kini (1994) attempted to assess the performance of firms as they make the 
fransition from private to public ownership through initial public offerings. Unlike 
the abovementioned studies, which focus on post-issue stock price to assess the 
performance of IPOs, Jain and Kini (J&K) investigated the change in operating 
performance of IPOs. They measured the operating performance of 682 firms going 
public over the period 1976-1988. Though J&K showed that the firms have high 
growth in sales and capital expenditure relative to firms in the same industry, the 
results indicated a significant decHne in post-issue performance, as measured by the 
operating returns on assets and operating cash flows deflated by assets for years 0, 
+1, +2 and +3 relative to their pre-IPO levels, year - 1 . Thus, they argued that the 
74 
Chapter III Initial Public Offerings Literature 
declining operating performance of IPO firms cannot be attributed to lack of sales 
growth opportunities or cutbacks in post-IPO capital expenditure. Then in an attempt 
to give explanations to this decline, they examined the relation between operating 
performance and the fraction of the firm retained by the original entrepreneurs and 
reported a positive relationship. J&K interpreted this result as being consistent with 
Jensen and Meckling's agency hypothesis (1976) and Leland and Pyle's signalling 
hypothesis (1977). According to the agency hypothesis, higher ownership retention 
by mangers reduces their incentives to undertake non-value-maximising projects. 
Leland and Pyle argued that, by retaining a significant ownership stake in the firm, 
entrepreneurs can signal project quality since false representation can be costly. Both 
hypotheses predict superior performance of IPOs with higher entrepreneurial 
ownership. 
According to signalling models, underpriced issues at IPOs should exhibit high 
operating performance and hence higher after market returns in comparison to those 
that do not. It is argued that firms underprice shares at IPOs to signal their quality, 
given that they will be able to recoup the cost of underpricing in subsequent 
offerings when the share prices are higher. In other words, as mentioned earlier (see 
section 3.1.4, signalling theories, p61) ovmers of new issues sell only a fraction of 
their shares at floatation and the other fractions are sold later in seasoned offerings at 
a higher price. To test this argument the authors looked at the correlation between 
the initial return at IPO and post-issue changes in operating performance. J&K found 
no relation between the average initial returns at floatation and change in operating 
performance at IPO. The absence of a positive relation between the change in 
operating performance and underpricing has been interpreted by the authors as being 
inconsistent with the signalling explanation for underpricing. 
Mikkelson, Partch et al. (1997) examined the relation between ownership 
characteristics and operating performance over a period up to ten years for a sample 
of 283 firms which went public in the period 1980-1983. The results showed that 
operating income scaled by assets or by sales exceeds the performance of matched 
publicly traded firms before going public and after two years declines to a level that 
is below the performance of the matched firms. Investigation of whether the 
operating performance of IPO firms is explained by changes in stock ownership 
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characteristics showed that neither the level nor the change in performance is related 
systematically to various measures of ownership by officers, directors and 
blockholders. They concluded that the change in equity ownership that results from 
going public does not lead to changes in incentives that affect operating 
performance. 
3.3.1.3 Investment bank 
Carter, Dark et al. (1998) assessed the relationship of both the initial and three-year 
returns following IPOs with investment banker's reputation. They used the three 
existing proxies as measures of underwriter reputation namely, (CM), (JM) and 
(MW) measures (for more details, see section 3.1.3.2, p58), and provided 
comparative evaluation of those measures. First, in terms of underpricing, they found 
that each of the reputation proxies is significantly related to the IPO initial returns as 
it is widely documented in previous IPO literature; the better the reputation of the 
underwriter, the less is the short-run underpricing. They showed that among the three 
alternative reputation proxies, the (CM) measure explains more of the variation in 
the initial returns compared to (JM) or the (MW). 
Second, in terms of long-term performance, they argued that high reputable 
underwriters attempt to market IPOs that wil l experience the least negative long-term 
market adjusted returns. As a consequence investors use the investment banker's past 
performance, as measured by the quality of firms in which they have previously sold 
equity, to assess their credibility. By selecting IPOs that have relatively better long-
term performance, investment bankers protect their reputation. Therefore, in 
conducting a regression analysis, the coefficients for underwriter prestige measures 
are expected to be positive when long-term abnormal return is used as an 
independent variable. The results suggested that IPO underwritten by more 
prestigious investment bankers, on average showed a less negative performance over 
three-year periods. The results also indicated that when the reputation proxies are 
evaluated simultaneously, only the (CM) measure is statistically significant and 
related to the IPO stocks' three-year returns. 
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3.3.2 Measurement problems 
Although the measurement problems will be discussed later in chapter V it is worth 
to highlight here the main difficulties faced when using event study methodologies in 
computing the abnormal long-term performance. Some researchers argued (see for 
instance Barber and Lyon (1997) and Khotari and Warner (1997)) that the commonly 
used methods to measure the long-term performance influence the magnitude of 
abnormal returns and generate miss-specified test statistics. There is a great debate 
among academics about whether it is better to use the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) or the buy-hold-retums (BHR). The latter is the return obtained by investors 
as a consequence of a strategy consisting in buying stocks at the end of the first 
trading day and holding them for a period of time. Barber and Lyon argued that the 
use of BHR is most appropriate because it measures the investors' experience. 
Furthermore, the returns obtained by investors in the long-run are better 
approximated by compounding returns. On the other hand Fama (1998) argued that 
the use of CARs is better suited because it yields less spurious rejections of market 
efficiency than does BHR. That is to say the abnormal long-run IPO performances 
are sensitive to the methodology employed and hence there is no general consensus 
on how to measure the long-term abnormal returns. 
The statistical inferences conducted to test the significance of the abnormal returns, 
such as t-test is mis-specified because of potential violations of the underlying 
statistical inferences. Lyon, Barber et al. (1999) argued that the use of the traditional 
t-test to gauge the significance of the long-run abnormal returns yields mis-specified 
test statistics that over-reject the null hypothesis of no positive abnormal 
performance. One cause of the mis-specification is due to the distribution of the 
abnormal long-run abnormal return. It is widely documented that the long-run 
returns are positively skewed. 
Some empirical research on IPOs, use the market return as benchmark (as measured 
by official indexes) in measuring the long-run performance. This benchmark is 
compared to a portfolio of IPOs, equally weighting (EW) or value weighting (VW) 
indices. It is argued that adopting the market index as a benchmark causes the t-test 
to be biased towards no abnormal returns because the IPO firms are included in the 
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benchmark. Finally, as pointed out by Fama (1998) all methods used for the 
estimation of abnormal returns are subject to problems arising from poor 
specification of the models and no method is able to minimise these problems for all 
classes of events. Even close models, such as Fama-French three-factor model and 
benchmarks matched by size and book-to-market ratio, which appear to control for 
variations in the returns motivated by these two variables, give rise to different 
estimations of abnormal returns. 
3.4 Summary 
As mentioned at the outset, the objective of this chapter is to survey the literature 
regarding initial public offerings. It is evident from this literature that the 
underpricing anomaly has been a topic of theoretical investigation for decades. The 
persistence of underpricing in IPO markets, especially during the recent internet 
bubble in the U.S., has raised further questions about the theoretical models 
previously presented. Ritter and Welch (2002) argued that theories based on 
asymmetry information are overemphasised and are unlikely to explain underpricing. 
In their view, there is no single dominant explanation for underpricing. As pointed 
out by Ritter and Welch reasons for underpricing differ from one company to 
another. Since none of the above-mentioned models appear to give an exhaustive 
description of the phenomenon of underpricing, the importance of studying the 
relative strength of the different models cannot be underestimated. Finally, as noted 
earlier with regard to long-run returns, the latter are not only sensitive to the 
benchmark and period of analysis but also to the methodology adopted. As posited 
by Khotari and Warner (1997), Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2000) the 
method of performance measurement influences both the magnitude of the abnormal 
returns as well as the size and power of the statistical return. So, one must be caution 
when interpreting long-run abnormal returns. This issue will be discussed later in 
greater detail in the chapter V. 
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CHAPTER FOUR VENTURE CAPITAL 
INVOLVEMENT & INFLUENCE 
A review of research on venture capital indicates that venture capitalists provide 
much more than financing for their portfolio. Venture capital is centred around 
equity based financial instruments which provides long-run investment to unquoted 
companies. The aim is to achieve primary reward as a capital gain rather than 
income interest or dividend yield. Unlike other passive sources of capital (for 
example banks), venture capitalists are personally and actively involved in their 
portfoUo companies. As pointed out by Sahlman (1994) venture capitalists (VCs), 
through their experience and active involvement, help unquoted companies to grow 
and perform better. Their major roles are, to provide financial and business advice, to 
monitor activities, to assist venture managers in developing strategy, to act as a 
sounding board for the firm, and to provide social networks, customers and suppliers 
(see for example MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989); Fried and Hisrich (1995); and 
Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996)). 
Venture capitalists have been also characterised as "patient" investors who take a 
long-term returns view in the form of capital gains and thereby allow managers to 
focus on long-run issues more than is the case with alternative investors who might 
constantly call for short-term assessments of performance. Lam (1991); Bygrave and 
Timmins (1992); and Fried and Hisrich (1995). Consistent with this long-term 
perspective, the image associated with venture capitalists lends credibility to the 
portfolio firm and sends positive signals to respective employees, customers and 
suppliers regarding the ongoing viabiHty of the firm, Cornell and Shapiro (1988). At 
the time of the initial public offering, VCs are considered as an insider and wil l be 
restricted in selling or liquidating their holding for some time after the floatation. 
In short, venture capitalists are active investors who provide valuable services to 
their portfolio firms through ongoing long-term commitment. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that active investors play a crucial role in monitoring and organising 
firms in which they participate. As argued in the previous chapter the presence of 
venture capitalists, as investors in a firm going public, has been regarded as a factor 
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that can affect both the price of the offer and the subsequent performance of the issue 
in the stock market. Thus the purpose of this chapter is, first, to discuss the studies 
that looked at the effect of the involvement of venture capitalists on a firms' 
performance, and second, to develop the main hypotheses, of the present study, 
which wil l be tested later. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The 
next section discusses the early attempts undertaken by researchers to gauge the role 
of venture capitalist in the venture they fund. The common element of these studies 
is to survey both enfrepreneurs and venture capitalists on their perceptions of value 
added. While, the third section discusses the empirical studies that assess the effects 
of venture capitalists involvement on the initial public offerings of firms. More 
specifically, it looks at the relationship between the underpricing phenomenon 
(discussed in the chapter III) and venture capitalists. It also discusses studies that 
have investigated the effects of venture capitalists on firm performance subsequent 
to initial public offerings. The final section discusses the few studies that attempted 
to assess the survival rates of companies that received financing from venture 
capitalists. 
4.1 Venture capital and value added 
Early attempts to assess the effect of venture capitalists on firm performance have 
tended to be descriptive. As such, researchers often seek to determine "value added" 
by surveying entrepreneurs and venture capitalists for their perceptions and then 
extrapolating as to the possible effects on performance. MacMillan, Kulow et al. 
(1989) investigated the correlation between venture capitalists involvement and 
venture performance. They examined 62 venture capitalist (from the Sol C Snider 
Entrepreneurial Centre of the Wharton School and Venture Economics, Inc) about 
their degree of involvement into strategic and operational activities relative to that of 
the top entrepreneurs in the firms they back. The results indicated that the level of 
involvement of venture capitalists differs from one activity to another. They also 
showed that some activities with relatively high degrees of involvement, such as 
negotiating employment terms or serving as a soimding board, are associated with 
high performance. Whilst other activities such as recruiting top management are 
associated with poor performance. Regression analyses showed no evidence of 
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systematic variation in involvement and thus they come to the conclusion that 
activity levels depends on the personal preferences o f the venture capitalists. 
In the same spirit Rosenstein, Bruno et al. (1989) surveyed 198 venture capital-
backed firms in Northern California and Texas. The results o f the survey showed that 
the CEOs o f these firms did not perceive that venture capitalists on their boards 
added more value than did other board members. In a follow-up study, Rosenstein, 
Bruno, et al. (1990) carried out a telephone survey with 98 CEOs fi-om 162 venture 
backed companies who participated in the prior study. The findings showed that 
CEOs rate venture capitalists as contributing about the same as other outside board 
members unless there is a venture capitalist on the board f rom the "top 20" VC firms 
(as defined in Stien and Bygrave (1990)). They concluded that venture capitalists 
add value only when they belong to the "top 20" set. 
Sapienza and Timons (1989) also examined the individual role o f venture capitalists 
in the venture they found by matching responses f rom CEOs o f VC-backed ventures 
and lead investors. Consistent with Rosenstein, Bruno et al. (1989) the respondents 
identify three important roles: strategic, supportive, and networking. The authors 
also found that venture capitalists' roles are regarded as being important mainly: (1) 
in early stage ventures; (2) for entrepreneurs without start-up experience; and (3) 
when venture capitalists hold a larger equity position in the venture. This led them to 
conclude that venture capitalists do add more than money. 
In a later study Sapienza (1992) attempted to measure the value added by venture 
capitalists. In doing so, they carried out a survey o f 51 U.S. venture capitalists and 
CEOs about the intensity o f their interaction as well as the performance o f the 
venture over a one-year period. The results indicated that the level o f innovation 
pursued by the venture company and the style o f interaction have a significant 
impact on the value o f venture capitalist involvement. The authors concluded that: 
(1) the provision o f money is a necessary but far from sufficient condition to 
promote economic growth and resilience; (2) some elite VC firms may be better at 
this process than others; (3) V C provide assistance, which is particularly useflil for 
highly innovative ventures; (4) the nature, style and interaction o f V C and CEO o f 
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the venture has a significant impact on the value o f venture capitalists involvement, 
specifically, more involved, open relations appear superior. 
In the U.K. Harrison and Mason (1992) investigated the role o f business angels and 
venture capitalists in entrepreneurial companies by using a methodology similar to 
the MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989) study. The results indicated that sounding board 
and strategic activities are very important to entrepreneurs. They also showed that 
entrepreneurs backed by venture capitalists are more dependent on their assistance 
than do those backed by business angels. A survey conducted by the British Venture 
Capital Association (1992) showed that entrepreneurs rate non-financial assistance 
as important as financial support in providing high value added. A follow-up survey 
carried out by the British Venture Capital Association (1999) based on 175 
companies backed by venture capital, indicated that 87 percent view the presence 
venture capital as being crucial and very important to the growth o f their business. 
The results o f the survey also showed that 60 percent o f respondents regarded highly 
the venture capitalist contribution as a sounding board for ideas. 
Conducting a comparative study, Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996) examined the 
venture capitalist's governance and their effort to add value beyond money in the 
U.S. and the three largest markets for venture capital in Europe (United Kingdom, 
France and the Netherlands). They developed a theoretical model o f value added on 
the expectation that venture capitalists add most value when the venture is 
struggling, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists are relatively more 
experienced. This study has been affected by two major factors. The first one regards 
data collection: in the U.S. data was collected during the period 1987-1988 whilst in 
Europe it was collected in 1992. The second is that the survey conducted in the U.S. 
consists o f interviewing venture capitalists and CEOs o f their portfolio companies, 
whereas in Europe the study consisted o f surveying only venture capitalists. In spite 
o f these limitations the results are consistent wi th prior studies; they showed that 
venture capitalists see their strategic roles as their most important contribution, 
followed by their interpersonal roles and their networking roles. The results also 
showed, both in Europe and in the U.S., venture performance is positively related to 
the measures used to determine value added. However, contrary to expectations 
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(highlighted in the theoretical framework o f this study) venture capitalists add more 
value to high performing than to poorly performing ventures. 
In analysing venture capitalist industries in the U.S. and Europe, the study indicated 
that venture capitalists in the U.S. and in the U.K. expend greater effort in 
monitoring and assisting their portfolio companies than do those in France and the 
Netherlands. The comparison between the three European countries showed that 
VCs in the United BCingdom are more involved in their funded companies and add 
the most value. 
The inconsistencies in the findings reported in the abovementioned studies can be 
attributed in part to differences in the measures used to determine the effect o f 
venture capitalists on the firm portfolio performance. Moreover, measures o f 
performance for private and unquoted companies are diff icul t to gather and 
standardise across companies. Caution must be exercised in the application and 
interpretation o f findings based on perceptual measures. These studies rely on the 
perceptions o f the CEOs and venture capitalists where bias and inaccuracy are 
potential threats. 
A n alternative approach is to examine the effects o f venture capitalist involvement 
on performance subsequent to initial public offerings (IPOs). As pointed out by 
Sapienza (1992) a stock-based approach enjoys the advantage o f being objective and 
being tied to an economic outcome. Thus, evaluating the effect o f venture capital in 
EPO firms provides an opportunity to gather consistent economic performance 
measures across firms. Moreover, among other exit strategies f rom the venture 
available to venture capitalists (for example management buy-outs, mergers and 
acquisitions), an IPO is by far the most lucrative for the venture capitalist. According 
to Bygrave and Timmins (1992) the average realised return fi-om an IPO in U.S. 
stock market is almost 5 times greater than acquisition. 
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4.2 Venture capital and underpricing 
The involvement o f venture capitalists in an initial public offering has been seen as 
empirical evidence o f underpricing theories. Like investment banks, investors regard 
the presence o f venture capitalists in a public offering as a form o f certification that 
reduces the risk o f the issue. It is argued that issuers and investors have different 
information sets concerning the value o f the offering f i rm. Issuers are believed to 
have an incentive to hide or delay the revelation o f adverse information, i f any, in 
order to sell shares at a higher price. Rational investors understand this incentive and 
w i l l only offer a low average price for the offer since they are likely to be convinced 
that accurate information disclosure has not occurred. On the other hand i f there is a 
third party (venture capitalist) wi th reputational capital at stake backing the issue, 
investors would regard the issue as less risky. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter venture capitalists bring companies in their 
portfolio to the market on an ongoing basis. Therefore, they have a strong incentive 
to establish a trustworthy reputation in order to retain access to the IPO market on 
favourable terms. Moreover, the greater a venture capital firms perceived access to 
the IPO market the more attractive it w i l l be to entrepreneurs, thus assuring a 
continuing deal flow. As pointed out by Sahlman (1990) the venture capitalist fund 
manager market is a relatively small and efficient labour market where the 
individuals' performance is constantly monitored and valued. Therefore, the 
investments in reputational capital by venture capitalists allow them to remain in the 
venture capital industry as well as in the capital market. 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) assessed whether the presence o f venture capitalists 
can certify that the offering price o f the issue reflects all the available and relevant 
inside information. In doing so they compared a sample o f 320 U.S. venture capital 
backed IPOs wi th a control sample o f 320 non-venture capital-backed IPOs matched 
by industry and offering size from 1983 to 1987. They found that firms certified by 
venture capitalists experience on average lower underpricing at public offerings, go 
public wi th higher quality underwriters and auditors, generate greater interest f rom 
institutional investors, and go public at younger ages. Moreover venture capitalists 
lower the cost o f due diligence and reduce underwriter, legal, auditor and associated 
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floatafion expenses. Therefore, as pointed out by Ritter (1987), venture capitalists are 
able to reduce two o f the highest costs associates wi th going public namely 
underpricing and underwriter compensation. 
Brophy and Verga (1988) examined inifial stock prices and the variability o f stock 
returns for 20 days after IPO o f 210 VC-baked and 1053 U.S non-VC-backed 
ventures, f rom 1977 to 1983. They hypothesised that i f venture capitalists add value, 
the companies they back w i l l be less underpriced at the outset than otherwise, 
moreover their initial returns would vary less than those o f other ventures. The 
results showed that VC-backed IPOs outperform non-VC-backed IPOs and that 
while non-VC-backed firms benefit substantially fi-om adding a prestigious 
underwriter, VC-backed firms do not. Thus, they concluded that venture capitalists 
serve a critical fiinction. 
In an other study on the U.S stock market Barry, Musceralla et al. (1990) assessed 
the performance o f venture capitalists by examining a set o f 433 venture capital 
backed and 1123 non-backed IPOs over the period 1978 to 1987. The findings 
support the notion that venture capitalists' experience and capability in monitoring 
investments can send a vital signal to investors at the time o f an IPO. This has lead to 
some suggestions that venture capitalists share at least some o f the private 
information about the prospects o f the firms they back; moreover they come to the 
IPO market repeatedly. Therefore, the authors speculated, venture capitalists may 
have an even greater incentive to build a reputation for backing good firms. The 
results showed also that IPOs backed by higher quality venture capitalists are less 
underpriced. 
Lemer (1994) provided evidence o f the ability o f venture capitalists to take 
companies public at the time when equity valuations are high by examining 350 U.S. 
venture capital backed biotechnology IPOs spanning fi-om 1978 through 1992. The 
results o f this study showed that experienced venture capitalists are more effective at 
timing IPOs. 
The above studies showed clearly that, at least in the U.S., companies backed by 
venture capital are less underpriced than non-VC-backed companies. As pointed out 
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in Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996) venture capitalist practices and behaviours in the 
U.K. appear to be most like those in the U.S. Therefore, one would expect U.K. 
venture capitalist backed IPOs to exhibit less uderpricing than other non-venture 
capitalist backed EPOs. This expectation can be stated formally as follows: 
HI: VC-backed will be less underpriced than non-VC-backed 
4.3 Venture capital and long-run performance 
As mentioned in chapter I I I (see section 3.1.3.3, p60) the involvement o f venture 
capitalists in an initial public offering has been seen as a factor that can enhance 
long-term performance. The first studies, to test this proposition, focused on the 
assessment o f target industries, and yielded mixed resuhs. Cherin and Hergert (1988) 
computed cumulative returns for a 24-month period after the IPO o f 71 VC-backed 
ventures and 59 non-VC-backed ventures in the U.S. computer and software 
industry. A negative return is found in both sets during the period o f the study, wi th 
no statistical difference between the two groups, and therefore they concluded that 
venture capitalists do not provide additional value. Similar to this prior study Stien 
and Bygrave (1990) compared the returns o f high-tech companies backed by the top 
20 VCs, with the returns o f similar companies that are not backed by the top 20 VCs, 
in the U.S.. They defined 20 high tech venture capitalists as those firms that hold the 
most seats on the boards o f the directors o f the sample companies. Based on this 
split, the results showed that firms which had venture capitalists f rom the top 20 
enjoy higher returns. This has led them to conclude that venture capitalists from the 
top 20 do indeed add value. 
Jain and Kin i (1995) compared the post-issue operafing performance o f 136 U.S. 
matched pairs o f IPOs from the period 1978-1988. They found that venture backed 
companies significantly outperform non-venture backed companies in terms o f 
change in operating performance during the 3 years fol lowing the IPO. Though both 
the VC-backed and non-VC-backed exhibit declines relative to pre-IPO levels, the 
VC-backed enjoyed superior performance compared to non-VC-backed on two cash 
f low related measures, operating returns on assets and operating cash flows deflated 
by total assets. They also investigated the claim that venture capitalists help firms go 
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public at higher price-to-eamings, (P/E) ratios. In doing so, they compared the 
median levels o f the market-to-book and P/E ratios for the two sets o f companies 
over several post-issue years. Consistent wi th the claim the results indicated that the 
P/E ratio for VC-backed IPOs is significantly higher than the ones o f non-VC-baked 
IPOs. This has led them to conclude that the market recognises and rewards the 
value o f V C monitoring even after the initial public offering. 
Mikkelson, Partch et al. (1997) examined whether the presence o f venture capitalists 
in an EPO influences investor's valuation o f companies. They found that firms 
backed by V C experience a smaller decline in operating performance from the year 
pre-IPO to the first year after the floatation. In contrast to Jain and Kini ' s study 
(1995) the authors found no evidence o f superior operating performance o f VC-
backed firms in the 3 years subsequent to the IPO. Regression analyses showed that 
the variation in operating performance after the floatation is explained mostly by the 
size and the age o f the issue. Further, in an effort to investigate whether size matter 
for the post performance o f the new issues, Mikkelson, Partch et al. (1997) split the 
sample in two size groups, measured by market capital. The results showed that the 
median o f the performance o f small size issues (measured by total asset value) is 
significantly below the performance o f a portfolio sample matched by industry in the 
post-issue. While larger issues the median performance is not significantly different 
fi-om the performance o f industry-matched firms, in post-issue. 
One should note that these kinds o f studies based on accounting information are 
susceptible to varying accounting methods and consequently the possibility o f 
accounting manipulation exists. Moreover, the authors do not mention in their work 
the gap o f time that usually exists between the publication o f the financial statements 
and the date the company is listed on the market. To illustrate this take the fol lowing 
example o f a company that was listed on the 12th o f December 2001 and assume that 
the fiscal year for this company ends on the 31 o f March 2001. One year prior to the 
issue would mean November 2000. The financial statements are published at the end 
o f the fiscal year, i.e, March 2001. So there is a time gap between March and 
November. It is diff icul t , not to say impossible, to get perfect matching because 
companies go public at different times during the year. 
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In a further attempt to shed light on the long-run undeprformance o f U.S. IPOs, 
documented in prior studies,'^ Brav and Gompers (1997) compared two disfinct 
samples o f IPOs, a venture-backed and non-venture backed. According to the 
authors, venture capital backed issues should exhibit less long-run underperformance 
in comparison to non-venture backed IPOs. They argued that venture capitalists back 
only promising and high growth companies. Moreover, venture capitalists stay on 
the board o f directors long after the IPO and may continue to provide access to 
capital that non-venture-backed companies lack. Venture capitalists have also 
contacts wi th top-tier investment and commercial bankers and may be able to attract 
high quality analysts to fol low their companies and hence reduce the information 
asymmetry between investors and firms. This may lead institutional investors, who 
are the main source o f capital for venture funds, to hold equity in firms that have 
been backed and taken public by venture capitalists. 
Another explanation put forward for the superior long-run performance o f venture 
backed IPOs, is venture capitalist concerns for their reputation. As pointed out by 
Gompers (1996) venture capitalists repeatedly bring firms public, i f they become 
associated wi th failures in the market, they may damage their reputation and ability 
to take firms public in the future. 
Several benchmarks are used in the study o f Brav and Gompers (1997) to compute 
the 5-year buy-and-hold returns for a sample o f 934 venture-backed and 3407 non-
venture backed businesses that went public between 1972 and 1992. They compared 
returns to the fol lowing benchmarks S&P 500, N A S D A Q value weighted composite 
index, NTSE/AMEX value weighted index, N Y S E / A M E X equally weighted index, 
and Fama and French (1994), industry portfolios size and book-to-market matched. 
The results show a wide difference between the two sets in terms o f equally 
weighted returns and wealth relative''' to the various benchmarks. However, value 
weighted returns do not exhibit any difference and appear similar in the samples. 
See Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
Wealth relative return is defined as ^ ( 1 + ) / X ^ b e „ c h , r ) > where R - j and Rbe„chj 
are the buy and hold return respectively on IPO / for period t and on the benchmark portfolio over the 
same period. 
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In order to gauge whether the underperformance is captured by Fama and French 
18 
(1993) 3 factors , they used the intercept fi-om the time series regressions as an 
indicator o f abnormal returns. The intercept f rom the regressions o f equal and value 
weighted venture-backed IPOs are significant, indicating that the three factors model 
cannot be rejected. With regard to non-venture backed firms, when the returns are 
weighted equally, the intercept is significantly negative indicating severe 
underperfommce. When the returns are value weighted, a smaller negative intercept 
is produced. Partitioning the non-venture backed sample on the basis o f size shows 
that underperformance occurs only wi th small issue sizes. Fama and French's model 
cannot explain the underperformance o f these small size non-venture backed firms. 
Various explanations are put forward by Brav and Gompers (1997) for the small size 
undeperformance. First, unexpected shocks may have hit small companies during the 
1980s. They jusfif ied this by the fact that returns o f IPO firms are highly correlated 
in calendar time even i f the firms go public in different years. Underperformance for 
venture-backed firms is concentrated between 1983 and 1986 and is concentrated 
from 1981 through 1987 for the non-backed firms. 
The second explanation for the underpeformance o f small, low book-to-market ratio 
firms is related to investor's sentiments. They argued that small non-backed ventures 
are more likely to be held by individuals. Individuals are more vulnerable to the 
influence o f fads or lack o f complete information. As pointed out by Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) institutional holdings o f equity after an IPO are substantially higher for 
venture-backed IPOs than non-venture-backed IPOs. 
According to Brav and Gompers (1997) small firms are more affected by 
information asymmetry because individuals spend considerably less time tracking 
returns than institutional investors do. Barry, Musceralla et al. (1990) showed that 
small non-venture-backed companies are floated on the market wi th lower tier 
underwriters than similar venture backed ones. Individual investors are also seen as a 
way that may derive util i ty from buying small size issues stocks because they value 
RMRF: the value weighted market return on all NYSE/NASDAQ (RM) minus risk free rate (RF), 
SMB (small minus big): the difference each month between the rehim on small firms and big firms, 
HML (high minus low): the difference each month between the return on portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low -book-to market stocks. 
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them as a "lottery ticket". The skewness o f returns is high for small non-venture-
baked IPOs, i f compared to either large or small venture-backed IPOs. 
From the above review o f U.S. empirical studies on long-term IPO performance, 
venture capitalists involvement appears to play a dominant role in enhancing the 
economic value o f firms that make it to the IPO stage. In short, venture capitalists 
certifications not only reduce the information asymmetries associated with going 
public, they also have positive effects on the long-run performance. Having said that 
the VC-backed companies are expected to exhibit higher long term returns than non-
VC-backed IPOs, the next hypothesis is: 
H2: In the long-run VC-companies outperform non-VC-companies 
4.4 Venture capital and firms survival 
As showed in chapter I I I , the aftermarket returns o f the initial public offerings have 
received considerable amount o f attention from academics. However, few studies 
have attempted to investigate the IPOs survivability in the aftermarket. Brown 
(1970), in analysing U.S. IPOs that went public between 1950 and 1960, reported 
that the average failure rate after 10 years going public is about 20 percent. In 
another study Jain (1999) showed that approximately a third o f IPO firms fail within 
the first five years after floatation (Khurshed (2000)). 
Unlike the above studies (Brown (1970) and Jain and K i n i (1999)) that were only 
confined to the failure rate, Hensler, Rutherford et al. (1997) took a different 
approach by investigating the relationship between IPO characteristics at floatation 
and time survival in the aftermarket. In so doing, they adopted survival analysis 
technique methodology on 741 firms that were floated on the N A S D A Q between 
1976 and 1984 and track each firm until the end o f 1992. Failure to survive is 
defined as those companies that were delisted f rom the stock exchange for negative 
reasons'^. Using the delisting codes reported in the 1992 Centre o f Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP), they found that 408 firms were delisted from the stock 
exchange for negative reasons and 333 continued to trade through 1991. As for the 
" Firms that conducted merger were excluded from the analysis. 
90 
Chapter FV Venture Capital Involvement & Influence 
IPO characteristics at the floatation that could affect the survival time in the 
aftermarket the authors posited the fol lowing hypotheses: larger size^° companies 
have higher probability o f survival than small size firms; similarly, older firms were 
also seen as having higher probability o f survivability; initial returns should be 
positively related to survivability; unlike in Ritter's study (1991), IPO activity is 
seen as not having any effect on survivability; market level is expected to have a 
negative relation with the survival time; the percentage o f insider ownership at 
floatation is expected to be positively related to the survival time; risky companies, 
measured as the number o f risk factors reported in the prospectus at floatation are 
expected to have lower survivability. Using Cox hazard methodology and estimating 
the accelerated failure time model, the results o f the regression were consistent wi th 
the authors' expectation. The survival fime for N A S D A Q IPOs increases with size, 
age, initial return, IPO activity and the percentage o f insider ownership and 
decreases with increasing number o f risk factors and market level at floatation. 
Jain and K i n i (2000) built on Hensler, Rutherford et al. (1997) and introduced to 
their model the impact o f venture capitalists. As argued at the outset o f this chapter, 
venture capitalists are active investors who provide valuable services to their 
portfolio firms through ongoing long-term commitment. Thus, the image associated 
with venture capitalists lends credibility to the portfolio firm and sends positive 
signals to respective employees, customers and suppliers regarding the ongoing 
viability o f the firm, Cornell and Shapiro (1988). Following this line o f reasoning, 
Jain and K i n i posited that the presence of venture capitalists at the floatation should 
reduce the probability o f not surviving. In the view o f the authors, there are various 
aspects o f going public that can a firm benefit f rom the venture capital involvement, 
and classify these aspects into internal and external They argued that venture capital 
could play a leading role in internal aspects (such as resource allocation, planning 
etc.) as consequence of its equity stake in the firm. As for the external aspects - such 
as underwriters, analysts' coverage- which are not controlled directly by V C but by 
the intermediaries that arrange it, could be achieved by the reputation that V C 
enjoyed in the market. This is to say the reputation that venture capitalists enjoy in 
the market w i l l help to establish a strong relationship with these intermediaries 
°^ Measured as the size of the issue 
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To conduct survival analysis, the authors used a sample o f 877 U.S. firms that went 
public during 1977-1990 and tracked each firm to the end o f 1996 to establish 
whether it is sfil l trading or not. Following Hensler, Rutherford et al. (1997) they 
define survival firms as those firms that continue to trade in stock exchange. Public 
firms that get delisted for negative reasons^' or are acquired are classified as non-
survivors. Their justification for excluding acquired firms is based on prior empirical 
findings which suggested that such kinds o f firms are typically distressed. 
Welboume and Andrews (1996) showed that, IPO firms that are acquired experience 
declining stock price performance prior to the acquisition. Wi th regard to the sample 
selection between VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs, the authors seemed to 
be neglecting to provide the readers wi th information on what basis they considered 
an IPO as backed or non-backed by venture capitalists. 
The comparison o f the survival distribution o f the two groups showed that VC-
backed IPOs have a lower rate o f failure in comparison to non-VC-backed IPOs. The 
cumulative percentage o f firms failing within the five years after floatation is 25.5 
percent and 30 percent for the VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs 
respectively. 
In an attempt to assess whether there are differences between sectors rates o f 
failures, the authors segmented their sample into six different sectors. The results 
appeared to only lend credibility to the belief that venture capitalists concentrate 
their financing in restricted number o f selected sectors. However, as pointed out by 
Khurshed (2000), it is surprising to notice that VC-backed IPOs operating in the high 
tech industries such as computer equipment have higher rate o f failure than their 
non-VC-backed IPO counterpart. 
The results o f the multivariate Cox Hazard regression indicated that the presence o f 
venture capitalists at floatation is significant and hence improve the l ife time o f the 
IPO. Similarly, factors such as research and development (R&D) intensity, analyst 
following, investment banker prestige and success in the road o f the show have 
'^ Negative reasons include insufficient capital, liquidation, bankruptcy, non-payment of fees or 
delinquent in filing, failure to meet financial guidelines to list, insufficient number of market makers, 
price fallmg below acceptable levels, and insufficient number of shareholders. 
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positive impact on survival in the aftermarket. In other words, the results showed 
that VC-backed IPOs significantly allocate higher resources to R & D expenditures, 
attract prestigious underwriters and quality analysts and do exfremely well during the 
road show in comparison to non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Most recently, Manigaret, Baeyens et al. (2002) compared the survival o f the 
Belgian venture capital backed companies wi th a sample o f companies that did not 
receive financing from venture capitalists. Unlike the above studies which rely only 
on VC-backed IPOs, Manigaret, Baeyens et al. (2002) examined all companies that 
received financing from the venture capitalists^^. In so doing, they identified 565 
companies that received financing from VCs between 1987 and 1997. Following 
prior studies, (see for example Megginson and Weiss (1991) ) , each VC-backed 
company was matched to a non-VC company according to its size and its l i fe cycle 
stage in the year before the V C investment. They define survival as those companies 
that still exist as an independent entity up to nine years after the investment. 
According to the authors not all termination events could be regarded as a negative 
outcome for a company. Merger or acquisition could be seen as a positive 
achievement for a firm. In line wi th this reasoning three types o f termination events 
were analysed separately, namely M & A , bankruptcy and sum of all negative 
events^^. Contrary to the findings o f Jain and K i n i (2000) study, the probability o f 
survival for non-VC-backed companies is higher than non-VC-backed companies. 
The cumulative survival rates are 56.25 percent and 58.27 percent respectively for 
VC-backed companies and non-VC-backed companies. The cumulative M & A event 
rate for VC-backed companies appears to be slightly lower than the non-VC-backed 
companies and these are 5.30 percent and 6.69 percent respectively. In the view o f 
the authors, this result is surprising as venture capitalists actively seek to exit through 
trade sales and acquisitions. The cumulative bankruptcy event rate for VC-backed 
companies is 19.49 percent whereas for non-VC-backed companies it is 14.84 
percent. 
The authors do not mention whether their sample includes companies that are listed on the Belgian 
stock exchange 
This includes bankruptcies, closures and lost follow-up. 
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Further, the authors conducted a multivariate regression analysis by introducing a 
VC dummy variable along with other control variables that could affect the survival 
time o f a firm. The results confirmed the univariate analysis where the presence o f 
venture capital did not appear to influence the survival time o f the company. 
Consistent wi th the expectation, companies with low cash ratios and high long term 
debt have a low survival term time. 
The findings reported by Jain and Kini ' s study (2000) appear to be contradicting the 
results reported by Manigaret, Baeyens et al. (2002). One possible explanation to the 
discrepancy in the findings could be related to the samples used in the two studies. 
The first study assessed the survival o f IPOs in the aftermarket whereas the second 
study examined the survival o f companies that received financing f rom venture 
capitalists for the period up to nine years after the investment. As discussed in 
chapter I I section 2.1 (p23) start-up and early stage companies are regarded as risky 
companies and hence one should expect that the probability o f failure to be high in 
this l i fe cycle stage. Table 1, in Manigaret, Baeyens et al. (2002, p i 10), shows that 
55 percent o f the sample are early stage financing^"* whereas 45 percent are late stage 
companies. Given this early stage proportion in the sample, one would expect high 
failure rate. It would have been helpfiil i f the study have investigated the survival 
time between early and late stage companies. Then, a direct comparison could have 
been possible to be drawn between the two studies as Jain and Kin i (2000) 
investigated only late stage companies (i.e., IPOs). 
Although the results reported above are mixed, in the context o f the broader 
literature the expectation within the thesis is that the presence o f the venture capital 
at floatation would increase the survival time o f IPOs. In addition the VC-backed 
IPOs are expected to have higher survival time probability than non-VC-backed 
IPOs. Thus, the fol lowing hypothesis is offered: 
This figure includes both start-ups and early stage companies. 
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H3: VC-backed IPOs have higher probability of survival than non-VC-backed 
IPOs. 
The hypotheses developed in this chapter w i l l be tested later on in chapter V I . 
However, it w i l l be first necessary to discuss the data selection procedures and the 
method used throughout this thesis to test the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER F I V E R E S E A R C H METHODOLOGY & 
DATA S E L E C T I O N 
As stated at the outset o f the thesis, the purpose o f this study is to contribute to a 
better understanding o f the involvement o f venture capital in initial public offerings. 
To investigate this, a scientific approach was adopted throughout the research which 
consists in formulating and testing hypothesises. According to Hollis (1994) there 
are two rivaling traditions in the social sciences: explanation and understanding. 
The tradition o f explanation has its roots in the natural sciences and when applied to 
the social sciences it represents a view on social l i fe and human affairs as belonging 
to a natural order that can be studied objectively. Researchers who subscribe to this 
reasoning are often called positivist. Positivist research belongs to the tradition o f 
explaining and rejects every fiindamental difference between the natural and the 
social sciences, Hollis (1994). According to May (1996) the scienUfic task and goal 
for this view consists in inquiring about the reasons for a phenomenon searching for 
the universally applicable over different times and conditions. In this philosophical 
thought it is often argued that i t is possible to achieve true knowledge since the 
phenomenon's existence is not connected to who is carrying out the study A 
distinction is made between researcher and the object o f research. Conforming to this 
approach all methods used are described as objective and analyses are made 
quanfitatively. May (1996). 
The other tradition in the philosophy o f social science is understanding, Hollis 
(1994) The understanding view on society, human life and social action differs 
profoundly from that o f explanation. It aims at an "interpretive" or "hermeneutic" 
social science. According to hermeneutics there is a crucial difference between 
explaining nature and understanding (interpreting) culture (May, 1996). The core 
issue in this tradition is that the social world must be understood f rom within, rather 
than explained from without", as pointed out by Hollis (1994). The hermeneufic 
researcher sees meaning in actions that come from the shared ideas and rules in 
society. They also believe that actors mean something by their actions. 
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The scientific goal and task for the hermeneutic approach is to understand a 
phenomenon's meaning. This meaning is affected by time, culture and the specific 
individuals involved. Nothing is universally applicable over time. This view marks a 
difference between the aims of social science and natural science. The hermeneutic 
view is holistic and reaHty is perceived as subjective, hence there is no true 
knowledge. In other words there is no understanding without someone who 
understands (May, 1996). 
This study uses the understanding approach, aiming at clarifying the involvement of 
venture capitalists in the initial public offerings and at shedding further light on the 
uderpricing and long-term IPO underperformance described in chapter I I I . The 
objective of the present study is not to explain these in a way that is universally true, 
but to give a current account of a phenomenon within a specific sample and in a 
certain period. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly 
describes the different methodological approaches, namely qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, and gives the justification of the approach adopted in this 
study. Section two describes the data sources and highlights the main difficulties 
faced when trying to obtain data. The hypothesises of the standard event 
methodology are discussed in the third section. Section four describes in detail the 
event method adopted in this thesis to compute and test both the initial and the long-
term returns. The final section describes the survival analyses techniques used to 
assess the probability of IPOs survival of the sample. 
5.1 Qualitative and quantitative approach 
Bryman (1992) describes two different methodological approaches that are used in 
the study of social science: the qualitative and the quantitative approach. There are 
no absolute differences between the two approaches; in particular they are not 
mutually exclusive as often researchers combine the two within a research project. 
The choice between qualitative and quantitative methods should be guided by the 
formulation of the research problem. 
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A qualitative method focuses on the researcher's perception and interpretation of the 
situation and cannot be transformed into "numbers" Bryman (1992). Qualitative data 
and methods have strengths in that they give a general view of the situation. A 
holistic picture increases understanding of social processes and contexts. 
According to Bryman (1992), a quantitative method turns information into digits and 
numbers, making it possible to analyse it statistically. The main advantage of a 
quantitative method is that it is possible to draw conclusions about a population 
based on the results of the sample. 
As described below, the secondary data used in this study is quantitative and as the 
aim is to conduct a comparative study between venture capital backed IPOs and non-
venture-capital-backed IPOs, a quantitative methodological approach has been 
adopted in the present study. 
5.2 Data sources and selection 
To test the hypotheses highlighted in the previous chapter secondary data is gathered 
from various sources. The first stage of the collection process consisted in contacting 
various institutions that are renowned for having the information needed to conduct 
the present study. The following organisations were contacted, KPMG, London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and British Venture Capital Association (BVCA). The 
subsequent databases were also used, Datastream (containing economic and financial 
data), London Share Price Database (LSPD) which is provided by London Business 
School, and FAME (containing financial information about U.K companies). The 
aim behind seeking to use different sources is to enable us to cross check, in the case 
of any discrepancies in the data, as some information is available in more than one 
source. The abovementioned organisations and databases have been used in order to 
construct the sample. Before reaching the final sample the author has been 
confronted with various obstacles regarding the data collection. The problems faced 
in the present study are mainly related to data availability and financial resource 
constraints. These problems are highlighted below as the data sources are described. 
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5.2.1 LSPD 
The LSPD was obtained from the London Business School. LSPD is a database of 
specific information on approximately 6,000 companies since January 1955. It 
contains 5 data ASCII files. To extract the data it was necessary to write a 
FORTRAN routine. The following section describes briefly the content of each file. 
5.2.1.1 Source File 
The file contains monthly share prices and share related data such as share capital, 
capital changes and dividend payments. The data is collected from a number of 
sources, including the Stock Exchange Daily Official List, the Financial Times and 
Extel's EXSHARE service. Each firm in the Source file is stored as a block. Within 
each block there are seven different sections of records: 
• General Descriptive (G records) 
• Capital Changes (C records) 
• Dividends (D records) 
• Units (U records) 
• Prices (P records) 
• Share Capital (S records) 
• Names & Stock Exchange Daily Official Code (SEDOL)" Numbers (N 
records) 
5.2.1.2 Master Index File 
The Master Index is a comprehensive index of the names of all U.K. companies 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange since 1955. Information includes all past 
names and SEDOL numbers about companies i f these have changed over the period. 
In other words it provides cross reference information which allows the user to trace 
companies which have changed their names or SEDOL numbers. 
This is a seven digit numbers used as an identifier for a security listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
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5.2.1.3 Returns File 
Returns are generated from the above-described data files. It contains records for 
each company in the Source file as well as indices in the Indices file. Each record 
contains general descriptive data on the share or index to which it refers, followed by 
a time-series of monthly log returns and an annual series of market capitalisations. 
The return is calculated as: 
r, = l n ( ( p , + d , ) / p , , ) (5.1) 
where r, is the log-return in month t, pt is the last traded price in month t, dt is the 
dividend, i f any, during month t and is the last traded price in month t-1. 
5.2.1.4 Archive File 
The Archive File provides, for each company, a monthly time series. Time series 
include those of turnover, market capital. Beta value, earnings per share, dividend 
per share, earnings per share and stock exchange industry code. 
5.2.1.5 Indices File 
The Indices File contains monthly time-series indices, which are stored as index 
values for each month together with some descriptive data such as dates, name and 
type. More precisely, it provides time series about the following types of indices: 
FTA FTSE Classified hidex, FTA Classified Dividend Yield, FTA Classified 
Earnings Yield, International Stock Exchange Index, Exchange Rate, Interest Rate, 
Economic Index and Commodity percentage Return. 
5.2.2 British Venture Capital Association 
From the BVCA two lists of companies that received financing from venture 
capitalists were obtained. The first consisted of U.K. VC-backed companies floated 
on the main London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 1992 and 1999. Whilst the 
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second list contains U.K. VC-backed companies floated on the Ahemafive 
Investment Market (AIM). The information includes name of the company and the 
names of the venture capitalists that invested in the company and are still 
shareholders at floatation (see Appendix 5, table 8-1, pi72). The most efficient way 
to cross check that the companies floated on the LSE and A I M are truly backed by 
VCs would be to obtain the prospectus at the issue of every company and hence 
ensure the validity of the data supplied from the BVCA. Due to the size of the 
sample targeted, the limitation of financial resources and the data filing of the LSE it 
was not possible to obtain the prospectus from the London Stock Exchange. As an 
alternative approach contact was made directly with the VC-backed companies, 
compiled on the list supplied by the BVCA via e-mail and telephone requesting the 
prospectus at floatation. After six-months only 20 prospectuses had been received 
from the 231 (see tables 2-2 and 2-3 p34) companies originally contacted^^. Given 
the poor response a decision was taken to stop waiting and carry on with the data 
available as explained below. 
5.2.3 New Issue Statistics 
KPMG used to publish the New Issue statistics bulletin every three months until 
1996 and thereafter every 6 months until 1998. The publication contained 
background information and overall statistics about IPOs during the quarter and is 
classified by industry. In other words it includes detailed information about every 
single IPO. The following details were included: date of issue, method of floatation, 
funds raised by shareholders, total proceeds^ ,^ percentage of equity issued, market 
capital on floatation, cost of floatation, turnover in the year before floatation, pre-tax 
profits for 3 years before floatation, book value at floatation, number of shares issued 
and issue price. New Issue statistics also provided information about sponsor, broker, 
auditor, reporting accountant and solicitors to the issue. 
*^ It should be noted that contact was made only with firms from the VC-backed sample (231 
companies) because at this stage of the research the non-VC-backed sample had not yet been 
consfructed as the aim was to obtain the final VC-backed sample before doing so. The construction of 
the non-VC-backed sample will be explained later in the next chapter. 
Total proceed is the offer price multiplied by the number of shares offered at floatation. 
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As mentioned earlier the aim was to extract the above information about U.K. IPOs 
from the New Issues Publications. To this end, KPMG was contacted directly via 
telephone and e-mail with the aim of obtaining the New Issues Statistics Publication. 
Regrettably the director of the publication, Mr Neil Austin, was unable to provide 
such information on the grounds that the New Issue is no longer being published. He 
also stated, in his letter, that back dated copies are no longer available and therefore 
KPMG was unable to help with the research. The Durham Business School librarian 
has also attempted to purchase the back dated New Issues statistics copies from 
KPMG for library use. Again, the librarian was told that back dated copies are not 
available and therefore can not be purchased. As a final attempt a visit was made to 
Newcastle KPMG branch and admission was kindly granted to use the local library. 
Only the New Issues statistics pubhshed between 1994 and 1998 were available. 
However, the following issues were missing and it was not possible to find them, 
1994 January-March issue, 1994 July-September and 1995 April-June issues. 
In an attempt to complete the missing issues contact was made directly with authors 
who mentioned KPMG New Issue Statistics as source to the data in their study. Two 
papers were identified from the U.K. literature on initial public offerings published 
respectively in the Financial Management and European Financial management 
journals. 
An e-mail together with a headed letter was sent to Professor Mario Levis, the author 
of the paper dated 1991 and titled "The long-run performance of IPOs: the U.K. 
experience 1980-1988" requesting whether it would be possible for him to discuss 
with us his data sources. Unfortunately, after two fiirther e-mails and letters, 
following the first contact, no correspondence from the author has been received. In 
the same way, contact was also made with Professor Alan Gregory, the co-author of 
the paper dated in 1999 and titled "Re-assessing the long-term underperformance of 
U.K. initial public offerings." He kindly responded to the e-mail stating that the data 
used in the paper was held with the other co-author Dr. Susanne Espenlaub and 
suggested to contact her directly. Once again, efforts were in vain, after several 
attempts to contact Dr. Susanne Espenlaub no response came. The fact of not being 
able to get hold of KPMG New Issues Stafisfics has seriously limited the research 
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endeavour, as some information contained in this publication is not available in any 
of the other sources cited earlier. 
The aim of the present study was also to gather financial information about 
companies in the sample aiming to compare the financial operating performance of 
both VC-backed EPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. It was also anticipated to conduct a 
cross-regression analysis to find possible explanations for underpricing and long-
term performance. More precisely, this required financial statements from at least 
one-year pre-IPO to 3-year subsequent to the floatation. In attempting to obtain the 
data two difficulties were encountered while downloading the statements from 
DataSfream. First, back records of financial statements of companies that are 
delisted, merged or acquired are omitted from the database after the event. The 
reason for the disappearance of companies that have conducted a merger or 
acquisition is due to the fact that these companies usually change their names and 
consequently are allocated new mnemonics within the database. To overcome this 
obstacle the Master Index file available on the LSPD database was used to trace 
these changes. 
After tracing the companies that went missing due to merger or acquisition, a further 
problem arose when trying to download financial statements from Datastream. This 
difficulty is related to data availability. Datastream provides financial statements 
only for companies which are still trading in the market. Back records for companies 
that have changed their Mnemonic for reasons such as merger or acquisition are 
truncated from the database. As an alternative, attention and effort was turned to 
FAME in the hope of gathering the missing statements. 
5.2.4 FAME 
FAME is renowned for containing information on public and private companies in 
the U.K. and Ireland including those that have been recently formed and have yet to 
file their first set of accounts. The information includes: company profile, profit and 
loss account, balance sheet and cash flow statement. 
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Similar problems were also encountered, though with less severity, using the 
database FAME. Balance sheets and cash flows of all companies are available 
however, the period of coverage of these statements differs fi^om one company to an 
other. As stated above, the target was to gather statements about each company 
starting one year before floatation and finishing 3-years after the EPO. Although in 
some cases the statements were available, it was noticed that some items Irom 
statements were missing. For instance, in order to compute the operating margin, that 
is to say, the operating income before depreciation divided by the total asset; some of 
the items needed to calculate the depreciation were missing. From the 231 VC-
backed companies available (from the BVCA) it was possible to gather complete 
information on only 42 firms. The majority of these companies were floated between 
1994 and 1996. As a consequence it was decided to abandon this route and conduct 
only stock-based performance analysis in the present study. Thus the data for this 
analysis is gathered both from the LSPD and the BVCA. 
5.3 Event study methodology 
Over the recent years event study methodology has become popular among 
researchers in the fields of management, accounting and finance. It consists of 
measuring the effect of an unanticipated event on stock prices. In other words, the 
event study method is used to determine whether there is a positive or a negative 
stock price effect associated with an event. These events can be either endogenous or 
exogenous to the firm, such as corporate illegalities, launch of a new product, 
corporate refocusing, diversification schemes, investment decisions plant closure, 
major layoffs, corporate control changes, appointment or resignation of a senior 
executive, merger or acquisition, etc. Researchers assess the effect of the event by 
analysing the price movement over a period. More precisely, they define a period of 
time over which the impact of the event wil l be assessed. This period is known as the 
event study or the window. To conduct such studies researchers are implicitly 
making the assumptions described below. 
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5.5.7 Market efficiency 
The market efficiency assumption consfitutes the theoretical basis for the 
implementation of the event study method. The assumption of market efficiency 
simply means that at any given time, security prices ftiUy reflect all available 
information. Therefore market traders are assumed to incorporate quickly any new 
relevant information available in the valuation of stock prices. The idea behind this, 
is that, information is quickly incorporated into stock prices and hence old 
information cannot be used to foretell future price movements. This also implies that 
at any time buying and selling securities does not require any specific skill, it simply 
means engaging in a game of chance. I f markets are efficient and current, it means 
that prices always reflect all information. As pointed out by Fama (1965) in an active 
market that includes many well-informed and intelligent investors, securities wi l l be 
appropriately priced and reflect all available information. I f a market is efficient, no 
information or analysis can be expected to result in outperformance of an appropriate 
benchmark. The subscribers to this reasoning consider any relevant information as an 
event. 
5.3.2 Unanticipated events 
The second assumption consists in the fact that the event is announced first on the 
media and that the market traders did not have any prior knowledge of the event. The 
resulting abnormal return is assumed to capture the reaction of the market traders to 
the event which is then translated into the subsequent change in the stock price. 
5.3.3 Confounding effects 
In this case it is assumed that there are no other confounding effects emanating from 
other events. This assumption is considered by many researchers (see for example 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997)) as the strongest assumption of the event study 
method. In other words researchers assume that the only event that can affect the 
stock prices is the one under study. This assumption may seem hard to reconcile with 
long window studies where other events could occur during the period under 
observation and could affect the stock prices. However, as pointed out by 
Mc Williams and Siegel (1997) a researcher can to some extent overcome this 
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obstacle by eliminating for instance firms that have confounding events from the 
sample, partitioning a sample by grouping firms that have experienced the same 
confounding events or by selecting companies that share the same characteristics 
(e.g., industry, size). 
The above description concerns firms that are already floated on the market. This is 
not the case of the present study where companies do not have historical stock 
prices. The event, i f any, is the presence of venture capitalists at the initial public 
offering. As mentioned in the previous chapter venture capitalists are considered as 
active investors who take a long-term view of returns in the form of capital gains. 
They provide assistance and help unquoted companies to grow and perform better. 
This is achieved through the provision of financial and business advice to venture 
managers. By doing so, managers tend to focus on long-term issues and, hence, send 
positive signals to market traders regarding the ongoing viability of the firm. On the 
other hand, as argued in chapters I I I and IV, non-venture-capital backed IPOs do not 
enjoy the same advantages of VC-backed IPOs. Venture capitalists are involved in 
the capital market and hence their reputation is at stake. Therefore market traders are 
aware of this fact and ought to believe that venture capitalists back only good 
companies. 
Thus, it becomes interesting to investigate whether investors would consider the 
involvement of venture capital in an initial public offering as an event. This is 
similar to saying that VC-backed IPOs would be regarded differently to non-VC-
backed EPOs in the market for the reasons cited above. This difference should appear 
at the time of the offering as well as in the post-IPO trading periods. To ascertain this 
statement a comparative study is conducted whereby venture capital IPOs are treated 
as the event group and non-VC-backed IPOs as the non event group. These are 
precisely the groups that wil l be considered in the next section and for which a 
comparison is made of the stock performance over two different periods. The first 
window is defined from the offering day to the first closing day at trading. Whilst the 
second is defined as the period between the end of the first month and the 36"^  
anniversary after the floatation. 
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5.4 Method 
5.4.1 Initial adjusted returns 
To test the hypotheses highlighted in chapter IV the event study method, described 
below, is adopted. First the initial market adjust return (ari) is measured; this is 
defined as the difference between the initial return (ri) and the benchmark return of 
the corresponding reference portfolio (r,„). The initial return of the firm / is computed 
as the difference between the offering price and the closing price of the first frading 
day. 
— - 1 (5.2) 
'OR ^ 
Where P, is the closing price of the first day after trading for IPO / and OPi is the 
offering price of the IPO /. Both P, and OPi were obtained from the LSPD source 
file. Pi is the equivalent of Pi on the P records whereas OPi corresponds at G29 in 
the G records. 
The corresponding market return index of EPO / is computed as follows 
' ^ > = ^ - U (5.3) lo 
where 4 is the market index value at the close of the first trading day and !„ is the 
market index value at the opening of the first day of trading for the corresponding 
IPO. The Financial Times value weighted Al l Actuaries A l l Share Index (FTA) was 
used as a benchmark to adjust for the initial return. This index was obtained directly 
from Datastream. 
Thus the adjusted initial market return can be expressed as follows 
ar, = r,-- . (5.4) 
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The argument advanced by the share allocation theories regarding the underpricing 
explanation indicates that equation (5-4) does not entirely measure the real return 
earned by an investor which consist of buying an IPO at the offering price and 
selling it at the first day closing price. It is argued that issuers underprice the IPOs in 
order to create excess demand. To achieve this, issuers wi l l ration the quantity of 
shares offered among investors rather than adjusting the issue price upward. 
Accordingly, investors are not allocated the fiill subscription. In other words, 
subscribers are getting a partial allocation from their original subscription. As 
pointed out by Keloharrju (1993) and Menyah and Inyangete (1995) in this case 
investors are bearing an extra cost for the amount tied-up in the subscription. I f 
information on the last day of subscription is available, this extra cost can be 
accounted for by subtracting the opportunity cost of the capital, relative to the part of 
the capitaP^ that has not been allocated shares from the initial return. 
5.4.2 Aftermarket returns 
Secondly, the long-run returns of IPOs are examined for a period of 36 months after 
floatation, where the first month is defined as the month following floatation. For 
instance, i f a company was floated on the market on 21^' of February, the following 
month of the long-run returns starts in March. Consequently, all IPOs in our sample 
are followed over the period of the study, i f any firm was delisted before the 36* 
armiversary the remaining after market period is truncated. 
It is worthwhile, however, before describing the method used to compute the 
abnormal returns, to point out that there is a growing concern among academics 
about the method that one should adopt when measuring long-term returns. More 
specifically, the debate is concentrated upon whether to use the cumulative average 
returns (CARs) as a measure for the long-run abnormal returns or the buy-hold-
retums (BHRs)^' as it wil l appear from this study that the two measures yield 
For the period going fi-om the last day of subscription to the date, usually this period coincides with 
the date of the first trading day. 
In this study, following (Barber and Lyon 1997), the BHRs is preferred as measure of the abnormal 
returns because the latter approximate the returns earned and experienced by an investor. As this 
method suffers from some drawbacks (biases) and for the sake of comparison the CARs was 
computed as well. CARs was selected because it is widely used in event studies as opposed to other 
methods of measurement such as the calendar-time portfolio approach (see for instance (Loughram 
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different results. The latter is the return obtained by investors as a consequence of a 
sfrategy consisting of buying stocks at the end of the first trading day and holding 
them for a period of time whereas CARs consist on summing returns over the period 
of the study. In one study Barber and Lyon (1997) argued that long-term returns 
suffer from three biases, namely new listing, rebalancing and skewness^°. Moreover, 
they showed that the degree and the magnitude of the biases depend on the method 
used to compute the long-run abnormal returns. Although, as will be discussed 
below. Barber and Lyon (1997) provided evidence that CARs are less affected by the 
abovementioned biases than BHRs, they went on to argue that they preferred the 
latter because it measures the investors' experience. This to say that the returns 
obtained by investors in the long-run are better approximated by compounding 
returns. On the other hand Fama (1998) argued that the use of CAR is better suited 
because it yields less spurious rejections of market efficiency than does BHR. 
Moreover, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argued that BHR may 
overstate the long-run abnormal performance since it can grow with the return 
horizon even when there is no abnormal return after the first period. This discussion 
suggests that the abnormal long-run IPO performances are sensitive to the 
methodology employed and hence there is no general consensus on how to measure 
the long-term abnormal returns. Finally, as both of the abovementioned methods 
present some inconveniences, in this research the long-term returns are measured 
using both the CAR and the BHR in order to compare the robustness of IPO 
performances. 
5.4.2.1 Cumulative average returns 
The CARs are calculated following the computation 
a r , = r i , -r„, , (5.5) 
where an, is the market adjusted return for the issue /' at the period t; r,, is the raw 
return for IPO / at period / and r,„, is the market benchmark return at period t. In this 
and Ritter 1995) and (Brav and Gompers 1997)) which consists of aggregating firm returns on a 
single portfolio or the wealth relative reported by Ritter (1991). 
The biases affect the significance test of the abnormal returns. The test statistic section, below, 
discusses the biases in more details. 
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study the value weighted of two market benchmarks are used namely^', the Financial 
Times value weighted A l l Actuaries Al l Share Index (FTA) and the value weighted 
Extended Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Excluding Financial Companies 
(HGSC)^^ The IPO reUims r„ are obtained from LSPD (returns file). These returns 
are taken from the Source file and are measured as the logarithmic difference 
between the last traded day of the month t and the last fraded price in month t-1 (P4, 
P records). Returns include dividend payments and are adjusted for rights and script 
issues. Following Espenlaub, Gregory et al. (2000) instead of using the logarithmic 
returns (as described in section 5.2.1.3, plOO) the exponential of the returns was 
taken. The file containing the data was inadequate for direct application of equation 
(5-5). Hence, it was necessary to develop two algorithms, a first one to extract the 
relevant data and a second one that would organise such data in a format compatible 
with spreadsheet applications. For more details see respectively Appendix 6, pi80, 
Appendix 7, pi82. 
The average market adjusted return for month t on a portfolio of n stocks is defined 
as the equally-weighted arithmetic mean and is given as 
AR,=-J^ar, (5.6) 
1=1 
Cumulative average return (CARi,) from month 1 to month T are computed using 
CAR.,=Y,AR, (5.7) 
(=0 
'^ According to (Loughran and Ritter 2000) value-weighted index is better suited than the equally-
weighted index if the mterest of the study is to quantify the change in the average wealth of the 
investor as a consequence of a certain event. 
The index value of Extended Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Excluding Financial Companies 
was obtained from Datastream. 
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5.4.2.2 Buy and hold returns 
Similarly, the buy-hold returns (BHR) from month 1 to month T is simply the buy 
and hold return of the sample firms less the return on a buy and hold of the market 
index and is given by 
BHR, = flO + ^ , v ) - l 
1=1 
r i ( i + ^ „ . ) - i 
1=1 
(5.8) 
where BHRu is the buy and hold adjusted return market for the issue i at the period t, 
Rii is the initial return for IPO / at month t and /?,„, is the corresponding market 
benchmark return at t. Since BHRu is calculated for every IPO, the average BHAR, 
for month t on a portfolio of n stocks is given as follows 
BHAR, = — BHR., 
' n, " (5.9) 
where n, is the number of firms trading at month t. 
5.4.3 Test statistics 
5.4.3.1 Initial return test for significance^^ 
To assess whether the initial adjusted market returns and the long-term abnormal 
returns are different from zero, the following standard parametric test statistics was 
computed 
" This test is reported in Chapter VI, Table 6-6. 
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^ . - ^ (3.10) 
where ar,, is the sample average of the initial adjusted market return and cr^ .^ is the 
cross-section of the sample standard deviation of the initial adjusted market return. 
Given the fact that the initial returns, in this study, are not normally distributed and 
appear to be skewed, it is also necessary to report the non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (z-test, see table 6-6 p 141), which tests the null hypothesis that the 
median abnormal return is equal to zero. 
5.4.3.2 Long-term returns test for significance 
Some studies (see for instance Barber and Lyon (1997) and Khotari and Warner 
(1997)) argued that the commonly used methods to measure the long-term 
performance influence the magnitude of abnormal returns and generate miss-
specified test statistics. As mentioned earlier. Barber and Lyon (1997) (B & L) 
argued that the statistics test suffers from the new listing, the rebalancing and the 
skewness biases. Moreover, they showed that the degree and the magnitude of the 
biases depend on the method used to compute the long-run abnormal returns. 
According to the authors the new listing bias affects mainly long-run event studies 
because companies constituting, for instance, the market index include firms that 
were listed on the post-event period whereas the sampled firms or the event sample 
does not. This is also to say that including new listings in the benchmark wil l lead to 
a downward bias. As a consequence, the tests are biased toward finding positive 
abnormal performance for sampled firms^'*. In this study, however, the new listings 
bias wi l l be different from the one described above by Barber and Lyon. As it 
considers IPOs as a context to compare the performance of companies that received 
financing from venture capitalists and ones that did not, the bias consists in the fact 
that some of the IPOs in our sample may be included in the market indices. 
In the same way, (B & L) argued that buy and hold returns are more prone to 
rebalancing bias since the compound returns of a market index are computed under 
*^ As discussed in chapter III (see, section 3.3) many empirical studies have documented that IPOs 
have poor long-term performance relative to other stocks and as a consequence (Barber and Lyon 
1997) argued that including IPOs in the benchmark portfolio will lead to downward bias since IPOs 
occur after the sampled firms (e.g., those experiencing an event) are chosen. 
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the assumption of monthly rebalancing whereas the returns from the event sample 
are compounded without rebalancing. As result of this, abnormal returns are biased 
downward. This is to say that rebalancing bias militates against the finding of 
positive abnormal performance when it is truly present. Further, (B & L) showed that 
the cumulative average returns are less affected by the rebalancing bias since the 
latter are summated rather than compounded. 
The third bias consists of the positive skewness of the long-run abnormal returns 
reported in several event studies. Skewness exposes the t-test to a severe downward 
bias which wil l lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns 
equal zero. 
The above discussion suggests that the buy and hold method suffers from new listing 
bias, rebalancing and skewness biases whereas the cumulative returns suffer mainly 
from the new listing bias while the effect of the skewness bias is less sever than for 
the BHR returns. To alleviate the biases and produce specified tests (B & L) suggest 
using the control firm approach portfolio as benchmark. It consists of matching the 
sample firms to the control firms of similar size and book-to-market ratios. To 
construct the matching sample they considered all stocks listed on the U.S. stock 
exchange and repeated the following procedure every year during the event window 
(the period of the study). First, they considered all stocks in the index that have 
market value between 70 percent and 130 percent of the market value of the event 
sample. Second, they matched all firms in the study sample to the firm with closest 
book-to-market ratio from the index group derived from the first step. Consequently, 
the authors argued that the new listing and rebalancing biases are eliminated since 
both the study sample and the confrol firm portfolio include only firms that were 
listed at the event month, and the returns are compounded. Correspondingly, the 
skewness is eliminated as the abnormal returns become reasonably symmetric when 
using a control firm approach. 
However, this study is more concerned about comparing the relative behaviour of 
VC-backed firms to non-VC-backed companies, the working assumption is that 
whatever biases there might be in comparing the VC-backed IPOs with the market 
index, these same biases wil l affect also the comparison of non-VC-backed EPOs 
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with the market portfolio. Hence, the final outcome, that is, the comparative 
understanding of the long-term performance of the two samples wil l not be 
significantly affected. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the cumulative average returns are less 
skewed and following Allen, Morkel-Kingsbury et al. (1999) the following test was 
used to test whether the cumulative average returns are different from zero, 
^CAR, ^CAR.,x{n,y'^/{{t + l)xVar + 2xtxCov)'' (5.11) 
where n, is the number of IPOs trading in month t, Var is the average cross-sectional 
variance over 36 months and Cov is the first-order auto-covariance of the AR, series. 
As mentioned above the BHRs are more severely skewed than the CARs and in 
order to correct the skewness one uses the bootstrapped-skewness-adjusted t-statistic 





S, = '-,andy, = 
^BHAR, '^I^BHAR, 
In order to compute the critical values for the (t^^ ) statistic the following procedure 
is used. First, the distribution is simulated of the by drawing b samples with 
replacement of size nb/ from the monthly original sample. Second, the skewness-
adjusted test statistics are calculated in each of these b bootstrapped resamples. More 
precisely, the bootstrap used in this study consisted of drawing 1000 bootstrapped 
resamples fi-om the monthly original sample of nb, = nt/4^ .^ In each resample the 
following statistic is computed, 
" This modified t-test was first introduced by Jonsiion (1978) and is based on Edgeworth Expansion. 
The choice of n,/4 is based on empirical analysis rather than theoretical basis. For more details (see 
Lyon and Barber, et al. 1999). 
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ti, = yf^(s:'+^f^sr+-^f:),t = 1,2,..36 
Where 
—-— ±{BHR,-BHAR,y ^^'^^^ 
^ BHAR, ^I^BHAR, 
<yBHAR the cross-sectional sample standard deviation. 
^ba,' "^f' ^* ^re the monthly bootstrapped resample analogues of , and S, 
from the original sample for b = 1,2,.... 1000 resamples. Following, Lyon, Barber et 
al. (1999) the null hypothesis that the monthly mean buy and hold return is zero is 
rejected i f 
Ka. < h ^s„. > \ • 
For every month, the critical values ( , x„ ) were obtained by sorting the monthly 
1000 simulated t-value and then searching for the cut-off points at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected at a significance level. For instance at a equal 5 percent the 
cut-off points are the 25"^  and the 975'^  t-values from the 1000 t-value generated. In 
other words the two critical values of the transformed test statistic (/„ ) were 
obtained by solving the following equation: 
Vr\t'' < x 1 = Prr^'' >x^ = — (5.14) 
To simulate and compute the above bootstrapped statistics a batch program was 
produced. For more details about the program see Appendix 8 p i 83. 
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5.5 Survival analysis techniques 
Survival analysis methodology is commonly used in the fields of engineering and 
medical sciences. Recently, this methodology has found application in economics 
and business to predict events such as bank and company failure and employee 
turnover (Jain and Kini (2000)). The advantage of the survival analysis is that it 
takes into account censored data to compute the probability that the event may occur 
in the future. In other words, survival analysis allows the examination of the 
conditional probability of failure provided that the firm has survived up to the end of 
the period of observation. In this thesis, EPOs in the sample are tracked until 
December 1999 from the LSPD database to determine whether it continues to trade 
or ceases to be quoted^''. 
Survival analysis is conducted because it is able to deal with censored data that 
represents situations where the events have not yet occurred and with time series 
data with different time horizons. The IPO market is characterised by both these 
situations. In this thesis, censored data refers to those IPOs that are still trading under 
the same SEDOL number during the period of observation. Moreover, the time 
window is different for each IPO depending on when it was floated on the market. 
For example, an EPO that went public in 1992 is tracked for seven years whereas an 
IPO that went public in 1996 is tracked for three years. 
The survival is defined as firms that continue to operate independently as public 
corporations and have not necessarily ceased to be quoted for negative reasons. As 
can be seen, in appendix 8.10 p i 88, LSPD provides a number of reasons (events) as 
to why a firm has ceased to be quoted. In the first instance, all negative events are 
classified as non survival. Secondly, as there is not a clear distinction in the literature 
whether to consider the event of a merger or acquisition, as failure. Companies that 
ceased to be quoted as the result of such events are included in the non survivor (i.e., 
they are considered as censored IPOs). 
•'^  LSPD, in the source file provides an indication of the reason why the security ceased to be quoted. 
The codes can be found in Appendix 8.10. 
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In so doing, the survival and the hazard functions are estimated. This is to say that 
the survival and risk profile of VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs are 
compared. The survival function indicates the probability that an IPO does not 
experience a negative event (liquidation, administrative receivership, quotation 
suspended, etc) before a certain point in time T. It describes the proportion of IPOs 
that survive in each successive time period. I f venture capital involvement positively 
influences the survival profile of IPO issuers, the survival function curve of VC-
backed IPOs is expected to be above that of non-VC-backed IPOs. The hazard 
function describes the risk profile of IPOs. Higher values indicate a higher risk of 
IPO failure. The hazard probability is the probability that an EPO will fail given that 
it has survived up to the current time. Hence, i f the involvement of VC lowers the 
risk of failure, the hazard function for VC-backed firms is expected to remain below 
the hazard function of non-VC-backed IPOs. 
To test whether the presence of venture capitalists and other IPO characteristics 
affect significantly the survival time of IPOs, a Cox hazard regression model is used. 
In what follows the derivation of the model is described. 
The hazard probability is the conditional probability that the IPO, floated at time t = 
0, has ceased to be listed at time / given that it has been listed before time t. Let T, be 
the number of months an IPO is listed on the London stock exchange, the hazard 
probability is 
' • ( ' • • ^ ) = ^ * ' ' - % - F ( , ; ; r ) ) <^-'5> 
where F(t; X) is the probability that an IPO with characteristics X has been delisted 
before time t and f{t;X) is the probabiHty density fiinction on T. There are several 
forms of hazard models that differ in their assumption regarding the relationship 
between the hazard rate and the covariates (independent variables). The general form 
of the hazard model is 
T{t-X)^h,{t)e'P (5.16) 
where T is the length of the frading periods measured in months; 
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/zq(0 is the baseline hazard function which describes the expected trading durations 
for the IPOs; 
^ is a vector of model parameters; 
X is a vector of independent variables (covariates), which contains a VC dummy 
variable and some control variables. 
As pointed out by Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), hazard models differ from each 
other in terms of the assumption made regarding the shape of the hazard function. 
The accelerated failure time model (AFT) is used in the present study. The latter is a 
parametric model based on a priori expectation. The main advantage of this model is 
that the effect of changes in the vector X, independent variables, on the hazard 
probability at any time t can differ according to the length of the aftermarket trading 
period (Hensler, Rutherford et al. (1997)). For instance, the impact of venture 
capitalists involvement on the survival may be greater for EPOs that have recently 
gone public than those that have been floated for some time. The AFT model can be 
written as follows: 
T{t-X)^h,{tre'P (5.17) 
where cr is an ancillary scale parameter that shapes the function. Equation (5.17) 
could also be written as 
LnTit;X) = ah,it) + XB, (5.18) 
since the failure distribution of IPOs is likely to be non-mono tonic, the following 
log-logistic baseline hazard function is selected 
where A and p are density parameters and t is the individual failure time. I f p <1, 
the log-logistic function is monotinically decreasing and vice-versa. 
The IPO literature reviewed has provided some evidence that variables such as size 
of the offering, initial return at floatation, ownership retention, investment bank 
underwriting the issue and risk of the issue could explain the long-term returns. 
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Given the data available to this thesis the following covariates (X) are used to 
estimate the Cox hazard model 
Size = measured as the market capital of IPO at floatation; 
Risk = standard deviation of the initial return at floatation; 
DVC = dummy variable indicating whether the IPO is backed by VC or not; 
LSE= dummy variable, equal 1 i f the IPO is floated on the LSE main market and 
zero otherwise. 
Ritter (1991) argued that larger offers tend to be less underperforming in the long-
run compared to that of smaller offers, and hence the size of the IPO is expected to 
have a positive impact on the survival of the firm. Empirical evidence suggests that 
riskier IPOs are more underpriced. IPOs with high standard deviation are expected to 
be riskier; risk is expected to have a negative impact on the survival profile of an 
EPO. It is a known fact that IPOs floated on the LSE main market are larger and tend 
to be older than those floated on the A I M market. Given this, it is expected that the 
LSE dummy to have a positive impact on the survival. Finally, for reasons 
mentioned throughout this thesis, the presence of VC (measured by DVC) at the 
initial public offerings is expected to affect the survival positively. 
The model parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood method. A 
positive coefficient indicates a positive impact on the survival of the IPO. In other 
words, positive coefficients indicate factors that increase the aftermarket-trading 
period and hence increase the probability of survival. 
Having discussed the data sources, the methods adopted to test the hypotheses of the 
present thesis, in what follows, in chapter V I , the description of the data together 
with the findings regarding initial returns, long-term returns and the probability of 
IPOs survival are presented. 
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DATA INTEGRITY & RESULTS 
6.1 Data description 
As stated in the previous chapter the data which was provided by the BVCA 
commences in 1992, and LSPD data is available only until December 1999; as the 
long-term returns are computed for a period of 36 months after floatation, the sample 
then ends in 1996. The initial sample is comprised of 574 IPOs (see table 6.2, pi25) 
listed on London Stock Exchange and Alternative Investment Market between 1992 
and 1996. According to the British Venture Capital Association 231 firms^^ from the 
initial sample are backed by venture capitalists. This sample excludes all transfers 
from the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), investment trusts and overseas 
companies. Financial and insurance companies such as banks, closed-end funds and 
real estate investment trust were excluded because they are considered distinct from 
other IPOs (see, Lee, Shleider et al. (1991); and Wang, Chan et al. (1992)). In order 
to be included in the sample, the IPO must be floated to the market either by 
placement or by offer for sale at fixed price and the firm conducting the EPO must 
have a SEDOL number with the London Share Price Database (LSPD). Following 
this procedure the final sample consists of 191 VC-backed companies^^. 
From the source file the following information concerning the characteristics of each 
offering were derived, the issue date (G28, in the G records), the method of 
floatation (G8, in the G records), the issue price (G29, in the G records) and the 
first day closing price (P3, in the P records), the reasons (events) of why a company 
ceased to be quoted in the LSPD database or "type of death" (GIO, in the G records) 
and the date of death ( G i l , in the G records). For more details about the subroutine 
used to extract the above data see Appendix 1, p i61. 
To derive the market capital at the end of the first month of the floatation and the 
London Stock Exchange industrial classification the Archive file was used from the 
(See tables 2.2 and 2.3) 
For full list of VC-backed IPOs included in the sample see Appendix 5, Table 8-1) 
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LSPD database. These items are coded as A4 and A l l respectively in the 
abovementioned file (see Appendix 2, pi64). 
Several empirical studies presented in the previous two chapters have documented 
that returns are affected by the size of the issue (see, for example, Drake and 
Vestsuypens (1993), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Mikkelson, Partch et al. 
(1997), etc). In these studies the size of the issue is measured by the amount of 
capital raised at the floatation (issue price times the number of shares issued) and it 
is sometimes referred to as the total proceed'* .^ Conversely, as mentioned in chapter 
III'*' many empirical studies conducted in different countries and at different periods 
of time have documented that IPOs are underpriced at floatation and the price of the 
issue tends to adjust in order to reflect the market value within the first few weeks of 
frading. Following this, it is argued that the size of the company would be better 
measured as the market capital of the ordinary share at the end of the first month of 
floatation. 
The industry to which the IPO belongs has also been seen as an empirical factor that 
could affect the abnormal returns. As mentioned by Ritter (1984) the level of returns 
tends to be clustered by industry. Later, Brav and Gompers (1997) argued that 
matching firms to industry portfolios avoids the noise of selecting individual firms 
and can control unexpected events that affect the returns of the entire sector. 
Following this argument, industry classification together with size has been 
considered whilst constructing the matching sample of firms that are not backed by 
venture capitalists in order to conduct a comparative study. Before constructing this 
sample all companies which were not named in the list supplied by the BVCA were 
classified as non-VC-backed BPOs. In so doing, the following procedures have been 
used to construct the non-VC-backed firms. 
In the first instance, a search was made for matching a non-VC-backed IPO to every 
VC-backed IPO in the sample. To consider a non-VC-backed IPO as matching to a 
*° The total proceed of the floatation is not available in the PSID and can be obtained only from 
KPMG New Issue Statistics. 
Table 3-1 
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VC-backed IPO, the former has to satisfy the following three conditions. First, the 
non-VC-backed IPO has to be floated on the stock exchange in the period between 
1992 and 1996. Second, the non-VC-backed IPO has to have the same industrial 
classification number. Third, the market capital'*^ of the matching IPO has to be 
between 70 percent and 130 percent of the VC-backed IPO. In other words, let VC-
backed IPO = Y and non-VC-backed IPO = X, then the third condition can be 
expressed as follows 
7 0 % x Y > X < Y x l 3 0 % . 
Following this procedure it was possible to match only 21 VC-backed IPOs fi-om the 
191. In other words about only 10 percent of the VC-backed sample is matched 
using the above conditions. 
Hence, in order to increase the number of matched IPOs, it was necessary to relax 
the conditions. The VC-backed sample is split into 10 market capital size groups and 
then the stock exchange industrial classification numbers of all IPOs forming each 
decile is obtained. 
The industrial classification numbers obtained from each size group are sorted and 
saved in data vectors called INDUSi (i=l,2,...,10) to be used later in the analysis. To 
carry out this procedure, an algorithm was developed taking into consideration the 
three subsequent conditions: size (measured as the market capital at the last trading 
day of the first month after floatation), industry (stock exchange industry numbers, 
INDUSj) and the time period (1992-1996). This algorithm was designed on the basis 
of the format and the content of the Archive file as described in Appendix 3, pi66. 
For instance to match IPOs in the first decile group the above conditions can be 
expressed as follows, let 
X= non-VC-backed IPO 
X M = the market capital of the non-VC-backed IPO 
Measured as the market capital at the end of the first month after the floatation. 
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X I = the industrial classification number 
XD = the date of the issue of the non-VC-backed IPO 
5' is a vector which contains the industrial classification numbers of the first decile 
group. 
Min = the minimum market capital in the first decile 
Max = the maximum market capital in the first decile 
01/06/92 >Z)a/e< 31/12/96 
SELECT X IF ( XD = Date AND Min > X M < Max AND X I = J ' ) 
The above process was repeated 10 times and every time the Min and Max was 
replaced with the corresponding market capital interval in the group decile. 
Similarly, the vector <5'was also replaced with the corresponding stock exchange 
industry classification. In short, the above describes the procedure which was 
adopted in order to construct the non-VC-backed IPO sample. 
Finally, the information concerning the characteristics of non-VC-backed IPOs was 
derived from the data available on the Source file, the issue date (G28), the method 
of floatation (G8), issue price (G29) and the first closing day price (P3), and the 
reasons, i f any, for deletion or "type of death" (GIO). To derive this data the 
subroutine described in Appendix 4, pi69 was made. 
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Table 6-1 Size distribution of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs 
Market capital £m VC-backed IPOs Non-VC-backed 
IPOs 
< 13 10.2 % 24.3 % 
> 13 < 19.4 9.7 % 11.1 % 
> 19.4 < 29 10.7 % 15.3% 
> 29 < 34 10.3 % 6.2 % 
> 34 < 42.5 9.1 % 7% 
> 42.5 < 51 10.8 % 6.9 % 
> 51 < 67.9 9.1 % 11.1 % 
> 67.9 < 98.2 8.6 % 4.9 % 
> 98.2 < 159.2 11.8% 2.1 % 
> 159.2 < 472 9.7 % 11.1 % 
Further, all the matched non-VC-backed IPOs that did not constitute true initial 
public offerings were excluded. In other words, only companies that were brought to 
the market through placement and offer for sale at fixed price procedures were 
considered. This has led the study to match only 144 IPOs"*^ . Table 6-1 shows that 
venture capital IPOs are evenly distributed over all market capital groups. This is not 
the case for non-VC-backed IPOs where 24.3 percent fall in the smallest decile. 
Moreover, 70.8 percent of non-VC-backed IPOs have a market value of less than 51 
million against 60.8 percent of VC-backed IPOs. As discussed in chapter I I (see, for 
instance, section 2.4.1, p25), this is further evidence that venture capitalists in the 
U.K. prefer to invest in late stage and established companies through, for example, 
management buy-outs and buy-ins. This also shows that the venture capital sample 
in this study is representative of its venture capital industry. The final sample 
consists of 355 IPOs of which 191 are VC-backed IPOs and 144 are not VC-backed 
IPOs. 
Table 6-2 shows the distribution of both VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs 
between 1992 and 1996. The overall percentage of IPOs included in the sample is 
about 58 percent. In 1996, about 62 percent of IPOs introduced in the market were 
For full list of non-VC-backed IPOs see Appendix 5, Table 8-2 
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included in the sample. No apparent differences were noticed, as shown in table 6-3, 
in the number of offerings each year between VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs 
Table 6-2 Distribution of VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs during 1992-
1996 
Year Total number of 
IPOs 
Number of IPOs included in the sample % included 
VC-backed IPOs Non- VC-backed IPOs Total 
1992 26* 12 12 24 92.31 
1993 118 37 25 62 52.55 
1994 175 53 39 92 52.58 
1995 75** 27 18 45 60 
1996 180** 62 50 112 62.23 
Total 574 191 144 335 58.37 
Figures from the British Venture Capital Association. These Figures exclude companies that were transferred from USM. 
Investment trusts, reverse takeovers and overseas companies are also excluded. 
* This figure includes only companies that were floated in the third and fourth quarter of the year 1992. 
••Figures include IPOs that were floated in the AIM market. 
Table 6-3 Number of VC-backed and non-VC-backed companies per year 
Year VC-backed IPOs Non-VC-backed IPOs 
1992 12 (6.28 %) 12 (8.33 %) 
1993 37 (19.37 %) 25 (17.36 %) 
1994 53 (27.74 %) 39 (27.08 %) 
1995 27(14.13 %) 18(12.50%) 
1996 62 (32.46 %) 50 (34.72 %) 
Total 191 144 
The industry classification of VC-backed and the matched non-VC-backed IPOs is 
shown in table 6-4. As can be seen, the sample is concentrated in 30 industries. A 
closer look at the table indicates that IPOs are largely concentrated on 6 industries, 
namely Computer Hardware & Services, Software, Business Support Services, 
Retailers, Pharmaceuticals and Publishing & printing. This is consistent with the 
figure provided by the British Venture Capital Association and reported in the 
second chapter (table 2-7, p46) where venture capitalist investments have shifted 
from manufacturing and industrials during the 1980s to technology companies in 
1990s. 
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Table 6-4 Sector classification of VC-backed and Matched non-VC-backed 
IPOs 
Classification Number of IPOs Percentage of IPOs 
Broadcasting Contractors 5 1.49 
Hotels 5 1.49 
Household Appliances & House-wares 5 1.49 
Electronic Equipment 6 1.79 
Healthcare 6 1.79 
House Building 6 1.79 
Media Agencies 6 1.79 
Property 6 1.79 
Telecommunications Equipment 6 1.79 
Building, Construction & Materials 7 2.09 
Plantations 7 2.09 
Distributors 8 2.39 
Food Processors & Manufacturers 8 2.39 
Medical Equipment 8 2.39 
Vehicle Components, Assemblers & Disruption 8 2.39 
Rail, Road & Freight 9 2.69 
Real 
Estate Holding 9 2.69 
Leisure 10 2.99 
Engineering 11 3.28 
Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 11 3.28 
Chemicals 12 3.58 
Electrical Equipment 12 3.58 
Paper and Packaging 13 3.88 
Pharmaceuticals 14 4.18 
Retailers 16 4.78 
Software 16 4.78 
Business Support Services 17 5.07 
Computer Hardware & Services 18 5.37 
Publishing & Printing 21 6.27 
Others 49 14.63 
Total 335 100 
Table 6-5 reports the difference in the offering characteristics of VC-backed and 
non-VC-backed IPOs. Two alternative statistics were computed in order to test 
whether the null hypothesis that the difference in the means of the two samples is 
equal to zero. First, as this study does not assume perfect matching, the following t-
test is used 
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^ ^ - ^ ^ ^ (6.1) 
where VC, NVC,5'^^, 5"^ ^^  ^re respectively the means and the variances of the 
venture capital and non venture capital sample characteristics. 
Second, the non-parametric, Mann-Whitney test, for difference between groups is 
computed. This test consists of combining the VC-backed IPO and the non-VC-
backed IPO into one set (N=N1+N2) element and ranking the new set from the 
smallest value (rank 1) to the largest. These rankings are resorted from the two 
original two samples and the sum of the rankings in each group is obtained. Then, 
the following statistic is computed. 
where refers to the smallest sum of the rankings 
Panel A shows that VC-backed IPOs have a high market capital. For instance the 
median of the VC-backed firms market capital is 42.5 million versus 27.5 million for 
non-VC-backed firms. As shown in panel B the difference in the mean offering price 
is significant at the 1 percent level using either the t-test or the nonparametric Man 
Whitney test. This to say that there is a difference in the offering size between the 
two samples and the probability that such a difference could be observed purely as a 
result of a random variation is less than 1 percent. The offering price of VC-backed 
IPOs range between 23 and 460 pence whereas it ranges between 12 and 290 pence 
for non-VC-backed IPOs. 
44 
Mann-Whitney test (U) is compared to a table of critical values based on the sample size of each 
group. If U exceeds the critical value at some significance level (usually 0.05) it means that there is 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis. 
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Table 6-5 Offering statistics of VC-baclced and non-VC-backed IPOs 
Panel A O fFering size 
Description VC-backed Non-VC -backed Difference in M ann-
MarCap at MarCap at the mcans Whitney 
floatation £M floatation £M t-stat test 
M ean 66.04 58.937 0.81 1 -3 .43** 
M edian 42.5 27.5 
M aximum 472 464 
M inimum 4 5 
Standard 
Deviation 70.10604 85.24586 
Pane l B Offering price 
Descriptio n V C-backed A'on-VC -backed Difference in Mann-
MarCap at MarCap at the mcans W hitney 
floatation £M floatation £M t-stat test 
M ean 152.6 1 18.1 4.562** -4 .795** 
M edian 144 115 
M aximum 460 290 
M inimum 23 1 2 
Standard 
Deviation 72.41 65.71 
significant at ttie 5 % level 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 Initial returns 
Over the period of the study, the VC-backed IPOs appear to be less underpriced than 
the non-VC-backed IPOs. This is consistent with the first hypothesis and the findings 
reported on U.S. studies (see for example Megginson and Weiss (1991)). Table 6-6, 
panel A (see, pl41), shows the VC-backed IPO distribufion of the initial returns, the 
market index returns and the adjusted market returns over five years. As can be seen, 
about 27 percent (53 out of 191) of VC-backed IPOs were floated on 1994. A further 
look at panel A indicates that 1994 was the least underpriced year during the period 
of the study. On the other hand, VC-backed IPOs registered the greatest underpricing 
in 1995. This is to say that an investor, on average, would have obtained a return of 
22,09 percent by buying VC-backed IPOs at the offering price and selling the stocks 
at the end of the first day of trading. In panel B, a similar, though less pronounced, 
pattern can be also seen for non-VC-backed IPOs. About 27 percent of non-VC-
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backed IPOs were introduced in the London Stock Exchange in 1994. Similarly the 
year 1995 is the most underpriced year for non-VC-backed IPOs whereby an 
investor would obtain an average return of 26.27 percent by buying at the offer price 
and selling at the trading price. 
The year 1996 could be described as a year where there was at least one hot issue 
period; many IPOs were brought to the market. According to Ritter (1991), one 
would expect investors to obtain, on average, a high initial return during this period. 
This is not the case with the sample under study where high initial returns were not 
obtained during 1996. This may be partly due to the fact that the initial returns 
reported in table 6-6 represent the average of the year. A comparison between the 
yearly adjusted returns of the two samples indicates that the initial adjusted returns 
of non-VC-backed IPOs are higher than the VC-backed EPOs over the 5 years, 
except for the year 1992. Thus apart from one year the results are in line with the 
expectation. The results reported in the year 1992 appear to be puzzling as no 
explanation could be given from the data available and the period covered in this 
study. It would be interesting to see whether this is a recurring phenomenon and 
what are its causes using studies covering grater periods of time. 
The ^-statistics, table 6-6, panel C (see, pl41) shows that the average initial adjusted 
returns for both samples over 5 years are significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting 
the rejection of the null hypothesis that the initial adjusted returns are equal to zero. 
However, an investigation of the distribution of the initial returns indicates that the 
latter are not normally distributed. As can be seen, the Kolmorgov-Simimov test of 
normality is significant for both samples suggesting that the normal distribution is 
not a good fit of the initial returns. Similarly, since the normal Q-Q plots (figures 6-1 
and 6-2, pi42) show that the initial returns are not normally distributed and they are 
not symmetric (positive skewness), the implication of the /-statistics should be 
treated with caution. Alternatively, the Wilcoxon non-parametric signed-rank test (Z-
test) is reported. Correspondingly, the non parametric test rejects the null hypothesis 
of no significant median initial adjusted return. The initial adjusted return for 191 
VC-backed IPOs is about 12 percent whereas the average initial return for 144 non-
backed IPOs is 15 percent. These results indicate, on average, the returns that an 
investor would have obtained by buying IPOs at the offer price and selling at the 
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closing price of the first day of trading. These results appear to support the prevailing 
belief that VC-backed IPOs are regarded as less risky issues with comparison to non-
VC-backed companies in the market. This is similar to saying that non-VC-backed 
IPOs need to underprice their issues more than VC-backed IPOs in order to attract 
investors. To put this in perspective, recall that the reputation hypotheses (regarding 
the underpricing phenomenon) presented in chapter I I I , section 3.1.3, p56 argued 
that when a firm sells shares for the first time its true value is imperfectly known by 
investors and therefore the issuers tend to underprice the issue in order to attract 
investor. However, i f there is a third party such as a venture capitalist, with 
reputational capital at stake backing and asserting the IPO, issuers do not need to 
underprice as much, as IPOs that are not backed by venture capitalists. One of the 
reasons why venture capitalists can fiilfil the role of the third party, as mentioned 
above, is that they are constantly present at the initial public offering market -by 
bringing companies in their portfolio to the market on an ongoing basis- and hence 
they have a strong incentive to establish a trustworthy reputation in order to retain 
access to the EPO market on favourable terms. It is in the interest of venture 
capitalists to disclose correct information at the IPO about companies that they back 
since they wil l be adversely and financially affected i f that information turns out to 
be false. Finally, it could be argued that the initial returns documented in this study 
appear to provide fbrther evidence that IPOs not backed by venture capitalist need to 
underprice more than venture capital backed IPOs in order to create demand for their 
shares. 
Segmenting the initial adjusted returns according to the market at floatation, as 
reported in Panel D (table 6-6 pl41), shows that companies that are floated on the 
A I M market need to underprice more than companies floated on the LSE main 
market irrespective of whether they are backed by venture capitalists or not. One 
possible explanation for the high underpricing of IPOs floated on the A I M market 
could be related to the fact that the requirements for the listing in this market are less 
stringent than in the LSE main market. As a consequence, investors would expect 
high underpricing since A I M IPOs are regarded as more risky than IPOs floated on 
the LSE main market. 
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6.2.2 Aftermarket returns 
Long-term returns are computed for a period of 36 months after the first month of 
the floatation for both samples (VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs). Table 6-7 
(pi43) provides summary statistics for the returns of the periods 12 months, 24 
months and 36 months after floatation for both samples. It also shows the results of 
tests about the distribution of the abnormal returns. As can be seen, buy and hold 
returns are more affected by skewness than cumulative returns. The majority of the 
buy and hold returns standardised skeweness statistics lies outside the range of -2 
and +2. Similarly, the standard Kurtosis for buy and hold returns depart from the 
above range indicating that the latter may not be normally distributed and hence the 
test for significance (t-test) is not appropriate for such data"*^ . 
6.2.2.1 Long-term returns with FTA benchmark 
Table 6-8 (pi45) reports the cumulative average returns using the FTA all shares 
index as a benchmark against 191 VC-backed IPOs and 144 non-VC-backed IPOs. 
At first glance it is apparent that VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs are 
outperforming the market benchmark in the first month after floatation. However, 
non-VC-backed IPOs are generating higher returns to investors than VC-backed 
IPOs. The abnormal return obtained by investing in non-VC-backed IPOs is 
significant at the 5 percent level for the first 3 months after floatation. Throughout 
the period of the study non-VC-backed IPOs are marginally outperforming both the 
FTA all share and the VC-backed IPOs. At the 36"^  anniversary after floatation, an 
investor would achieve a positive abnormal return by investing in non-VC-backed 
EPOs and a negative abnormal return by investing in VC-backed EPOs. 
On the other hand, computing the abnormal returns using buy and hold method 
yields a different result from the one reported above. Table 6-9 (pi46) reports the 
buy and holds long-term returns, as can be seen, these results appear to be in line 
with the hypothesis stating that VC-backed IPOs outperform the non-VC-backed 
As the significance tests in this study are reported on monthly basis rather than annually it is 
necessary to run the Kolmorgov-Smimov test for normality to check whether the monthly buy and 
hold returns have a normal distribution. Regardless of the benchmark used to adjust for the returns it 
was found that only 12 percent of the series were significant, indicating non-normality. As a 
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IPOs. Unlike the CAR returns, the buy and hold average returns at the end of the first 
month is negative for both VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. These are 
respectively -2.79 and -5.25 percent and they are statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. This may suggest that the underpricing (reported in table 6-6, pl41) 
adjusts quickly in the first weeks after the floatation. This is to say that IPO prices 
are adjusting upward reflecting the real value of the stocks after being sold at a low 
price at the time of the offering. An interesting result is that in the short run, up to 
one year after the floatation, non-VC-backed IPOs are outperforming both the 
market benchmark and the VC-backed IPOs abnormal return. However, a closer look 
at the series indicates that returns of both samples are dropping at and around the 
first year anniversary after the listing. This fall is more noticeable for VC-backed 
IPOs as their abnormal returns turn to negative values. This may be partly explained 
by the fact that this period (at and around the first year) coincides with the lock-
up/lock-in agreement expiry date documented by Espenlaub, Gregory et al. (2000) 
for U.K. IPOs. Expressed in an other way, this means that stock prices tend to fall as 
the offer of shares increases since inside shareholders can sell their stakes in the 
market. Nonetheless, it is hard to find sustainable explanations to why VC-backed 
IPOs are more affected than the non-VC-backed EPOs at and around this period''^. It 
would be interesting for fiirther studies to investigate this issue as this period could 
be the period when venture capitalists exit fi-om the investment. The market adjusted 
returns for VC-backed IPOs turn to a positive abnormal return series after the 16"^  
month after floatation. Moreover, the VC-backed IPOs are outperforming the FTA 
all share index and the non-VC-backed IPOs. This is similar to saying that investing 
equal money on buying VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs at floatation would 
yield returns of 15.42 percent and 10.16 percent respecfively at the 36"^  anniversary 
after the floatation. However, although the -^tests are adjusted for the skewness, the 
buy and hold returns are only significant in some cases at the 10 percent level from 
month 25 through to month 32. 
consequence it was preferred to use the bootstrapped adjusted skewness suggested by Lyon and 
Barber, et al. (1999). 
Similar patterns are also documented when computing the cumulative average returns (table 6-8) 
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6.2.2.2 Long-term returns with HGSC benchmark 
Tables, 6-10 and 6-11 (respecfively, pi47) report the long-term returns using Hoare 
Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) index as a market benchmark. The results are 
not different from the above abnormal returns adjusted by the FTA all share index. 
As can be seen from figures 6-3 and 6-4 (pi44) they appear to follow the same 
pattern. The CARs for VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs are respectively -1.34 
percent and 3.13 percent at the end of the 36"^  month but not statistically significant. 
The non-VC-backed IPOs are only significant at the 10 percent level for the months 
1 to 7, except month 4. Conversely, the buy and hold returns show that both samples 
are outperforming the HGSC index. Additionally, VC-backed IPOs are 
outperforming the non-VC-backed IPOs in the 3 years after floatation. 
6.2.3 Aftermarket returns segmented by market at floatation 
In order to gain further insights on the long-term returns reported in the above 
section, the following two analyses were conducted. First, companies which were 
floated on the A I M market were excluded from the computation of the long-term 
returns (i.e, only IPOs that were floated on the LSE main market were analysed). 
Second, the aftermarket returns of the VC-backed IPOs and the non-VC-backed 
IPOs floated on the A I M market were compared. From 191 VC-backed IPOs in the 
sample 24 were listed on the A I M market whereas from 144 non-VC-backed IPOs 
31 companies were floated on the A I M market. 
6.2.3.1 Aftermarket returns of IPOs floated on the LSE main market 
After excluding IPOs that were floated on the A I M market, the VC-backed sample 
consisted of 167 IPOs and the non-VC-backed sample consisted of 113 IPOs. By and 
large, excluding IPOs floated on the A I M market does not appear to affect markedly 
the long-term returns reported above (see section 6.2.2). Similarly, the significance 
tests for the long-term returns are not affected. The only difference, i f any, is that the 
aftermarket returns slightly tend towards positive values. 
The results of the long-term returns of IPOs floated on the LSE main market are 
reported in Appendix 8.11 (pi89). Table 8-8 (pi89) shows the long-term cumulative 
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returns using FT A as benchmark. Both samples, VC-backed and non-VC-backed 
IPOs, are outperforming the FTA market index during the first 6 months after 
floatation. The non-VC-backed IPOs appear to generate higher returns to investors 
than the VC-backed IPOs, and these returns are significant at the 5 percent level. 
Over the period of the study, the non-VC-backed IPOs are outperforming both the 
FTA all share and the VC-backed IPOs. Following a strategy of buying IPOs at the 
offer price at floatation and selling at the 36"^  month after floatation, an investor 
would achieve a return of 5.04 percent by investing in non-VC-backed IPOs and a 
return of 2.21 percent by investing in VC-backed IPOs. 
The long-term buy and hold returns for IPOs floated on the LSE main market are 
reported in table 8-9 (pi90). As pointed out earlier, the buy and hold method yields a 
different result from the cumulative returns. In the short run, up to one year after the 
floatation, the non-VC-backed EPOs are outperforming both the FTA market index 
and the VC-backed IPOs abnormal return. However, in the long-term, up to 36 
months after floatation, the VC-backed IPOs are outperforming the non-VC-backed 
IPOs. Thus, buying at the offering price and holding the VC-backed IPOs would 
have yielded a return of 17.83 percent. On the other hand, following the same 
sfrategy with the non-VC-backed IPOs would have yielded a return of 12.57 percent. 
These returns are slightly higher than those reported in table 6-9 (pi46), which 
include IPOs floated on the A I M market. The bootstrapped /-tests for the non-VC-
backed IPOs are significant at the 5 percent level between the third and the eight 
month; and between the fifteenth and the thirty second month; after floatation. 
Whereas, for the VC-backed IPOs, the returns are significant only between the 
twenty fifth and the thirty second month after floatation. 
The patterns reported above regarding the long-term returns are similar to those 
found using the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) index as a market 
benchmark. These aftermarket returns are reported in tables, 8-10 and 8-11 in 
Appendix 8.11, pl91 and pl92 respectively. The CARs for VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPOs are marginally outperforming the HGSC at the end of the 36 month 
after floatation. Investing £1 in EPOs backed by venture capitalists would have 
yielded about £1.028 at the end of the third year after floatafion. Equally, investing 
the same amount of money in IPOs that are not backed by venture capitalists at 
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floatation would have yielded about £1.060. On the other hand, computing the 
abnormal returns using the BHRs method and investing equal money would have 
generated a return of 18.79 percent for IPOs backed by VCs, and a return of 14.02 
percent for IPOs that are not backed by VCs, at the end of the third year after 
floatation. 
Excluding IPOs that were floated on the A I M market from the original sample 
showed that the abnormal returns tend toward positive values and are higher than the 
abnormal returns reported above (see section 6.2.2). The IPOs floated on the A I M 
market appear, in other words, to have a negative effect on the abnormal returns. 
Analysing the after market returns of IPOs floated on the A I M market needs to be 
undertaken using an appropriate benchmark. 
6.2.3.2 Aftermarket returns of IPOs floated on the AIM market 
As mentioned earlier, 24 VC-backed IPO and 31 non-VC-backed IPOs were floated 
on the A I M market, between 1995 and 1996, from the original sample of 191 and 
144 IPOs respectively. Given that the A I M market is mainly characterised by the 
presence of smaller companies than those present in the LSE main market, the Hoare 
Govett Small Companies value weighted index is used as benchmark to compute the 
long-term returns. The aftermarket returns of IPOs floated on the A I M market can be 
found in Appendix 8.12 (pl93). It should be noted, however, as the size of A I M IPO 
samples are small, the aftermarket returns together with the tests of significance 
reported should be treated with caution. As a consequence, the non parametric 
Wilcoxon test is used to test the significance of the buy and hold returns (BHRs) 
instead of the skewed adjusted bootstrapped t-test. The obvious reason for not 
computing the latter is that, as mentioned above, the size of the samples are too small 
to allow computer simulation of the critical values. 
Both the CARs and the BHRs, reported in tables 8-12 and 8-13 (pi93 and pi94), 
show that the IPOs floated on the A I M market are underperforming the HGSC index 
in the long-term. The cumulative average returns for VC-backed IPOs are positive 
only between the third and the sixth month after floatation whereas the non-VC-
backed IPOs appear to outperform the index in the period up to 12 months after 
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floatation. As for the period between one year and three year after floatation, both 
samples are underperforming the benchmark. The VC-backed EPOs are severely 
underperforming the HGSC index than the non-VC-backed IPOs. For instance, at the 
36"^  armiversary after floatation, an investor would achieve a negative abnormal 
return of 39.05 percent, by investing in VC-backed IPOs, and of 2.1 percent by 
investing in VC-backed IPOs"*^ . On the other hand, the buy and hold returns, reported 
in table 8-13 (pi94), show that an investor, at the end of the third year after 
floatation, would generate negative returns of 16.08 percent and 19.98 percent by 
investing in A I M VC-backed IPOs and AEM non-VC-backed IPOs respectively. 
Notwithstanding the fact that there are limits to the generality of the long-term A I M 
IPOs returns, reported above, due to the size and the time span of the sample, the 
results are of interest since they appear to suggest that a more severe 
underperformance of companies floated on the A I M market are underperforming the 
HGSC benchmark more than their counterpart companies floated on the main 
London stock exchange, regardless of whether these companies are backed by 
venture capitalists or are not. Thus, this is an area which can be explored further in 
fiiture studies. 
6.2.4 Survival analysis findings 
In order to test the survival hypothesis, in what follows, first, the survival and the 
hazard functions of VC-backed and non-VC-backed EPOs are estimated and 
compared. Second, as highlighted in section 5.5 (pi 16), the presence of venture 
capitalists is tested using the Cox hazard regression model. 
6.2.4.1 Univariate analyses 
As pointed out in chapter V, survival is defined as firms that continue to operate 
independently as public corporations and have not ceased to be quoted for negative 
reasons. In other words, IPOs that ceased to be quoted in the LSPD database were 
considered as non survival companies. Those EPOs which did not cease to be quoted 
As the cumulative returns are not significant, the interpretation of the abnormal returns reported in 
table 8-12 should be treated with caution. 
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are considered as censor companies. To this end, all IPOs in the sample, floated 
between 1992 and 1996, were tracked until December 1999. The investigation 
showed that 71 VC-backed DPOs conducted either merged or have been acquired, 
and 9 ceased to be quoted because they were under administration or receivership''^. 
From the 71 M & A companies, 55 have formed a new entity (company) and hence a 
new SEDOL number, whereas 16 companies have ceased to be quoted in the LSPD 
database because they were taken over by either foreign companies or by private 
companies, (i.e., companies not listed on the London stock exchange). The 
examination for the non-VC-backed IPOs showed that 39 firms have conducted a 
M&A"*^, while only 3 firms ceased to be quoted and they were either under 
administration or receivership. The examination also showed that 11 EPOs (from the 
39 EPOs) were taken over by foreign or private companies. 
Figure 6-5 (pl49) depicts the estimated survival function of VC-backed and non-
VC-backed IPOs. The non-VC-backed IPOs curve is above that of VC-backed IPOs 
over the period of observation indicating that the former have a higher survival 
profile than the latter. Accordingly, the probability of survival-i.e., not to cease to be 
quoted for negative reasons- is higher for non-VC-backed IPOs than for VC-backed 
IPOs. At the end of the observation, the cumulative survival rates are 46.92 percent 
and 44.27 percent, for non-VC-backed and VC-backed IPOs respectively^". The 
hazard function, as shown in figure 6-6 (pi49), of non-VC-backed IPOs remains 
below that of VC-backed EPOs over the period of the observation indicating that the 
risk profile of the latter is higher than that of the non-VC-backed IPOs. In short, the 
survival and the hazard functions showed that the presence of venture capitalists do 
not necessarily improve the survival and the risk profile of EPOs. 
M & A takes the code 5, administration and receivership take codes 16 and 20 in the L S P D . For 
more information on delisting codes see Appendix 8.10. 
The frequency of merger for VC-backed-IPOs appear to contradict that reported by Brav and 
Gompers (1997), on U.S. VC-backed IPOs, where merger was low and was mainly concentrated 
within the non-VC-backed IPOs sample. One possible explanation to the high merger frequency 
among U . K . VC-backed IPOs is that during the period 1994 and 1996 merger became popular in the 
market and venture capitalists may have used this opportunity to divest. The M & A event could also 
imply the exit of V C . 
The cumulative survival rate is computed using the follow-up life table. The basic idea of the life 
table is to subdivide the period of observation into month intervals. For each month, all IPOs which 
have been observed at least that long are used to calculate the probability of a terminal event 
occurring in that month. The probabilities estimated from each of the months are then used to estimate 
the overall probability of the event occurring at different time points. 
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However, as noted in Chapter V, the event of M & A could be regarded as positive 
event. Following this line of reasoning separate survival analyses are run whereby 
companies that conducted M & A are not considered as non-survival. Consistent with 
the survival resuhs reported above, figures 6-7 and 6-8 (pi50) show that the non-
VC-backed IPOs have higher survival profile and low risk profile compared with the 
VC-backed IPOs. The cumulative survival rates are 96.41 percent for the non-VC 
sample and 93.41 percent for VC-backed IPOs. 
6.2.4.2 Multivariate analyses 
The results for the log-logistic of the AFT model, described in chapter V (pi 16), are 
presented in table 6-12 (pl51). Model I refers to the results where M & A events are 
considered as non survival whereas in model I I they are excluded. DVC and LSE are 
dummy variables indicating whether the IPO is backed by VC and whether the IPO 
is floated on the London stock exchange main market. The other variables are 
control variables that may influence the probability of survival. A positive 
coefficient implies a positive impact on the survival profile of the IPO and vice-
versa. 
The presence of venture capital, in model I , appears to have a negative impact on the 
survival of the IPO, but it is only significant at the 10 percent level. As expected, 
being floated on an established and more rigid market, like the LSE main market, has 
a significant positive impact on the survival (significant at 1 percent level). The 
coefficient of the risk, measured as the standard deviation of the initial returns at 
floatation, has the right sign (i.e, negadve) and yet is not significant. Similarly, the 
size of the IPO is not significant. Excluding M & A events from non-survival did not 
appear to affect the results, as shown from the coefficients estimates in model I I . The 
only difference is that venture capital involvement is not significant as reported in 
model I . 
Contrary to the expectation, the survival analyses showed that VC-backed IPOs have 
a lower probability of survival than comparable non-VC-backed IPOs. Similar 
results were also reported by Manigaret, Baeyens et al. (2002), on the Belgian 
venture capital market. These findings, however, appear to be not consistent with 
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Jain and Kini (2000), who found a higher survival probability for U.S. VC-backed 
IPOs. One possible explanation for this difference may be the shorter time frame 
used in this thesis, this period is relatively short. Notwithstanding this limitation, the 
finding provides an interesting result which can be investigated further in future 
studies to gain a deeper understanding and allow cross comparisons. Another 
possible explanation, as pointed out by Wright and Robbie (1998) is that there is a 
difference between the definition of venture capitalist in the two countries. In the 
U.K., as discussed in chapter I I , venture capitalists tend to invest in late stage 
companies such as management buy-outs and management buy-ins. In the U.S. 
venture capitalists invest mainly in early stages while investments in late stages are 
not considered to be part of the venture capital industry. This difference may partly 
explain the disparity in the findings. 
6.3 Summary 
The results reported in this chapter are consistent with previous studies stating that 
both samples are significantly underpriced. However, VC-backed IPOs are less 
underpriced than the non-VC-backed IPOs. This finding provides further evidence to 
the suggestion that investors regard the presence of venture capitalists in a public 
offering as a form of certification that reduces the risk of the issue. This is also to say 
that the findings support the notion that venture capitalists' experience and capability 
in monitoring investments can send a vital signal to investors at the time of an IPO. 
Similar results were also reported on U.S. studies (see for example Barry, Musceralla 
et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). 
The comparison of the long-term IPOs performance of VC-backed and non-VC-
backed IPOs yielded mixed results depending on the method used to compute the 
abnormal returns. The cumulative average returns showed that venture capital IPOs 
are underperforming market portfolios whereas non-venture backed IPOs have 
relatively outperformed the market portfolios at the end of the 36"^  month after 
floatation. On the other hand, a rather contrasting result was found using the buy and 
hold method as a measure of the abnormal returns. Both venture capital and non 
venture capital IPOs appear to outperform the market portfolios. Similar results were 
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also documented by Shah (1995) and Allen, Morkel-Kingsbury et al. (1999) where 
IPOs on average outperformed the market indices. Moreover, the long-term returns 
were not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In light of the lack of 
statistical evidence on one hand and the contrasting long-run returns documented 
throughout this chapter it is hard to state that VC-backed IPOs have outperformed 
non-VC-backed IPOs, or vice versa, at the end of the 3 years after floatation. 
The long-term returns reported in this study do not appear to be underperforming the 
market benchmarks in the same magnitude as documented in previous U.K. IPO 
studies. For instance Levis (1990) examined U.K. IPOs and reported a cumulafive 
average return of -11 percent. Similarly, Espenlaub, Gregory et al. (2000) reassessed 
the U.K. long-term returns and reported, over a period of 36 months, cumulative 
returns, irrespecfive of the benchmark adopted, ranging from -15.9 percent to -28.15 
percent. 
Segmentation of the returns according to the market floatation showed that IPOs 
floated on the A I M market are more underpriced and more underperforming than 
IPOs floated on the LSE market. One could say that at the time of the offering, 
venture capitalists do add value to the offer by reducing the uncertainty documented 
in the literature. Regarding long-term performance, this study supports others (see 
among others, Brav and Gompers (1997), Fama (1998) and Espenlaub, Gregory et al. 
(2000)) and argues that long-term returns are highly sensitive to the methodology 
employed as different methods can produce astoundingly unlike results. Further 
studies are clearly necessary in order to shed more light on whether venture 
capitalists play a leading role in enhancing the long-term performance of the 
companies that they back. Finally, contrary to the expectation, the survival analyses 
showed that VC-backed IPOs have a lower probability of survival than comparable 
non-VC-backed IPOs. 
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Table 6-6 Initial returns 
between the offering price at subscription and the first trading day. Panel A and Panel B respectively show the yearly 
distribution of the initial returns. The third column shows the initial returns, the fourth shows the FTA all share returns 
whereas the fourth shows the initial adjusted maricet returns. Panel C provides the initial adjusted market returns over 
the period of the study which is measured as described in equation [5-4].The t-statistics for the initial adjusted returns is 
coinputed as described in equation [5-10], The zstatistic is based on the one sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Panel 
C also provides the Kolmorgov-Smimov test and the standard skeweness and the standard Kurtosis, which can be used 
to determine whether the returns are normally distributed. Panel D shows the initial adjusted returns for IPOs segmented 
by maricet at floatation 
Panel A: Venture Capital Initial Returns 
Year Number of IPOs 
Corresponding Initial maricet 


























Panel B: Non-Venture Capital Initial Returns 
Year Number of IPOs 
Corresponding Initial Adjusted 

















































L S E A I M 
VC-backed IPOs non-VC-backed IPOs VC-backed IPOs non-VC-backed IPOs 
167 113 24 31 
12.85% 14.32% 16.64% 17.03 
2.93** 3.25** 4.2** 5.6** 
10.12 9.78 11.19 13.45 
950** 1298** 6005** 8294 
Note : significance at the 1% level and Significance at the 5 % level. 
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Figure 6-2 Normal O-O Plot of non-VC-backed IPOs 
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Table 6-7 Summary descriptive statistics for after market returns of IPOs 
The table provides descriptive statistics of returns for 12 months, 24 months and 36 months after floatation of V C -
backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. The left side of the panels shows the cumulative abnormal returns whereas the 
right side shows the buy and hold returns. The abnormal returns are adjusted by either the FTA all share or the 
HGSC benchmarks. The table includes measures of central tendency, variability and measures of shape. 
Panel A 12 months cumulative returns and buy-and-hold-retums 
Cumulative returns Buy-and-hold returns 
VC-backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
non-VC-backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
VC-backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
non-VC-backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
Mean -0.45% -0.70% 4.07% 4.30% -0.29% 0.12% 2.49% 3.94% 
Median -0.14% -0.54% 3.76% 4.14% -6.50% -6.40% -3.61% -3.70% 
Skewness -0.8356 -0.82914 0.08796 -0.05474 3.94922 4.00631 3.11573 2.21173 
Kurtosis 0.6373 0.60139 -1.53115 -0.45093 29.6325 30.8024 2.62168 2.61214 
Minimum -4.45% -3.59% 2.73% 2.80% -11.16% -13.45% -10.13% -16.89% 
Maximum 1.72% 1.10% 5.38% 5.51% 51.99% 56.10% 22.60% 21.95% 
Panel B 24 months cumulative returns and buy-and-hold-retums 
Cumulative returns Buy-and-hold returns 
VC-backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
non-VChacked IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
VC-backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C 
non-VCbacked IPOs 























































Panel C 36 months cumulative returns and buy-and-hold-retums 
Cumulative returns 
VC-backed IPOs non-VC backed IPOs 
Buy-and-hold returns 
VC-backed IPOs non-VC backed IPOs 
F T A H G S C F T A H G S C F T A H G S C F T A H G S C 
Mean -2.60% -1.09% 2.09% 3.32% 15.43% 16.85% 10.16% 12.25% 
Median -2.39% -0.77% 2.08% 3.30% -30.51% -28.02% -27.74% -28.68% 
Skewness -0.10091 -0.2129 -0.01534 0.00394 4.36723 4.42089 2.92207 3.02824 
Kurtosis 0.38759 -0.21266 -1.25174 -0.9363 29.6707 30.0935 11.1924 11.9134 
Minimum -7.21% -5.83% 76.81% 0.52% -10.22% -12.11% -6.33% -9.93% 
Maximum 1.72% 3.71% 5.38% 6.35% 16.90% 15.93% 17.42% 5.00% 
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Figure 6-3 After market adjusted returns for the period 1992-1996 (FTA) 
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Figure 6-4 After market adjusted returns for the period 1992-1996 (HGSC) 
20 
CAR(VC) CAR(NVC) 
BHAR(VC) ^ " BHAR(NVC) 
M n n t h 
144 
Chapter V I Data integrity and results 
Table 6-8 long-term cumulative returns f F T A ) 
The table shows the results of the average market returns (ARt) and the cumulative average market adjusted returns (CARt) for 
the 36 months after floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The 
FTA value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The average returns are computed as described in equation [5-6] 
and CARs are computed as described in equation [5-7]. The t-statistic is computed as described in equation [5-11] where Var is 
the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months and Cov is the first order auto-covariance of the average ARt series. The 
Var and Cov of VC-backed IPOs are 0.020666 and 0.000119 respectively. These values are 0.024388 and 0.000198 
respectively for non-VC backed IPOs. 
VC-backed IPOs Non-VC backed IPOs 
FTA FTA 
Month Sample AR, CARt t-CAR Sample AR, CARt t-CAR 
1 191 0.4018 0.4018 0.3245 144 2.7858 2.7858 2.1407** 
2 191 0.2741 0.6759 0.0368 144 2.369 5.1549 2 yg*** 
3 191 0.6605 1.3364 0.1032 144 -0.4289 4.726 2.0855** 
4 191 0.2153 1.5517 0.3104 144 -1.2049 3.521 1.3447 
5 191 0.1671 1.7188 0.4851 144 1.8637 5.3847 1.8386* 
6 191 -1.2359 0.4829 -0.1478 144 -0.1053 5.2794 1.6451* 
7 191 -1.1624 -0.6795 -0.4011 144 -0.4125 4.867 1.4039 
8 190 -0.5493 -1.2288 -0.389 144 -1.032 3.835 1.0346 
9 190 -0.9564 -2.1852 -0.5863 143 -0.1591 3.6758 0.9316 
10 189 1.3334 -0.8518 -0.2229 143 -0.109 3.5668 0.8575 
11 189 A.2111 -2.1296 -0.6192 143 -0.1904 3.3764 0.7739 
12 186 -2.3172 -4.4467 -1.011 143 -0.6499 2.7265 0.5983 
13 186 -0.808 -5.2548 -1.1197 143 -1.7529 0.9737 0.2053 
14 185 -0.8739 -6.1286 -1.2391 142 -1.6311 -0.6575 -0.1331 
15 184 0.8431 -5.2856 -0.996 142 -0.061 -0.7185 -0.1406 
16 184 -1.9214 -7.207 -1.3657 142 0.369 -0.3495 -0.0662 
17 183 0.4459 -6.7611 -1.2353 142 1.9819 1.6324 0.2999 
18 181 -0.3688 -7.1299 -1.3231 142 1.3686 3.001 0.5357 
19 181 2.0737 -5.0562 -0.7228 142 -1.0874 1.9136 0.3325 
20 179 0.294 -4.7622 -0.5316 139 0.338 2.2516 0.3772 
21 176 -0.0494 -4.8116 -0.4751 138 1.5488 3.8004 0.6191 
22 175 0.9784 -3.8332 -0.2827 138 0.9276 4.728 0.7525 
23 173 0.5843 -3.2489 -0.1517 136 -0.519 4.209 0.6504 
24 173 -1.6055 -4.8544 -0.3178 136 -2.5269 1.6821 0.2545 
25 171 0.2879 -4.5664 -0.145 136 -1.3463 0.3358 0.0498 
26 171 2.1785 -2.3879 0.2125 136 0.2221 0.5579 0.0811 
27 169 1.6262 -0.7618 0.5581 135 2.3683 2.9262 0.4158 
28 169 0.7103 -0.0514 0.6522 134 -2.3083 0.6179 0.0859 
29 165 -0.8523 -0.9037 0.4837 133 -0.9069 -0.289 -0.0394 
30 165 -0.8439 -1.7477 0.2398 133 0.2098 -0.0792 -0.0106 
31 161 -0.3563 -2.104 0.1803 133 -0.5714 -0.6506 -0.0857 
32 159 -0.987 -3.091 -0.0427 133 -1.0066 -1.6573 -0.2147 
33 159 0.0084 -3.0826 -0.0861 133 2.9578 1.3005 0.1659 
34 159 1.7113 -1.3713 0.0755 133 -1.4007 -0.1002 -0.0126 
35 158 0.3266 -1.0447 0.0556 133 -0.2045 -0.3047 -0.0378 
36 158 -1.5882 -2.6329 -0.2016 133 1.5316 1.2269 0.1499 
*** ** * Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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Table 6-9 Long-term buy and hold returns ( F T A ) 
The table shows the results of the buy and hold average market adjusted returns (BHARt) for 36 months af^ er 
floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The FTA 
value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The buy and hold average returns is computed as 
described in equation [5-9]. The bootstrapped adjusted skewness t-test reported below is described in equation [5-
12]. The critical values at a = 5 % and at a =10% are reported in Appendix 8. 





t-test Month Sample BHAR, Sample BHAR, 
1 191 -2.7975 -2.272929519** 144 -5.253 -2.3333902** 
2 191 -0.3047 -0.268848296 144 0.4259 0.1748806 
3 191 1.1272 0.741128253 144 1.5215 0.6140818 
4 191 1.5469 0.868019375 144 1.1177 0.455678 
5 191 2.163 1.003340859 144 3.7976 1.3251006 
6 191 1.8725 0.747227859 144 5.0529 1.5779126* 
7 191 1.0485 0.393789674 144 5.4375 1.6240943** 
8 190 -0.099 0.006357089 144 3.8875 1.212076 
9 190 0.1962 0.098543029 143 4.2587 1.1702092 
10 189 2.43 0.659074128 143 4.4524 1.2112481 
11 189 2.0561 0.575570443 143 3.137 0.82836 
12 186 -0.2915 -0.017492996 143 2.4885 0.666721 
13 186 -1.2252 -0.213538673 143 2.0595 0.4906066 
14 185 0.2245 0.104051972 142 1.5347 0.3335933 
15 184 -0.2169 0.026538702 142 3.0611 0.5727051 
16 184 -1.2188 -0.132397857 142 3.2692 0.5884427 
17 183 0.1615 0.072683057 142 6.2304 1.0161511 
18 181 5.4648 0.755823963 142 1.6602 0.2794553 
19 181 4.69 0.703679651 142 9.0175 1.3024425 
20 179 7.6978 1.00694942 139 7.5809 1.0548312 
21 176 5.8921 0.7874579 138 10.7264 1.4648377* 
22 175 9.0893 1.153525315 138 13.9254 1.7870829** 
23 173 9.4897 1.23199716 136 15.6719 1.9868845** 
24 173 9.123 1.110979125 136 12.4666 1.590228* 
25 171 11.6212 1.33006923* 136 12.4408 1.4952666* 
26 171 14.3868 1.621711981* 136 13.11 1.5251104* 
27 169 13.4946 1.538882821* 135 14.7443 1.6197587** 
28 169 14.8714 1.641531126* 134 13.03 1.3628926 
29 165 11.008 1.229832148 133 14.9428 1.4432551* 
30 165 13.2441 1.373761104* 133 17.7611 1.5598166* 
31 161 15.7405 1.600641707* 133 21.2 1.7394208** 
32 159 14.7617 1.475275255* 133 18.5659 1.5595191* 
33 159 12.1922 1.203987803 133 14.4005 1.2467857 
34 159 13.5692 1.26935467 133 12.528 1.100588 
35 158 16.2429 1.397420034* 133 10.5686 0.8605646 
36 158 15.4251 1.23816746 133 10.1633 0.7661863 
Statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
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Table 6-10 Long-term cumulative returns ( H G S C ) 
The table shows the results of average market returns (ARt) and the cumulative average market adjusted returns (CARt) for 
the 36 months after floatation, excluding the initial returns for VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The Hoare 
Govett Small Companies value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The average market returns are computed as 
described in equation [5-6]. The CARs are described in equation [5-7]. The t-statistic is computed as described in equation 
[5-11] where Var is the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months and Cov is the first order auto-covariance of the 
average series. The Var and Cov of VC-backed IPOs are 0.019318 and 0.000111 respectively. These values are 0.023423 
and 0.000162 respectively for non-VC backed IPOs. 
VC-backed IPOs non VC-backed IPOs 
HGSC HGSC 
Month Sample AR, CARt t-CAR Sample AR, CARt t-CAR 
I 191 0.3263 0.3263 0.3245 144 2.7979 2.7979 2.1938** 
2 191 -0.2739 0.0524 0.0367 144 1.5922 4.39 2.4257** 
3 191 0.128 0.1804 0.1029 144 -0.4001 3.99 1.798** 
4 191 0.4464 0.6268 0.3087 144 -0.719 3.2709 1.2758 
5 191 0.4688 1.0957 0.4825 144 2.2411 5.512 1.9223* 
6 191 -1.4613 -0.3656 -0.1462 144 -0.1416 5.3704 1.7093* 
7 191 -0.7066 -1.0723 -0.3989 144 -0.013 5.3574 1.5784 
8 190 -0.0426 -1.1149 -0.3879 144 -0.6497 4.7077 1.2973 
9 190 -0.6674 -1.7823 -0.58 143 -0.4621 4.2456 1.0991 
10 189 1.0662 -0.7162 -0.2217 143 -0.3556 3.8901 0.9553 
11 189 -1.3708 -2.087 -0.6109 143 0.0998 3.9898 0.9342 
12 186 -1.501 -3.5879 -1.0055 143 0.0482 4.038 0.9052 
13 186 -0.5479 -4.1359 -1.1106 143 -1.4762 2.5618 0.5517 
14 185 -0.6268 -4.7627 -1.2256 142 -1.6254 0.9364 0.1937 
15 184 0.7889 -3.9737 -0.9878 142 0.1416 1.078 0.2154 
16 184 -1.6537 -5.6274 -1.347 142 0.0844 1.1624 0.2249 
17 183 0.3661 -5.2613 -1.2251 142 1.9752 3.1377 0.5888 
18 181 -0.5691 -5.8304 -1.3046 142 0.982 4.1197 0.7512 
19 181 2.5578 -3.2726 -0.7148 142 -0.6578 3.4618 0.6144 
20 179 0.7898 -2.4828 -0.5255 139 0.7892 4.251 0.7276 
21 176 0.1894 -2.2934 -0.4697 138 1.4974 5.7485 0.9566 
22 175 0.8927 -1.4007 -0.277 138 0.6 6.3485 1.0322 
23 173 0.6278 -0.7729 -0.149 136 -1.0577 5.2908 0.8352 
24 173 -0.881 -1.6539 -0.3094 136 -2.104 3.1868 0.4925 
25 171 0.8792 -0.7747 -0.1415 136 -1.1852 2.0016 0.3031 
26 171 1.9326 1.1578 0.2081 136 0.0606 2.0622 0.3062 
27 169 1.9594 3.1172 0.5463 135 2.7517 4.814 0.6988 
28 169 0.5928 3.71 0.6385 134 -2.1572 2.6568 0.3773 
29 165 -0.876 2.834 0.4703 133 -0.9775 1.6793 0.2335 
30 165 -1.4054 1.4285 0.2368 133 0.103 1.7823 0.2436 
31 161 -0.3228 1.1057 0.1769 133 -0.4787 1.3036 0.1753 
32 159 -1.3732 -0.2675 -0.0417 133 -0.7833 0.5203 0.0689 
33 159 -0.2806 -0.5481 -0.0842 133 2.8009 3.3212 0.4328 
34 159 1.0358 0.4877 0.0733 133 -1.3592 1.962 0.2519 
35 158 -0.122 0.3657 0.0545 133 -0.5308 1.4312 0.1811 
36 158 -1.7101 -1.3444 -0.1963 133 1.6997 3.131 0.3907 
Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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Table 6-11 Long-term buy and hold returns ( H G S C ) 
The table shows the results of the buy and hold average market adjusted returns (BHARt) for 36 months after 
floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The HGSC 
is used as benchmark. The buy and hold average returns are computed as described in equation [5-9]. The skewed 
adjusted bootstrapped t-test reported below is described in equation [5-12]. The critical values at a = 5 % and at 





Month Sample BHAR, 
bootstrapped 
t-test Sample BHAR, 
bootstrapped 
t-test 
1 191 -2.875 -2.41270051** 144 -5.2116 -2.3507888** 
2 191 -0.9457 -0.8641307 144 -0.4018 -0.2026425 
3 191 -0.1319 -0.09116701 144 0.5609 0.237594 
4 191 0.4127 0.24765153 144 0.6602 0.279454 
5 191 1.3643 0.65223831 144 3.6781 1.3142791 
6 191 0.8043 0.34018705 144 4.8414 1.5374115* 
7 191 0.4349 0.18664289 144 5.7472 1.7621861** 
8 190 -0.2636 -0.04767304 144 4.4714 1.422045 
9 190 0.2727 0.12155136 143 4.895 1.3815249 
10 189 2.069 0.58061415 143 4.7758 1.3192816 
11 189 1.4768 0.42886039 143 3.7688 1.0237298 
12 186 0.1154 0.07501611 143 3.9424 1.0763029 
13 186 -0.4398 -0.05083599 143 4.0763 0.9978404 
14 185 1.5587 0.36146649 142 3.8977 0.859417 
15 184 1.2936 0.30954984 142 5.5451 1.0796594 
16 184 0.6059 0.16720571 142 5.6859 1.0609721 
17 183 1.935 0.38322047 142 8.548 1.453213* 
18 181 9.0286 1.28047891 142 5.3873 0.9308341 
19 181 6.9583 1.07693356 142 11.3452 1.6954257* 
20 179 10.4165 1.41604542* 139 10.6283 1.5400275* 
21 176 8.9145 1.23004446 138 13.4902 1.9095756** 
22 175 11.8411 1.5557457** 138 16.2511 2.1621532** 
23 173 12.1579 1.63627779** 136 17.3042 2.2589125** 
24 173 12.9079 1.63915851** 136 14.9209 1.9659348** 
25 171 15.8103 1.89715662** 136 14.773 1.8233093** 
26 171 18.1984 2.15265862** 136 15.2626 1.8195561** 
27 169 18.0327 2.17476495** 135 17.2966 1.9528893** 
28 169 19.518 2.28593535** 134 15.7416 1.6939113* 
29 165 15.6281 1.84681376** 133 17.2412 1.7021914** 
30 165 17.2966 1.88896805** 133 19.8211 1.7826656** 
31 161 19.4592 2.059685** 133 23.5931 1.9791402** 
32 159 18.1626 1.88421185** 133 21.2472 1.8199763** 
33 159 15.2522 1.54957716* 133 17.0742 1.496259* 
34 159 15.7753 1.51144507* 133 15.2501 1.3464568 
35 158 17.6559 1.52786203* 133 13.0972 1.0692824 
36 158 16.847 1.35439609* 133 12.2532 0.9201103 
Statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
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Figure 6-7 Survival functions excluding M & A 
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Table 6-12 The log-logistic regression results 
Variables Model I Model I I 
Constant 3.5842*** 3.5841*** 
(-0.1156) (-0.12622) 
Risk -0.0002 -0.0001 
(-0.0003) (-0.0002) 
DVC -0.1605* -0.1604 
(-0.0862) (-0.0977) 
Size 5.999E-08 5.999E-08 
(-4.12E-07) (.4.44E-07) 
LSE 0.4267*** 0.4266*** 
(-0.1189) (0.131) 
Sigma 0.4126*** 0.4126*** 
(-0.0308) (-0.0567) 
Log-likelihood -305.7147 -272.0329 
*** significant at 1 percent level 
Standard deviation of coefficient estimates are between brackets 
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7CONCLUSIONS & DISCUSSION 
The objective o f this study was twofold. The first aim was to investigate the impact 
o f the involvement o f venture capitalists on the performance o f their portfolios. In 
undertaking such a task the initial public offering was chosen as a context for this 
study. Prior studies have documented that initial public offerings are underpriced and 
underperform market portfolios in the long-term. The presence o f a venture capitalist 
at the initial public offering has been regarded as empirical evidence to test the 
theories advanced to explain the IPO's phenomenon. As argued, in chapter four, 
venture capital backed IPOs are expected to be less underpriced and outperform 
reference portfolios. As such, the second objective was to shed light on both 
underpricing and aflermarket performance. 
A plethora o f reasons has been put forward by researchers to explain why venture 
capital backed IPOs should exhibit superior performance to other IPOs. The first set 
o f reasons is related to the nature o f venture capitalists and the way in which they 
operate. It is argued that venture capitalists provide much more than financing for 
their portfolio. MacMillan, Kulow et al. (1989); Fried and Hisrich (1995) and 
Sapienza, Manigrat et al. (1996) argued that the role o f venture capitalists includes 
providing business advice, monitoring, assisting venture managers in developing 
strategy and acting as a sounding board for the firm. Similarly, Bygrave and 
Timmins (1992) and Fried and Hisrich (1995) described venture capitalists as 
investors who take a long-term view o f returns in the form o f capital gains and 
thereby allow managers to focus on long-run issues more than is the case with 
alternative investors who might constantly call for short-term assessments o f 
performance. This is similar to saying that venture capitalists through their 
experience and active involvement help unquoted companies to grow and perform 
better. 
The second set o f reasons is derived f rom the first set through it is still worth 
mentioning them explicitly. These reasons are related to the perception o f market 
traders. It is argued that the latter regard the presence o f venture capitalists in a 
public offering as a form o f certification that reduces the risk o f the issue at the 
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offering and could enhance long-term performance. The risk associated with the 
offering emanates from the fact that issuers and investors have different information 
sets concerning the value o f the offering f i rm. Issuers are believed to have an 
incentive to delay the revelation o f adverse information, i f any, in order to sell shares 
at a higher price. Market traders are thought to be aware o f this incentive and as a 
consequence they w i l l offer a low average price for the offer at the floatation since 
they believe that accurate information has not been disclosed. I f , however, there is a 
third party such as a venture capitalist wi th reputational capital at stake asserting the 
issue, the risk associated with the offer w i l l be reduced. Venture capitalists bring 
companies in their portfolio to the market on an ongoing basis and hence they have a 
strong incentive to establish a trustworthy reputation. Market traders recognise this 
fact and tend to consider the companies backed by venture capitalists as less risky 
and therefore the information disclosed concerning the issue is believed to be more 
accurate. Similarly, in the aftermarket period market traders would tend to place high 
values on companies backed by venture capitalists. This market behaviour could be 
associated with the long-term perspective that venture capitalists bring to their 
investments. Expressed in an another way, this means that the image associated wi th 
venture capitalists lends credibility to the portfolio firm and sends positive signals to 
potential investors. As a consequence, it is expected that venture capital IPOs would 
outperform other reference portfolios in the long-term. 
The majority, not to say all, o f the above suggestions regarding the involvement o f 
venture capitalists in their portfolios and the subsequent expectations on the IPO 
market were derived from studies on U.S. venture capital markets. No prior study 
has examined the effect o f the presence o f venture capitalists in U.K. initial public 
offerings. Thus the aim o f this study was also to fill this gap by contributing both to 
the venture capitalists performance literature and to the initial public offering studies 
in the U.K. To establish whether the U.K. venture capitalist portfolios are regarded 
(by market traders) in a similar fashion as that described above in U.S. studies, a 
comparative study was carried out. This study compared the stock returns o f two 
distinct samples, namely venture capital backed IPOs and non-venture capital backed 
IPOs, over two different periods. In the first period the initial returns o f the two 
samples are compared. These returns are computed as the difference between the 
offering price and the closing price o f the first trading day. In the second period the 
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aftermarket returns are compared. The latter are examined for a period o f 36 months 
after floatation, where the first month is defined as the month fol lowing floatation. In 
doing so, the initial sample was comprised o f 574 IPOs listed on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) and the Alternative Investment Market ( A I M ) between 1992 and 
1996. The sample consisted o f 231 IPOs backed by venture capitalists. After 
excluding all financial companies and considering only companies that were brought 
to the market through placement or offer for sale at a fixed price, the final sample 
consisted o f 191 venture capital backed IPOs. In order to construct a matching 
sample o f non venture capital backed companies, the fol lowing procedures were 
adopted. First, all companies which were not named in the list supplied by the British 
Venture Capital Association and floated either on the LSE or the A I M between 1992 
and 1996 were classified as non-VC-backed EPOs. Second, the non venture capital 
backed IPOs were matched according to the size and the industrial classification 
number o f the venture capital backed IPOs. Unlike prior studies, in this study size is 
measured as the market capital at the end o f the first month after floatation rather 
than market capitalisation at floatation. The justification for measuring the size in 
this fashion stems fi-om the overwhelming evidence that IPOs are underpriced, as 
documented in past studies. In addition to that, it is argued that the price o f the IPO 
w i l l adjust within the first weeks subsequent to floatation, reflecting its intrinsic 
value. Consequently, it can be said that size is better captured i f measured at the end 
o f the first month after floatation. Following this procedure 141 non venture capital 
backed IPOs were matched to the venture capital sample. Thus, the final sample 
consisted o f 355 IPOs f rom which 191 were VC-backed IPOs and 144 were not V C -
backed. 
The results regarding the initial returns are consistent wi th previous studies. Both 
samples were shown to be significantly underpriced. This result implies that the 
underpricing can be regarded as a cost that issuers have to bear in order to enter the 
market regardless o f whether they are risky or not risky. A comparison between 
venture capital backed IPOs and non venture capital backed IPOs showed that the 
former are less underpriced than the latter. Expressing this numerically, over the 
period o f the study the average initial returns are respectively 12.07 percent and 
15.02 percent. This may not appear to be conclusive evidence that the presence o f 
venture capitalists in the initial public offering is regarded as a form o f certification 
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that markedly diminishes the risk associated to the issue and hence should reduce 
underprincing, however these figures do appear to be in line wi th this notion. Barry, 
Musceralla et al. (1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) found similar resuUs 
comparing samples o f venture capital and non venture capital backed companies that 
went public on the U.S. stock exchanges. 
A second interesting result appeared in this study by investigating the survival and 
risk profile o f IPOs in the aftermarket period. Contrary to the expectation, the 
survival analyses showed that VC-backed EPOs have a lower probability o f survival 
than comparable non-VC-backed EPOs. Correspondingly, the Cox hazard regression 
model did not show that the presence o f venture capitalists have a positive impact on 
the survival o f IPOs. In short, the survival analyses do not support the argument 
advanced in the literature which stipulates that venture capitalists enjoy the ability to 
influence and to guide the managing team on strategic resource allocation decisions 
that can lead to a competitive advantage and hence affect the post-IPO survival time, 
as pointed out by Jain and K i n i (2000). It should be noted, however, that the results 
concerning IPOs survival, reported in this thesis, have to be treated with caution as 
the period covered is relatively short. To achieve a conclusive result one should 
consider a much longer period. Nevertheless, the low probability survival o f VC-
backed IPOs appears to be an interesting phenomenon that can be investigated 
further in future studies to gain a deeper understanding o f its causes. 
The long-term returns computed for the period o f the 36 months fol lowing the 
floatation are not severely underperforming the market benchmarks used throughout 
this thesis. In other words, the abnormal returns o f both samples are not 
underperforming the FTSE all share and the Hoare Govett Small Companies indices. 
These returns do not lend evidence to the U.K. IPO underperformance documented 
in prior studies (see for instance Levis (1993) and Espenlaub, Gregory et al. (2000). 
As there is no general consensus about the computation o f the long-term returns, the 
latter are measured using both the cumulative average returns (CARs) and the buy 
and hold returns (BHRs). The former consisted in summing the average monthly 
returns whereas the BHRs are compounded over the period o f the study. The main 
advantage o f the BHRs is that they represent a good approximation to the returns 
earned and experienced by investor fol lowing a strategy o f buying and holding 
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stocks. On the other hand, the compounded returns are severely skewed and hence 
the conventional parametiic t-tesi can not be used to infer whether the abnormal 
returns are significantly different f rom zero. This bias does not affect the CARs in a 
similar magnitude as the returns are averaged and summed. Consistent with this, the 
central tendency tests conducted on the aftermarket returns showed clearly that the 
BHRs are more affected by the skewness than the CARs. It was therefore appropriate 
to use the skewness bootstrapped adjusted /-test proposed by Lyon, Barber et al. 
(1999) to test for the significance o f the buy and hold returns. This is a modified t-
test tailored for asymmetrical distribution based on the Edgeworth Expansion 
developed by Johnson (1978). 
A n analysis o f the aftermarket returns up to one year after the floatation indicated 
that both samples are underperforming the market portfolios regardless o f the 
method used to compute the returns. More specifically, in the period around and at 
the end o f the first anniversary after the floatation the underperformance becomes 
acute. This underperformance appears to affect more the VC-backed IPOs than the 
non-VC-backed IPOs. It is argued that this period coincides wi th the expiry date o f 
the ban for owners to sell their shares. As pointed out by Ritter and Welch (2002) at 
this point the prices fal l because more public shares become available in the market. 
This may partly explain the short-run underperformance. However, wi th the data 
available to this study it is not possible to make a sound explanation as to why V C -
backed IPOs are more affected by this underperformance in the short-run. 
The comparison o f the long-term IPO performance o f the two samples yielded mixed 
results depending on the method used to compute the abnormal returns. The 
cumulative average returns showed that venture capital IPOs are underperforming 
market portfolios whereas non-venture backed IPOs have relatively outperformed 
the market portfolios at the end o f the 36"^ month after floatation. A contrasting 
result was found using the buy and hold method as a measure o f the abnormal 
returns. Both venture capital and non venture capital backed IPOs appear to 
outperform the market portfolios. Neither the cumulative average returns nor the buy 
and hold returns are significant at the 5 percent level, albeit after adjusting for the 
skewness the latter are only significant at the 10 percent level in some periods. 
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Although there are other studies which found that IPOs are not undeperforming the 
reference portfolios in the long-term (see for example Shah (1995) and Allen ; 
Morkel-Kingsbury et al. (1999)), this is the first study which documents such a result 
in the U.K. As mentioned earlier, both samples did not show similar 
underperformance as documented in prior U.K. IPO studies. In addition to that the 
comparison o f the long-term performance o f VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed 
IPOs provided contrasting results. Based on these results it is hard to state that VC-
backed IPOs have outperformed the non-VC-backed IPOs, or vice versa, at the end 
o f the 3 years after floatation. However, the results o f the long-term returns provide 
further evidence that the abnormal returns are highly sensitive to the methodology 
employed as different methods can produce different results. 
In order to gain further insights on the long-term returns, IPOs were segmented 
according to market at floatation and abnormal returns were computed. The results 
showed that companies floated on the A I M market appear to be more 
underperforming market portfolios than companies floated on the LSE market, 
regardless whether these companies are backed or not venture capitalists. This 
finding appears to be consistent wi th the belief that smaller companies are more 
underperforming than larger companies (see for instance Ritter (1991); and Lemer 
and Gompers (1997)). 
7.1 Implication of the results and further studies 
Venture capital investment is often thought o f as risk investment in unestablished 
companies. This understanding is mainly derived from studies on the U.S. venture 
capital market. A review o f the U.K. venture capital market indicates that this 
understanding may not be entirely applicable to the British venture capital industry. 
As documented in chapter I I , venture capital investments in the U.K. appear to be 
more concentrated in late stages, more precisely in management buy-ins and 
management buy-outs where risk is low. This suggests to some extent that there is a 
difference between the two markets. The role that venture capitalists play in their 
respective portfolios documented in the literature is derived from studies that 
investigated early stage companies such as seed capital and start-ups where venture 
capital expertise is much needed and goes beyond the provision o f the financial 
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means. Thus it would be interesting for further studies to investigate the role o f 
venture capital in late stage companies as it seems likely that there is a difference 
between the involvement o f venture capitalists in these kinds o f investments 
compared to the early stage investments. In other words, early stage investments 
require a lot o f effort and time fi-om the venture capitalists and their involvement is 
crucial. Clearly, studies investigating the involvement o f venture capitalists in late 
stage companies are needed in order to cast some light on their relative impact on 
firm performance. Eventually, this w i l l certainly help understanding and gain a wider 
picture about whether the presence o f venture capitalists at the initial public offering 
matters. Although the results fi-om this study showed that the venture capital sample 
is less underpriced than the non venture capital sample, the difference is not striking. 
Similarly, the fact that venture capitalists prefer to invest in late stage companies do 
not make them distinguishable fi-om other conventional types o f finance provider 
such as banks. This is similar to saying that investors in the British markets may not 
regard the presence o f the venture capitalists in a similar fashion to that described in 
U.S. studies. 
According to the reputation hypothesis presented in chapter I I I the risk associated 
with the offer could be reduced by the presence o f a third party wi th reputational 
capital at stake asserting the issue. The reputation o f the investment bank 
underwriting the issue has also been seen as a factor that could affect the 
underpricing o f the EPOs. It would be interesting i f further studies investigated 
whether there is an interaction between the venture capitalist and the underwriter o f 
the issue. In other words it is unlikely that venture capitalists or underwriters act 
independently. For instance, it is quite possible that reputable investment bankers 
select to underwrite issues that are backed by venture capitalists. That is to say 
reputation underwriters ought to be selective in order to protect their reputation. In 
the same way, the presence o f venture capitalists could reduce the uncertainty o f the 
firm's value as well as the information asymmetry that occurs between the 
underwriters and the issuer firms. On the other hand, it could be argued that V C -
backed IPOs could be underwritten by low reputable investment banks since the 
latter may not require a prestigious investment bank to further certify the quality o f 
the issue. This implies that VC-backed IPOs could be underwritten either by a 
prestigious or low reputation investment bank. Research looking at whether there is a 
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difference between VC-backed IPOs underwritten by high and low reputation 
investment banks may shed some light on the impact o f the venture capitalists on the 
underpricing phenomenon as in this study the results do not appear to be conclusive. 
As mentioned in chapter I I , the institutional investors such as pension funds are the 
main providers o f finance to the British venture capital industry, approximately, 39 
percent o f investment in B V C A members between 1987 and 1998. As institutional 
investors are also the major investors in the stock exchange, one would expect that 
the latter would prefer to invest their money by holding IPOs backed by venture 
capitalists. Prior studies (see for instance Jain and K i n i (1994)) have documented 
that long-term IPO performance is positively related to institutional holdings. It 
would be interesting for further studies to examine the interactive effects o f venture 
capitalists and the institutional ownership on the long-term performance o f EPOs 
instead o f examining the role o f these two factors independently. 
7.2 Limitations of the study 
There are a number o f limitations associated with this study that must be 
acknowledged when evaluating the results. Fortunately, the limitations inevitably 
lead to opportunities for subsequent investigations. First the sample consists only o f 
IPOs that were floated on the market between 1992 and 1996, it may be argued that 
5 years is a short period and hence one may ask whether the results documented in 
this study would hold across different samples o f IPOs and over longer periods. As 
mentioned earlier VC-backed IPOs had low probability o f survival than non-VC-
backed IPOs. Clearly, a larger sample is needed to gain a conclusive insight on the 
survival analysis documented in this study. Furthermore, this study considered only 
companies that were floated on the London Stock Exchange. What about companies 
that did not make it to the capital market? Do they exhibit higher performance than 
the comparable non-backed companies? According to the British Venture Capital 
Association (1992) trade sale is the most common exit used by U.K. venture 
capitalists. Thus the conclusions reached from studies based on the event study 
methodology provide only a partial picture o f the venture capital performance. 
Alternative methods about performance measurement should be exploited, as the 
159 
Chapter V I I Conclusion 
stock-based approach methodology did not appear to provide a clear picture about 
whether venture capital companies are outperforming in the long-term the companies 
that did not receive backing fi-om venture capital. Neither prior studies nor this study 
controlled for confounding events that may affect the long-term VC-backed 
performance. One such important event is the exit o f venture capital from the 
company by selling the shares in the market. Further research may investigate the 
timing o f such events and consequently examine its impact on the post exit IPO 
performance. 
The interpretation o f the long-term EPO returns have sparked an intuitive question 
about whether the IPOs should be treated as a separate group from the other firms 
already floated on the market. In other words, do market traders really regard the 
newly floated companies as different from the existing trading companies? 
Assuming that this holds then how long does i t take for a so called IPO to be 
admitted to the club^' (i.e., not being considered anymore as an EPO)? These are 
fundamental questions that should be addressed in the future when assessing the 
long-term IPO performance. 
In spite o f its limitations, this study has the potential to make contributions to 
knowledge primarily because it fraversed uncharted territory. This is the first study 
that examines the impact o f the involvement and the survival o f venture capitalists in 
the U.K. IPO market. By so doing, this research has contributed to both the venture 
capital and the initial public offering literatures. It enhances the venture capital 
literature by further evaluating the value added o f venture capital involvement in EPO 
firms. It also contributed to the initial public offerings by further shedding light on 
the underpricing and the long-term IPO performance. In addition to that it 
highlighted the main difficulties that fiarther studies could overcome regarding data 
availability. Finally, it generated ideas for further investigation that may lead to 
broader understanding o f the U.K. venture capital. 




8.1 Appendix 1 VC-backed IPOs characteristics 
C T h i s program d e r i v e s the f o l l o w i n g data from the Source f i l e from 
C the LSPD the i s s u e date (G28, i n the G r e c o r d s ) , the method of 
C f l o a t a t i o n (G8,in the G r e c o r d s ) , t h e i s s u e p r i c e (G29,in the G 
C reco r d s ) and the f i r s t day c l o s i n g p r i c e C (P3, i n the P records) 
C and the reasons, i f any, f o r d e l e t i o n or "type of death 
C(G10, i n the G records) 
Q * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
C SUBROUTINE GETCOM(STR,DESC(1), DESC, CAP, DIV, U, PRI, SHCP, EPS, 
C NAM, NDESC, NCAP, NDIV, NU, NPRI, NSHCP, NEPS, NNAM,*) 
Q************************************************************** 
C ROUTINE TO READ IN A DESC(1)ANY RECandD 
C STR = TAPE INPUT STREAM 
C DESC(l) = DESC(1)ANY REFERENCE NUMBER 
C DESC = ARRAY Fand DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
C CAP= ARRAY Fand CAPITAL CHANGES 
C DIV= ARRAY Fand DIVIDENDS 
C U = ARRAY Fand UNITS 
C PRI= ARRAY Fand PRICES 
C SHCP = ARRAY Fand SHARE CAPITAL 
C EPS= EARNINGS PER SHARE 
C NAM= ARRAY Fand NAMES 
C NDESC= NUMBER OF DESCRIPTIVE RECandDS 
C NCAP = NUMBER OF CAPITAL CHANGE RECandDS 
C NDIV= NUMBER OF DIVIDENDS RECandDS 
C NU = NUMBER OF UNITS RECandDS 
C NPRI= NUMBER OF PRICES RECandDS 
C NSHCP= NUMBER OF SHARE CAPITAL RECandDS 
C NNAM = NUMBER OF NAMES RECandDS 
C * = END OF F I L E 
Q* ***** ie **************************************************** * 
C D e c l a r a t i o n 







i n t e g e r i,nu 
V 
DATA FIRST/0/,SEQ/0/ 





C Reading of the the SEDOL of VC-Backed IPOs; the SEDOL numbers 
c were obtained from the Index f i l e and s o r t e d i n "Vnumero.dat" f i l e 
do i=l,231 
read(12,*) n u v ( i ) 
enddo 
Q* ***************************************************************** * 






IF(MIN.NE.-1) GOTO 80 
C DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
READ (10,1005)(DESC(J),J=1,60) 










C SHARE CAPITAL 
IF(NSHCP.GT.0)READ(10,1010)((SHCP(I,J),1=1,2),J=1,NSHCP) 
C NAME AND SEDOL NUMBER RECandDS 
DO 60 J=1,NNAM 
IF(NNAM.GT.0)READ(10,1012) (NAM(I,J),1=1,16) 
60 CONTINUE 
Q* ********************************************************* * 
C D e r i v i n g and w r i t i n g the VC-backed IPOs c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
do i=l,231 
i f ( D E S C ( 1 ) . e q . n u v ( i ) ) then 
write(11,1250) DESC(28),DESC(1),(DESC(J),J=33,41),DESC(8) 
* ,DESC(10),DESC(29),DESC(17),PRI(4,1) 
e n d i f 
enddo 
enddo 
c l o s e ( 1 0 ) 
c l o s e ( l l ) 
******************************************************************* 
1000 FORMAT ( I 2 , I 5 , 8 I 4 ) 
1002 FORMAT (13,15,814) 
1003 FORMAT (110,13,15,814) 
1005 FORMAT (15,3I3,212,2(14,12),215,17,16/,18, 
! 3 I 3 , 6 I 4 , I 8 / , I 5 , I 3 , 2 I 6 , I 2 , 2 A 4 , 6 A 4 / , 
! 3A4,419,512/312,518,212) 
1006 FORMAT (216,212,11,16,615) 
1007 FORMAT (416,313,15,16) 
1008 FOFIMAT (16,12,16) 
1009 FORMAT (616) 
1010 FORMAT (12,18) 
1011 FORMAT (12,315) 
1012 FORMAT (214,16,12,2(12,16)/,8A4) 
1013 FORMAT (214,' ',16,' ',12,' ' , 2 ( I 2 , I 6 ) / , 8 A 4 ) 
1100 FORMAT (7112) 
1200 FORMAT (919) 





8.2 Appendix 2 Industry codes derivation 
Q * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
T h i s program d e r i v e s the market c a p i t a l (A4) of and the London took 
stock exchange i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ( A l l ) of the VC-backed POs 
from the Ar c h i v e f i l e . 
( ^ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
C D e c l a r a t i o n 
program a r c h i v e s 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(A-Y) 
DIMENSION A(ll,563839),nuv(315) 




* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Reading of the SEDOL of VC-Backed IPOs; the SEDOL numbers were 





C Reading and d e r i v i n g the data from the A r c h i v e f i l e 
do 1=1,563839 




i f ( A ( l , I ) . E Q . n u v ( k ) ) then 
WRITE(11,10001) ( A ( J , I ) , J = l , 2 ) , A ( 4 , I ) 






c l o s e ( l O ) 
c l o s e ( 1 1 ) 
1000 FORMAT (16,319,316,110,17,18,14) 






8.3 Appendix 3 Selection of non-VC-backed IPOs 
Q******************************************************************* 
T h i s program s e l e c t s the non-VC-backed companies t h a t were f l o a t e d 
i n the LSE between 1992 and 1996, according to the market c a p i t a l 
(A4) and the London st o c k s t o c k exchange i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
( A l l ) of the VC-backed IPOs from the Ar c h i v e f i l e . T h i s program i s 
f o r a pr e - d e f i n e d group ( d e c i l e ) . 
Q******************************************************************* 





i n t e g e r kount,testnvc,nvc,quar(4) 
e x t e r n a l t e s t n v c 
Q******************************************************************* 
o p e n ( u n i t = 1 0 , f i l e = ' a r 9 6 . d a t ' , s t a t u s = ' o l d ' ) 




C reading of the LSE i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the VC-backed IPOs 
C d e c i l e . T h i s i s the i n d u s t r i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n number saved i n the 






READdO, 1000) (A( j , i ) , j = l , 11) 
enddo 
Q******************************************************************* 
C F i n d the s e c t o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n number of a l l companies i n the 
database 
kount = 0 
do 1=1,46455 
i f ( A ( l , i ) .ne.Ad, I + l ) ) then 
kount = kount + 1 
sec(kount) = A(11,1) 
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num(kount) = A ( l , i ) 
e n d if 
enddo 
C S e l e c t i o n of the non-VC-backed companies according to the 
s p e c i f i e d 
C c o n d i t i o n s . t e s t n v c i s a f u n c t i o n which c o n t a i n s the VC-backed 
C IPOs SEDOL numbers.The l a s t p a r t of the s e c t i o n w r i t e s the data of 
the 
C group s e l e c t e d i n a f i l e , 
kount = 0 
do 1=1,46455 
i f ( A ( l , i ) .ne.Ad, I - l ) ) then 
kount = kount + 1 
macap(kount) = A ( 4 , i ) 
date(kount) = A ( 2 , i ) 
if(macap(kount).gt.13 .and. macap(kount).le.19.4) then 
nvc = testnvc(num(kount)) 
i f ( n v c . e q . l ) then 
write(11,10001) num(kount),date(kount), macap(kount),sec(kount) 
do j = l , q u a r ( l ) 
i f ( s e c ( k o u n t ) . e g . s e c n u m ( j ) ) then 
write(14,10001) num(kount), d a t e ( k o u n t ) , 
macap(kount),sec(kount) 
e n d i f 
enddo 
end i f 
e n d i f 
e n d i f 
enddo 
c l o s e ( 1 0 ) 
c l o s e ( 1 1 ) 
2000 FORMAT(13) 
1000 FORMAT (16,3I9,3I6,IlO,17,18,14) 
10001 FORMAT (16,4X,16,4X,19,4X,14) 
END 
C Exclude the VC-backed companies from the s e l e c t i o n 
f u n c t i o n t e s t n v c ( i ) 
i m p l i c i t none 
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i n t e g e r t e s t n v c , i 
i f ( i.ne.VCnumero.)then 
t e s t n v c = 1 
en d i f 




8.4 Appendix 4 Non-VC-backed IPOs characteristics 
Q* ***************************************************************** * 
C T h i s program d e r i v e s the f o l l o w i n g data f o r the non-VC-backed IPOs 
C from the Source f i l e . The i s s u e date (G28, i n the G r e c o r d s ) , 
C the method of f l o a t a t i o n (G8,in the G r e c o r d s ) , t h e i s s u e p r i c e 
C (G2 9,in the G records) and the f i r s t day c l o s i n g p r i c e 
C (P3, i n the P r e c o r d s ) a n d the reasons, i f any, f o r d e l e t i o n or 
C"type of death (GIO, i n the G r e c o r d s ) . The non-VC-backed IPOs were 
C s e l e c t e d from the A r c h i v e f i l e (see appendix 3 ) . The SEDOL numbers 
C of the l a t t e r were s o r t e d i n the NVC.dat to be used i n t h i s 
r o u t i n e . 
Q******************************************************************* 
* * 
C D e c l a r a t i o n 




C DIMENSION EPS(4,50) 
i n t e g e r i,nu 
V 
DATA FIRST/0/,SEQ/0/ 





C Reading of the SEDOL numbers r e t r i e v e d (see Appendix 3) 
do i=l,216 








c * NNAM 
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READ (10,1000)MIN,comp,NDESC,NCAP,NDIV,NU,NPRI,NSHC P,NEPS, 
* NNAM 
c p r i n t * , 'marker read' 
c WRITE (6,1003) 
K,MIN,DESC(1) ,NDESC,NCAP,NDIV,NU,NPRI,NSHCP,NEPS, NNAM 
IF(MIN.NE.-l) GOTO 80 
C DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
READ (10,1005)(DESC(J),J=1,60) 







IF(NPRI.GT.O) READdO, 1009) ( ( P R I ( I , J) ,1 = 1,6) , J=1,NPRI) 
C SHARE CAPITAL 
IF(NSHCP.GT.O)READ(10,1010)((SHCP(I,J),1=1,2),J=1,NSHCP) 
C NAME AND SEDOL NUMBER RECandDS 





C D e r i v i n g and w r i t i n g the non-VC-backed IPOs c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
do i=l,216 
i f ( D E S C ( l ) . e q . n u v ( i ) ) then 
write(11,12 50) DESC(28),DESC(1),(DESC(J),J=33,41),DESC(8) 
* ,DESC(10),DESC(29),DESC(17),PRI(4,1) 
e n d i f 
enddo 
enddo 
c l o s e ( 1 0 ) 




1000 FORMAT (12,15,814) 
1002 FORMAT (13,15,814) 
1003 FORMAT (110,13,15,814) 
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1005 FORMAT (15,313,2I2,2(14,12),215,17,16/,18, 
! 3 I 3 , 6 I 4 , I 8 / , I 5 , I 3 , 2 I 6 , I 2 , 2 A 4 , 6 A 4 / , 
! 3A4,419,512/312,518,212) 
1006 FORMAT ( 2 I 6 , 2 I 2 , I I , 1 6 , 6 1 5 ) 
1007 FORMAT (416,313,15,16) 
1008 FORMAT (16,12,16) 
1009 FORMAT (6I6) 
1010 FORMAT (12,18) 
1011 FORMAT (12,315) 
1012 FORMAT (2I4,16,12,2(12,16)/,8A4) 
1013 FORMAT (214,' ',16,' ',12,' ',2(12,16)/,8A4) 
1100 FORMAT (7112) 
1200 FORMAT (919) 






8.5 Appendix 5 Name of companies included in the sample 
Table 8-1 Venture capital backed IPOs 
Nb 
S E D O L 
number Company Name 
Name of the 
venture 
capitalists 
1 8720 Kenwood Appliances pic 
Household Appliances & 
Housewares 
Candover 
2 8723 Telegraph (The) pic Publishing 3i 
3 8724 British Biotech pic 




4 8725 Anglian Group pic 
Building & Construction Materials 
Candover 
5 8730 Taunton Cider p|c 
Spirits, Wines & Ciders Morgen Grenfell 
Dev Cap, HSBS 
6 8743 Linx Printing Technologies pic Electronic Equipment M T I 
7 8746 Wetherspoon (J D) pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 3i 
8 8750 Critchley Group pic 
Electrical Equipment 3i, M A M , 
Montagu private 
equity 
9 8752 Hunters Armley Group pic Printing Yorkshire fund 
10 8753 Tadpole Technology pic Computer Hardware 3i 
11 8754 National Express Group pic 
Rail, Road & Freight ECI, Natwest 
private equity 
12 8756 International Food Machinery Distributors, Others 3i 
13 8759 Motor World pic 
Vehicle Components & Assemblers 
Candover 
14 8765 Yorkshire Food Group pic 
Food Manufacturers Murray Johnstone 
Phildrew 
15 8767 David Lloyd Leisure pic 
Leisure HBS private 
equity 
16 8770 Quality Software Products pic Software 3i, Advent 
17 8772 Holliday Chemical Hldgs pic 
Chemicals, Speciality 3i, Natwest private 
equity 
18 8773 David Brown Group pic 
Engineering, Diversified Morgen Grenfell 
Dev Cap 
19 8775 Stagecoach Holdings pic 
Rail, Road & Freight Murray Johnstone 
Phildrew 
20 8779 Bruntcliffe Aggregates pic Building Materials 3i 
21 8783 Drew Scientific Grp pic Medical Equipment & Supplies Thompson Clive 
22 8790 Inveresk pic 
Paper 3i, Morgan 
grenfell, Natwest 
private equity 
23 8791 RJB Mining pic Leisure Schroder 
24 8797 Carpetright pic 
Retailers - Sofl Goods Phildrew, Natwest 
private equity 
25 8798 Anagen pic Health Care Schroder 
26 8799 Metrotect Industries pic Chemicals - Commodity 3i 
27 8801 Devro pic 
Food Processors Charterhouse, 3i, 
Advent Intl 
28 8804 Celsis International pic Medical Equipment & Supplies Granville 
29 8810 Court Cavendish Group pic Health Care KB DC 
30 8813 Quadramatic Engineering - General Granville 
31 8817 Field Group pic Packaging Cinven 
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32 8830 Axis Shield pic Medical Equipment & Supplies Apax 
33 8831 Hamlet Group pic Distributors, Others Causeway 
34 8832 Parkdean Leisure pic Leisure 3i, MPE 
35 8833 Virtuality Group pic Computer Services Apax 
36 8836 Scotia Holdings pic Pharmaceuticals Apax 
37 8837 Cantab Pharmaceuticals pic Pharmaceuticals Abingrowth 
38 8839 BSM Group pic 
Education, Business Training & 
Employment Agencies MGDC 
39 8848 Roxboro Group pic Electronic Equipment Schroder 
40 8849 Allders pic Retailers - Multi Department PPM, 3i 
41 8858 Paramount Foods pic Food Processors 3i 
42 8860 Canadian Pizza Murray Johnstone 
Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries Murray Johnstone 
Phildrew 
43 8862 Litho Supplies pic Distributors - Other 3i 
44 8864 Azlan Group pic Computer Services Cinven 
45 8865 Badgerline group Transport F&C ventures 
46 8870 Lilliput Group pic 
Furniture & Furnishings Lazards, North of 
England venture 
47 8875 Firstgroup pic Rail, Road & Freight Na private equity 
48 8883 Celltech Group pic Pharmaceuticals PPM, MPE, M A M 
49 8892 MC Donnell Info Systems 
Software Baring, 
Charterhouse 
50 8905 Slimma pic Clothing & Footwear Capital 
51 8906 Coda Group pic Computer Services Na private equity 
52 8913 Parkside International pic Paper and Packaging Capital 
53 8921 Radstone Technology pic Computer Hardware 3i, Apax. PPM 
54 8922 Finelist Group pic 
Vehicle Distribution 3i, Natwest private 
equity 
55 8923 Chiroscience Group pic Pharmaceuticals Schroder 
56 8924 Goldsborough Healthcare pic 
Health Care Natwest private 
equity 
57 8932 Midland Independent Newsppr Publishing Candover 
58 8933 Applied Distribution Group pic Transport CLDC,CVC 
59 8934 Partco Group pic Vehicle Distribution Candover 
60 8936 MDIS Group Computer Services Top technology 
61 8939 United Carriers pic Rail, Road & Freight Phildrew,Cinven 
62 8948 Domnick Hunter Group pic Engineering - General Granville 
63 8952 Inspec Group pic 
Chemicals, Speciality Advent 
International 
64 8953 Wainhomes pic House Building Cinven 
65 8955 Novara pic Retailers - Soft Goods CLDC 
66 8957 Trafficmaster pic Rail, Road & Freight Top technology 
67 8960 Unipalm Group pic Computer Services 3i 
68 8967 Properties pic Property MPE, 3i 
69 8971 Oxford Molecular Group pic 
Pharmaceuticals Baring, 
Charterhouse 
70 8973 llion Group pic 
Plantations Natwest private 
equity 
71 8979 Keller Group pic Other Construction Candover 
72 8981 GRT Bus Group pic Transport 3i 
73 8983 Hamleys pic Retailers - Hardlines LDCCVC 
74 8985 My Kinda Town p|c Leisure Facilities Apax, Cinven 
75 8986 Vymura pic Furniture & Furnishings BDCL, 3i 
76 8989 Healthcall 




77 8992 DCC pic Distributors - Other 3i 
78 8993 Speciality Shops pic Property F&C ventures 
79 8994 Nightfreight pic Rail, Road & Freight 3i 
80 8995 Norcor Holdings pic Packaging Phildrew, LDC 
81 9005 Cassell pic Publishing Schroder, PPM 
82 9006 Denby Group pic 
Household Appliances & 
Housewares 3i 
83 9009 Argent Group pic 
Property EM Warburg 
Pincus 
84 9011 Aerostructures Hamble HIdgs Engineering, Aerospace & Defence L&G, Nash Sells 
85 9013 UPF Group pic 
Vehicle Components & Assemblers Phildrew, 
LDCBDCL 
86 9014 Amey pic Business Support Services Close Investment 
87 9019 Bloomsbury Publications pic Publishing & Printing ECl 
88 9022 JBA Holdings pic Sofhvare LDC,Cinven 
89 9023 UCM Group Chemicals - Advanced Materials 3i 
90 9029 EuroDollar (Holdings) pic Transport PPM, MGDC 
91 9045 Pillar Property pic 
Real Estate Holding & 
Development Electra 
92 9046 Chamberlain Phipps Grp pic Textiles, Diversified L&G 
93 9050 Compel pic Computer Services LDC, 3i 
94 9057 Ennemix pic 
Building Materials Nash Sells & 
Partners 
95 9058 Games Workshop Group pic Home Entertainment Charterhouse, ECI 
96 9063 Filtronic pic 
Telecommunications Equipment Advent 
International, 
Apax 
97 9077 Ashbourne pic Health Care Electra, PPM 
98 9078 Focus Dynamics pic Engineering - General Hambro Group 
99 9091 Clydeport pic Shipping & Ports 31 
100 9092 RAP Group pic Distributors - Other ABN AMRO 
101 9094 RM pic Software 3i 
102 9098 MICE Group pic Business Support Services 3i 
103 9131 Zotefoams pic Chemicals - Advanced Materials 3i, PPM, CDC 
104 9135 Jazz FM pic Broadcasting Contractors APAX 
105 9147 PTS Group pic Builders Merchants FIS, F&C 
106 9149 Vision Group pic Electronic Equipment Quantum group 
107 9150 Biocompatibles Intnl pic Medical Equipment & Supplies 3i,Advent 
108 9152 Precoat International pic Steel 3i 
109 9153 Rainford Group pic Electrical Equipment Granville 
110 9157 General Cable pic Packaging 3i 
111 9163 Silk Industries pic Other Textiles & Leather Goods LDC, CVC 
112 9167 Meconic pic 
Chemicals - Speciality Natwest private 
equity 
113 9178 Kingsbury Group pic 
Retailers, Chain Store 31, PPM, 
Yorkshire fund 
114 9179 Stoves pic 
Household Appliances & 
Housewares Candover 
115 9184 Oasis Stores pic 
Retailers - Soft Goods Apax, Natwest 
private equity 
116 9188 BTG pic 
Business Support Services Cinven, NW, 
K.BDC 
117 9192 McBride pic Household Products L&G, Cinven 
118 9288 Creos International pic 




119 9296 Enterprise Inns pic 
Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries Natwest private 
equity, L&G 
120 9302 Vero Group pic Electronic Equipment Candover 
121 9305 Tom Cobleigh pic 
Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries European 
Acquisition 
Capital 
122 9314 The maiden group Media Agencies MGDC, 3i 
123 9315 Peptide Therapeutics Group pic 
Pharmaceuticals Prelude 
Technology 
124 9319 Cortworth pic 
Engineering, Diversified Natwest private 
equity 
125 9321 Wilmington Group pic Publishing & Printing Schroder 
126 9324 Gearhouse Group pic 
Business Support Services 3i, Natwest private 
equity 
127 9331 Century Inns Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries Schroder 
128 9333 Unicom International pic Engineering, Diversified Apax 
129 9334 Victrex pic Chemicals - Advanced Materials CVC, Cinven 
130 9348 Shire Pharmaceuticals Gp Pharmaceuticals 3i, Schroder 
131 9349 IOC International pic Electronic Equipment 3i 
132 9350 Streamline Holdings pic Building Materials CDC, Cinven 
133 9358 Stadium Group pic Engineering - General Electra 
134 9360 Macdonald Hotels pic 
Hotels RBDC, Dunedin 
Ventures 
135 9367 Triad Group pic Computer Services M A M 
136 9371 First Information Group pic Publishing & Printing 3i, FIS 
137 9396 Fl Group pic Computer Services Schroder 
138 9401 Cardcast pic Business Support Services MTl 
139 9404 Active imaging pic 
Distributors Of Industrial 
Components & Equipment Quester,3i 
140 9425 Vanguard Medica Group pic Pharmaceuticals 3i, Elctra 
141 9426 C A Coutts Holdings Packaging 3i 
142 9436 Luminar pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries M A M 
143 9442 Recognition Systems Group pic Software Hambro Group 
144 9444 Whitecross Group pic Healthcare 
GLE, HSBS 
venture 
145 9452 Hydro-Dynamic Products pic Chemicals - Speciality ECl ventures Ltd 
146 9454 PPL Therapeutics pic Pharmaceuticals Apax, 3i, Given 
147 9457 Richmond Foods pic Food Processors Schroder 
148 9462 City Technology Holdings pic Electronic Equipment 3i, HSBS 
149 9465 Sinclair Montrose Healthcare Other Health Care Abingworth 
150 9468 Whittard of Chelsea pic Food & Drug Retailers Granville 
151 9470 Jarvis Hotels pic 
Hotels Cavdover, Electra, 
KBDC 
152 9471 Intelligent Environments Grp 
Software MT, Legal & 
General, Natwest 
private equity 
153 9473 Vocalis Group pic 
Software Prelude 
Technology 
154 9475 Circle Communications pic Broadcasting Contractors 
Gartmore Private 
capital 
155 9477 AFA Systems pic Software Top technology 
156 9484 Belhaven Brewery Group pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries CVC 
157 9491 Allied Carpets Group pic Retailers - Soft Goods Cinven 
158 9495 Digital Animations Group pic Home Entertainment 3i 
159 9498 Plasmon pic 




160 9504 Treats group Computer Hardware 3i 
161 9502 Network Technology pic Computer Hardware 3i 
162 9512 Brunner Mond pic Chemicals, Commodity CVC 
163 9513 Shalibane pic Auto parts 3i 
164 9514 Deltron Electronics pic Plantations FIS, LDC 
165 9515 PNC Tele.com pic 
Fixed-Line Telecommunication 
Services F&C ventures 
166 9516 Cantors 
Telecommunications Equipment Natwest private 
equity 
167 9518 Airtech pic 
Telecommunications Equipment HBS private 
equity 
168 9521 Ultra Electronics pic Defence Phildrew 
169 9525 Lavendon Group pic Business Support Services Cinven 
170 9533 Beechcrofl pic House Building Quester 
171 9534 Deep-Sea Leisure pic 
Leisure Facilities N V M , Scottish 
Entreprise, 
Dunedin 
172 9536 Jardinerie Interiors Group p Business Support Services 3i 
173 9538 Britt Allcrofl pic Broadcasting Contractors M A M 
174 9540 Brands Hatch pic Leisure Facilities Apax 
175 9542 Scottish Highland Hotels pic Hotels Dunedin 
176 9543 Limelight pic Retailers - Hardlines Schroder 
177 9544 Oliver Ashworth pic 
Distributors Of Industrial 
Components & Equipment Natwest 
178 9545 Access plus 
Media Agencies Charterhouse 
Development 
179 9547 Druid Group 
Computer Services Candover, DLj 
Phoenix 
180 9548 Provend Group Business Support Services ECI, Candover 
181 9553 Charterhouse Communications Publishing & Printing Schroder 
182 9556 Car Group pic Vehicle Distribution Natwest 
183 9559 Recycling Services Group pic Environmental control 3i 
184 9563 Semple Cochrane pic Business Support Services 3i 
185 9564 Cadcentre Group pic Software 3i 
186 9566 Parkwood Holdings Business Support Services 3i 
187 9569 Kier Group Other Construction Electra 
188 9578 Crown Leisure pic Gaming Natwest 
189 9579 Fountain Forestry Hldgs pic 
Business Support Services Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
190 9580 Linden pic House Building 3i ,MAM 
191 9581 Xenova Group pic Pharmaceuticals Schroder 
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Table 8-2 Non Venture Capital Backed IPOs 
Nb SEDOL number Company Name Sector of Activity 
1 8700 Rosebys pic Retailers - Soft Goods 
2 8706 Avonside Group pic House Building 
3 8707 Forth Ports pic Shipping & Ports 
4 8708 British Data Management pic Business Support Services 
5 8714 Hughes (TJ) pic Retailers - Multi Department 
6 8715 Slug & Lettuce Group pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 
7 8716 Industrial Control Services Grp Electrical Equipment 
8 8718 Vega Group pic Computer Services 
9 8719 Country Casuals Hldgs pic Retailers, Chain Store 
10 8728 Quality Care Homes pic 
11 8742 Dennis Group pic Vehicle Components & Assemblers 
12 8757 OIS International Inspection Business Support Services 
13 8771 Full Circle Industries pic Construction Materials 
14 8781 Division Group pic Software 
15 8782 Capital Bars pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 
16 8785 RPC Group pic Packaging 
17 8786 Phonelink pic Publishing & Printing 
18 8793 AG Holdings pic Paper and Packaging 
19 8800 Environmed pic Medical Equipment & Supplies 
20 8803 Business Post Group pic Business Support Services 
21 8829 VHE Holdings pic Other Construction 
22 8844 Crest Packaging pic Paper and Packaging 
23 8847 Abacus Polar pic Plantations 
24 8853 Dorling Kindersley Hldgs pic Publishing 
25 8855 Roxboro Group Electronic Equipment 
26 8857 Cleveland pic Estate Holding & Development 
27 8861 LITHO SUPPLIES Distributors - Other 
28 8863 WYEVALE GARDEN CENTRES Retailers - Hardlines 
29 8866 DPS Furniture pic Retailers - Hardlines 
30 8869 Northern Leisure Leisure Facilities 
31 8871 Ruberoid pic Building & Construction Materials 
32 8872 Biotrace International pic Medical Equipment & Supplies 
33 8873 Royal Doulton Household Appliances & Housewares 
34 8874 Allen Other Construction 
35 8879 On Demand Information pic Publishing 
36 8881 Primar-E pic Computer Services 
37 8884 Telspec pic Telecommunications Equipment 
38 8904 Rackwood Minerals Hldgs pic Leisure 
39 8908 CFS Group pic Software 
40 8914 Trifast pic Plantations 
41 8915 Clinical Computing pic Software 
42 8926 Cedar Group pic Software 
43 8927 Graham Group pic Builders Merchants 
44 8935 Wellington Holdings pic Engineering - General 
45 8937 Brightstone Properties p!c Property 
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46 8942 Waste Recycling Grp pic Environmental control 
47 8944 Beazer Group pic House Building 
48 8945 Robert Wiseman Dairies pic Food Processors 
49 8958 Groupe Chez Gerard pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 
50 8972 Superscape VR pic Software 
51 8980 DRS Data & Research Service pic Computer Services 
52 8984 Go-Ahead Group pic Rail, Road & Freight 
53 8991 Redrew Group pic House Building 
54 8998 Automotive Precision Hldgs Auto parts 
55 9008 London Clubs International Gaming 
56 9010 Spargo Consulting pic Computer Services 
57 9025 CPL Aromas pic Food Processors 
58 9026 VCl pic Publishing 
59 9033 Colombus Group pic Publishing & Printing 
60 9034 Yates Brothers Wine Lodges Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 
61 9036 InterX Plantations 
62 9041 Magnum Power pic Electrical Equipment 
63 9044 Osmetech pic Electrical Equipment 
64 9047 Copyright Promotions Grp pic Media Agencies 
65 9049 Independent Parts Group pic Vehicle Components & Assemblers 
66 9051 Ryland Group pic Vehicle Distribution 
67 9053 Fleming Natural Ressources Geographical Specialists - Developed Markets 
68 9066 Calluna pic Computer Hardware 
69 9068 Churchill China pic Household Appliances & Housewares 
70 9071 TLG pic Electrical Equipment 
71 9072 Tele-Cine Cell Group pic Broadcasting Contractors 
72 9076 JJB Sports pic Retailers - Soft Goods 
73 9079 Telewest Communications pic Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 
74 9080 JJB SPORTS Retailers - Soft Goods 
75 9096 Advanced Medical Solutions Medical Equipment & Supplies 
76 9102 Hil l Hire pic Rail, Road & Freight 
77 9126 LlBERfabrica Publishing & Printing 
78 9130 GET Group pic Electrical Equipment 
79 9138 Dailywin Group Household Appliances & Housewares 
80 9140 Datrontech Group pic Plantations 
81 9151 Coral Products pic Packaging 
82 9162 Gradus Group pic Building Materials 
83 9180 Character Group pic Media Agencies 
84 9213 Consolidated Coal pic Leisure 
85 9217 Hay & Robertson pic Clothing & Footwear 
86 9221 Media Business Group pic Media Agencies 
87 9231 Universal Salvage pic Business Support Services 
88 9280 Ask Central pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 
89 9282 Morrison Construction Group pic Other Construction 
90 9297 Heritage Bathrooms pic Furniture & Fumishings 
91 9299 Viewinn pic Publishing 
92 9311 Gardner (L) Group pic Engineering - General 
93 9317 CMG pic Computer Services 
94 9329 Polymasc Pharmaceuticals pic Pharmaceuticals 
95 9340 Ballynatray Hldgs pic Property 
96 9343 MediaKey pic Publishing & Printing 
97 9352 Visual Action Holdings pic Broadcasting Contractors 
98 9363 Fulmar pic Publishing & Printing 
99 9376 ILP Group pic Packaging 
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100 9380 Systems Integrated Research pic Publishing & Printing 
101 9382 Dicom Group pic Plantations 
102 9389 Harvey Nichols Group pic Retailers - Multi Department 
103 9390 La Senza pic Retailers, Chain Store 
104 9406 Dairy Crest pic Food Processors 
105 9412 London & Edinburgh Publishg Publishing & Printing 
106 9415 Millennium & Copthome Hotels pic Hotels 
107 9416 Phytopharm pic Pharmaceuticals 
108 9417 Sira Business Services pic Business Support Services 
109 9418 Stentor pic Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 
110 9423 Reflec pic Chemicals - Speciality 
111 9424 Maiden Group pic Media Agencies 
112 9429 Premier Group pic 
Education, Business Training & Employment 
Agencies 
113 9431 Thomas Potts pic Publishing & Printing 
114 9448 Carisbrooke Shipping pic Shipping & Ports 
115 9458 Theo Fennell pic Furniture & Furnishings 
116 9460 Fibemet Group pic Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 
117 9466 Staffware pic Software 
118 9467 Solid State Supplies pic Electrical Equipment 
119 9469 Pace Micro Technology pic Electrical Equipment 
120 9481 Pordum Foods pic Food & Drug Retailers 
121 9482 Lotteryking Holdings pic Gaming 
122 9488 Alizyme pic Pharmaceuticals 
123 9490 UNO pic Retailers - Hardlines 
124 9496 Robert Walters pic 
Education, Business Training & Employment 
Agencies 
125 9497 Atkins (WS) pic Business Support Services 
126 9500 AND International Publishers Publishing 
127 9508 Sopheon pic Software 
128 9510 Weeks Group pic Business Support Services 
129 9511 AEA Technology pic Business Support Services 
130 9519 Interoute Telecom pic Packaging 
131 9520 Oriental Restaurant pic Restaurants, Pubs & Breweries 
132 9531 John David Sports pic Retailers - Soft Goods 
133 9535 Mondas pic Software 
134 9539 Beaufort Group pic Business Support Services 
135 9541 Majestic Wine pic Food & Drug Retailers 
136 9546 Barrasford Holdings Property 
137 9554 Future Integrated Telephony Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 
138 9555 Advanced Power Components Electrical Equipment 
139 9557 Minerva pic Real Estate Holding & Development 
140 9567 Colt Telecom Group Fixed-Line Telecommunication Services 
141 9568 SDX Business Systems pic Electrical Equipment 
142 9570 Oxford Biomedica pic Pharmaceuticals 
143 9571 Yeoman Group pic Computer Hardware 
144 9585 Sunderland A F C Leisure Facilities 
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8.6 Appendix 6 Monthly returns derivation 
T h i s program d e r i v e s the monthly r e t u r n s . The SEDOL numbers of the 
IPOs a r e s o r t e d i n the f i l e 'number.dat'. 
C D e c l a r a t i o n 
program r e t u r n 
IMPLICIT INTEGER(A-Y) 
DIMENSION ZRET(540),DATES(540),MCAP(45),nu(198) 






C Read the f i l e s 'number.dat' and the f i l e 'RETS1999' 
do i = l , N 
read(14,3000) n u ( i ) 
enddo 
c l o s e ( 1 4 ) 
do kk=l,7146 
Read(12,100) comp,SEDOL,RNAME,DTI,FREQ,START 
* , END,NOBS,SAMP,INDY, 
* MVAL,NTRADE,FTPR,DYLD,PER,DMARK,NETASS,VELOCITY, 
* (ZRET(J), J = l,540),(DATES(J), J=l,540) 
* ,(MCAP(K), K=l,45) 
do i i = l , N 




C The below s e c t i o n compute the year and the month corresponding to 
Cthe company i 




y e a r = y e a r - l 
endif 
Q * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
C The s e c t i o n below d e r i v e the monthly s e r i e s (ZRET). The s e r i e s 
C a r e organised i n b l o c k s . The f i r s t l i n e of the block provides 
C the SEDOL number of the company, the remainder of the block 
C c o n t a i n s a matrix where the f i r s t column r e f e r s to the year, 
C the second column g i v e s the month and the t h i r d column provides 
C the monthly r e t u r n s . 
Q * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
i f ( y e a r . g t . 1 9 9 1 ) then 
write(13,300) year,month, ZRET(i) 
endif 
enddo 




c l o s e ( 1 2 ) 
c l o s e ( 1 3 ) 
100 format(218,A32,1518,540F8.4, 54012,4515) 











8.7 Appendix 7 Excel's Macro 
Sub copy() 
t 
' copy Macro 
' Macro recorded by Yacine 
' T h i s i s macro o r g a n i s e s the monthly s e r i e s d e r i v e d from appendix 5 
by columns 
' i n E x c e l 
Dim X , y, z As I n t e g e r 
Dim a As I n t e g e r 
Dim b As I n t e g e r 
a = InputBox("Enter the f i n a l row number p l e a s e " , " F i n a l Row", 1) 
z = InputBox{"Enter the column r e f e r e n c e p l e a s e " , "row s e l e c t i o n " , 
1) 
X = 1 
y = 97 
b = 1 
Do 
S h e e t s { " d a t a " ) . S e l e c t 
R a n g e ( C e l l s ( x , z ) , C e l l s ( y , z ) ) . S e l e c t 
S e l e c t i o n . c o p y 
S h e e t s ( " r e s u l t s " ) . S e l e c t 
C e l l e d , b) . S e l e c t 
A c t i v e S h e e t . P a s t e 
S h e e t s ( " d a t a " ) . S e l e c t 
X = X + 97 
y = y + 97 
b = b + 1 




8.8 Appendix 8 Bootstrappe's algorithm 
Q * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
T h i s program i s run on the s t a t i s t i c a l software R. I t computes the 
c r i t i c a l v a l u e s of the bootstrapped skeweness a d j u s t e d t - s t a t i s t i c 
f o r alpha = 5 percent 
f u n c t i o n ( f y , alpha = 0.05) 
{ 
yd = r e a d . t a b l e ( f y , sep = header = T, n a . s t r i n g s = "M") 
t = c { ) 
f o r ( j i n 1:dim(yd)[2]) { 
yy = yd[, j] 
yy = y y [ ! i s . n a ( y y ) ] 
S = mean ( y y ) / v a r (yy)'^0 . 5 
L = sum( (yy - mean (yy) )'"B ) / ( l e n g t h (yy) * v a r (yy)''1. 5) 
T = s q r t (length (yy) ) * (S + L * S'^2/3 + L/(6 * l e n g t h ( y y ) ) ) 
t s b = c ( ) 
fo r ( i i n 1:1000) { 
zz = sample(yy, l e n g t h ( y y ) / 4 ) 
Sb = (mean(zz) - mean (yy) )/var (zz ) "^ 0 . 5 
Lb = sum((zz - mean(zz) )'^B) / ( l e n g t h ( z z ) * v a r ( z z ) ' ^ l .5) 
Tb = s q r t ( l e n g t h ( z z ) ) * (Sb + Lb * Sb'^2/3 + Lb/(6 * 
l e n g t h ( z z ) ) ) 
t s b = c ( t s b , Tb) 
} 
s t s b = s o r t ( t s b ) [ c ( a l p h a / 2 * 1000, (1 - alpha/2) * 1000)] 
t = r b i n d ( t , c ( l e n g t h ( y y ) , T, s t s b , T < s t s b [ l ] || T > 






8.9 Appendix 9 bootstrappe critical values 
Table 8-3 Venture capital sample bootstrapped critical value at a = 5 percent 
FTA as benchmark HGSC as benchmark 
Month Lower Uper Lower Uper 
1 -1.66346 3.672571 -1.73627 3.800193 
2 -1.8809 2.047892 -1.925545 2.173247 
3 -2.06413 1.866866 -1.92652 1.879588 
4 -2.01289 2.102024 -2.029697 1.795362 
5 -2.17645 1.786811 -2.142735 1.675763 
6 -2.18976 1.763032 -2.158132 1.785742 
7 -2.17991 1.734418 -2.256149 1.566793 
8 -2.18811 1.778132 -2.203372 1.625055 
9 -2.33692 1.734173 -2.311558 1.721188 
10 -2.57594 1.600933 -2.525914 1.621223 
11 -2.25387 1.65171 -2.282098 1.642598 
12 -2.33866 1.626549 -2.502189 1.640477 
13 -2.27714 1.672013 -2.406296 1.699573 
14 -2.48223 1.625939 -2.374043 1.694842 
15 -2.24918 1.63957 -2.308458 1.536934 
16 -2.1364 1.618878 -2.282853 1.537905 
17 -2.04565 1.698024 -1.987682 1.750874 
18 -2.64335 1.700221 -2.545572 1.558151 
19 -2.2649 1.471445 -2.515839 1.600819 
20 -2.37428 1.636755 -2.744798 1.615269 
21 -2.33016 1.654976 -2.584143 1.568601 
22 -2.41178 1.646358 -2.544616 1.497526 
23 -2.46727 1.569227 -2.258364 1.553903 
24 -2.59201 1.631633 -2.743845 1.54029 
25 -2.55736 1.531377 -2.4034 1.548754 
26 -2.39461 1.632882 -2.596067 1.449332 
27 -2.55864 1.577288 -2.451127 1.705021 
28 -2.22123 1.691413 -2.250756 1.64332 
29 -2.09935 1.530289 -2.087687 1.797935 
30 -2.433 1.72249 -2.213409 1.538138 
31 -2.3009 1.60151 -2.364829 1.533482 
32 -2.10226 1.691796 -2.123454 1.534859 
33 -2.04742 1.607781 -2.221818 1.587288 
34 -2.15484 1.529322 -2.0741 1.665889 
35 -2.25494 1.595057 -2.365129 1.573532 
36 -2.19741 1.634749 -2.108028 1.527194 
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Table 8-4 Venture capital sample bootstrapped critical value at a = 10 percent 
FTA as benchmark HGSC as benchmark 
Month Lower Uper Lower Uper 
1 -1.34894 3.302541 -1.36962 3.634894 
2 -1.5968 1.751464 -1.48254 1.741584 
3 -1.56542 1.53201 -1.62505 1.461157 
4 -1.61474 1.584359 -1.67883 1.41191 
5 -1.85416 1.431526 -1.90884 1.484393 
6 -1.74658 1.472753 -1.73995 1.501464 
7 -1.83863 1.502457 -1.87309 1.502605 
8 -1.6998 1.509729 -1.7898 1.495878 
9 -1.83682 1.395239 -1.92705 1.348638 
10 -1.93644 1.455551 -2.1052 1.428591 
11 -1.96704 1.515098 -1.9275 1.491806 
12 -1.83118 1.411041 -2.05469 1.536499 
13 -1.70714 1.455735 -2.0268 1.36883 
14 -2.07291 1.362942 -2.13971 1.348651 
15 -1.92583 1.335506 -1.94471 1.415604 
16 -1.94611 1.418776 -1.92025 1.437045 
17 -1.89828 1.410859 -1.78885 1.431788 
18 -2.06913 1.334226 -2.20482 1.349181 
19 -1.8448 1.373645 -2.18905 1.41721 
20 -2.1107 1.430712 -2.26913 1.402734 
21 -2.14128 1.380467 -2.18354 1.334796 
22 -2.01202 1.343932 -2.16965 1.315486 
23 -2.13039 1.334075 -2.09087 1.429617 
24 -2.16977 1.38144 -2.3137 1.452192 
25 -2.15335 1.261538 -2.26529 1.329022 
26 -2.1018 1.319804 -2.10171 1.29691 
27 -2.17008 1.289812 -1.83667 1.347665 
28 -2.03538 1.362086 -1.93554 1.347459 
29 -1.89587 1.421336 -1.85789 1.410679 
30 -1.75904 1.291732 -1.73089 1.448882 
31 -1.64412 1.364625 -1.9368 1.392512 
32 -1.85578 1.472966 -1.94782 1.432349 
33 -1.8095 1.412734 -1.80998 1.353204 
34 -1.83807 1.303757 -1.61914 1.415268 
35 -1.8999 1.371831 -1.80522 1.383591 
36 -1.88693 1.34013 -1.97848 1.34067 
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Table 8-5 Non-venture capital sample bootstrapped critical value at a 
percent 
= 5 
FTA as benchmark HGSC as benchmark 
Month Lower Uper Lower Uper 
1 -1.57453 4.221136 -1.64893 5.214035 
2 -2.04204 2.375674 -1.84134 2.808848 
3 -2.32587 1.896192 -2.35673 1.927908 
4 -2.20374 2.037307 -2.08683 1.946548 
5 -2.641 1.65196 -2.49389 1.615167 
6 -2.45967 1.62399 -2.63896 1.603615 
7 -2.32445 1.579833 -2.60486 1.703305 
8 -2.20276 1.576624 -2.17034 1.488508 
9 -2.22182 1.638157 -2.24667 1.634464 
10 -2.1333 1.678774 -1.95947 1.670476 
11 -2.06747 1.672472 -2.06263 1.708118 
12 -1.87049 1.75003 -2.06991 1.871911 
13 -2.042 1.613911 -2.20136 1.653457 
14 -1.94155 1.773755 -2.13723 1.643658 
15 -2.30747 1.809973 -2.18861 1.739955 
16 -2.1755 1.743949 -2.16238 1.743978 
17 -2.12767 1.783617 -2.2282 1.705151 
18 -1.76072 1.653072 -1.96475 1.64158 
19 -2.05509 1.729349 -2.14599 1.713026 
20 -2.05784 1.69213 -1.92309 1.58589 
21 -1.80716 1.585903 -2.20161 1.583031 
22 -2.20565 1.737413 -1.9181 1.602412 
23 -2.04279 1.695059 -2.10179 1.642717 
24 -1.9798 1.649986 -1.97657 1.476816 
25 -2.07928 1.759466 -2.28016 1.677315 
26 -2.21552 1.641174 -1.98677 1.732211 
27 -2.22122 1.604512 -2.10938 1.652461 
28 -2.23586 1.704604 -2.33996 1.724121 
29 -2.32218 1.629975 -2.33981 1.671647 
30 -2.46792 1.560317 -2.31229 1.669883 
31 -2.68054 1.602837 -2.44015 1.584619 
32 -2.394 1.563444 -2.54887 1.610012 
33 -2.31169 1.572536 -2.18606 1.601614 
34 -2.15423 1.697552 -2.32877 1.644028 
35 -1.95284 1.541374 -2.15985 1.708731 
36 -2.88412 1.528168 -2.62751 1.5703 
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Table 8-6 Non-venture capital sample bootstrapped critical value at a 
percent 
= 10 
FTA as benchmark HGSC as benchmark 
Month Lower Uper Lower Uper 
1 -1.4113 1.455344 -1.395411 1.339162 
2 -1.43968 2.322143 -1.547378 2.221941 
3 -2.06024 1.763542 -1.918594 1.659173 
4 -1.77683 1.701359 -1.81828 1.738794 
5 -2.08742 1.605007 -2.161217 1.442505 
6 -2.04562 1.445172 -2.347661 1.370171 
7 -1.79455 1.497086 -2.078054 1.451109 
8 -1.72457 1.399861 -1.581527 1.463242 
9 -1.86491 1.438647 -1.838747 1.426357 
10 -1.62651 1.513151 -1.729765 1.440877 
11 -1.71786 1.447261 -1.69376 1.443765 
12 -1.54195 1.444218 -1.445047 1.466242 
13 -1.76477 1.491834 -1.547893 1.433199 
14 -1.54208 1.383664 -1.651967 1.442534 
15 -1.68687 1.354074 -1.872324 1.477393 
16 -1.68535 1.353637 -1.760569 1.410785 
17 -1.76967 1.421677 -1.673649 1.434351 
18 -1.44246 1.451301 -1.509751 1.346648 
19 -1.73096 1.567864 -1.686009 1.46991 
20 -1.66644 1.354338 -1.669233 1.467636 
21 -1.66499 1.386189 -1.655612 1.298851 
22 -1.65119 1.468418 -1.621937 1.41484 
23 -1.56568 1.48665 -1.499884 1.433938 
24 -1.59471 1.49448 -1.739079 1.384411 
25 -1.76058 1.417429 -1.787182 1.380381 
26 -1.87376 1.450625 -1.75031 1.417141 
27 -1.99619 1.390567 -1.747234 1.40448 
28 -1.93862 1.415353 -1.729015 1.389318 
29 -1.94285 1.396427 -1.98673 1.328017 
30 -2.03588 1.404815 -2.047885 1.452504 
31 -2.15553 1.388361 -1.952097 1.375329 
32 -1.88006 1.366893 -1.887675 1.365567 
33 -1.83235 1.450916 -1.822783 1.398214 
34 -1.75607 1.346876 -1.762734 1.396171 
35 -1.7371 1.357549 -1.674746 1.369915 
36 -1.97257 1.443073 -1.872189 1.323387 
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8.10 Appendix 10 LSPD's delisting codes 
Table 8-7 Codes and reasons of why a security ceased to be quoted 
5 Acquisition/takeover/merger 
6 Suspension/cancellation with shares acquired later. Meanwhile, may be traded under 
rule 163(2) 
7 Liquidation (usually valueless, but there may be liquidation payments) 
8 Quotation cancelled (maybe suspended initially) as company becomes a private 
company, or there is insufficient trading in the shares. Dealings continue under rule 
163(2) or (3) 
9 As for 8, but no dealings under rule 163 
10 Quotation suspended - i f suspended for more than three years, this may lead to 
automatic cancellation 
11 Voluntary liquidation, where value remains and was / is being distributed 
12 Changed to foreign registration 
13 Quotation cancelled for reason unknown. Dealings continue under rule 163(2) or (3) 
14 As for 13, but no dealings under rule 163 
15 Converted into an alternative security for the same company 
16 Receiver appointed/liquidation. Probably valueless, but not yet certain 
17 Unitisation of an investment or financial trust 
18 Nationalisation 
19 Enfranchi sement 
20 In Administration/Administrative receivership 
21 Cancelled and assumed valueless 
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8.11 Appendix 11 Results of IPOs listed on the main market (LSE) 
Table 8-8 L S E long-term cumulative returns (FTA) 
The table shows the results of the average market returns (ARt) and the cumulative average market adjusted returns 
(CARt) for the 36 months after floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC^ 
backed IPOs. The FTA value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The average returns are computed as 
described in equation [5-6] and CARs are computed as described in equation [5-7]. The t-statistic is computed as 
described in equation [5-11] where Var is the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months and Gov is the first order 
auto-covariance of the average ARt series. The Var and Cov of VC-backed IPOs are 0.18277 and 0.000114 respectively. 
These values are 0.16686 and 000241 respectively for non-VC backed IPOs. 
VC-backed IPOs Non-VC backed IPOs 
FTA 
Month Sample AR, C A R t t -CAR Sample 
FTA 
A R, C A R t t -CAR 
1 167 1.05 1.05 0.9991 113 2.82 2.82 2.315** 
2 167 -0.1 0.96 0.6415 113 1.35 4.17 2.404** 
3 167 0.26 1.21 0.6622 113 0.15 4.31 2.027** 
4 167 0.04 1.24 0.5875 113 -0.55 3.76 1.531** 
5 167 0.47 1.71 0.7243 113 2.3 6.05 2.201** 
6 167 -0.81 0.9 0.3469 113 0.97 7.02 2.33** 
7 167 -1.07 -0.18 -0.0615 113 -0.97 6.06 1.86* 
8 167 -0.37 -0.54 -0.1815 113 -2.26 3.81 1.0921 
9 167 -0.67 -1.21 -0.3824 113 0.81 4.61 1.2485 
10 166 1.77 0.57 0.1681 113 0.88 5.49 1.4084 
11 166 -1.12 -0.56 -0.1582 113 -0.42 5.07 1.2418 
12 164 -1.8 -2.35 -0.6385 113 -0.53 4.55 1.0662 
13 164 -0.9 -3.24 -0.8459 113 0.36 4.9 1.1036 
14 163 0.02 -3.23 -0.8099 113 -0.83 4.08 0.8837 
15 162 1.26 -1.98 -0.4766 110 1.28 5.35 1.1051 
16 162 -1.83 -3.8 -0.8875 109 0.55 5.89 1.1743 
17 161 1.15 -2.66 -0.6003 109 4.41 10.3 1.991** 
18 159 0.08 -2.58 -0.5623 109 2.15 12.44 2.338** 
19 159 1.73 -0.85 -0.1803* 109 -0.27 12.18 2.226** 
20 157 -0.06 -0.9 -0.1849* 109 0.79 12.96 2 .31** 
21 155 0.12 -0.78 -0.1557* 109 1.51 14.46 2.515** 
22 154 0.87 0.09 0.0174* 109 1.64 16.09 2.735** 
23 153 0.86 0.95 0.1799* 108 -1.68 14.41 2.384** 
24 152 -0.75 0.21 0.0375 107 -2.52 11.9 1.9178* 
25 151 0.62 0.83 0.1484 107 -1.35 10.56 1.6668* 
26 151 2.75 3.57 0.6316 107 0.4 10.95 1.6955* 
27 149 1.32 4.89 0.8436 107 1.95 12.89 1.9591* 
28 149 1.4 6.28 1.0645 107 -1.31 11.59 1.7293* 
29 146 -0.55 5.74 0.9457 107 -0.64 10.95 1.6055* 
30 146 -0.73 5.01 0.8118 107 0.31 11.25 1.6223* 
31 143 -0.27 4.75 0.7491 107 -1.45 9.81 1.3909* 
32 141 -1.2 3.55 0.5479 107 -2.13 7.68 1.072 
33 141 -0.52 3.04 0.4613 107 -1.45 6.24 0.8574 
34 141 0.35 3.39 0.5066 107 -1.76 4.48 0.6068 
35 140 0.58 3.96 0.582 107 -0.73 3.76 0.5012 
36 140 -1.76 2.21 0.32 107 1.29 5.04 0.6635 
Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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Table 8-9 L S E long-term buv and hold returns (FTA) 
The table shows the results of the buy and hold average market adjusted returns (BHARt) for 36 months 
after floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed 
IPOs. The FTA value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The buy and hold average 
returns is computed as described in equation [5-9]. The bootstrapped adjusted skewness t-test reported 









t-test Sample BHAR, 
bootstrapped 
t-test 
1 167 -0.83 -0.717 113 0.94 0.474 
2 167 1.05 1.046 113 3.3 1.856 
3 167 1.56 1.053 113 3.71 1.852** 
4 167 1.93 1.064 113 4.2 2.198** 
5 167 2.95 1.329 113 7.1 2.547** 
6 167 2.85 1.098 113 7.8 2.764** 
7 167 2.25 0.791 113 6.96 2.289** 
8 167 1.31 0.463 113 4.31 1.31 
9 167 1.66 0.514 113 5.75 1.575 
10 166 4.59 1.16 113 6.6 1.813** 
11 166 3.2 0.82 113 6.4 1.663 
12 164 1.59 0.392 113 5.91 1.494 
13 164 0.75 0.201 113 7.11 1.573 
14 163 3.12 0.605 113 7.66 1.509 
15 162 3.16 0.62 110 10.37 1.815** 
16 162 2.23 0.417 109 11.29 1.901** 
17 161 3.56 0.625 109 16.81 2.656** 
18 159 10.06 1.294 109 14.85 2.423** 
19 159 8.32 1.164 109 22.08 3.169** 
20 157 11.16 1.372 109 22.01 3.028** 
21 155 9.35 1.167 109 23.88 3.175** 
22 154 12.42 1.477 109 25.77 3.235** 
23 153 12.43 1.512 108 22.57 2.78** 
24 152 13.23 1.511 107 18.59 2.295** 
25 151 15.48 1.689** 107 17.72 2.064** 
26 151 18.8 2.041** 107 18.93 2.111** 
27 149 17.75 1.952** 107 21.31 2.245** 
28 149 19.49 2.083** 107 19.91 1.963** 
29 146 15.65 1.699** 107 19.86 1.832** 
30 146 16.97 1.746** 107 23.35 1.984** 
31 143 18.62 1.858** 107 22.95 1.857** 
32 141 17.82 1.752** 107 18.96 1.58** 
33 141 14.83 1.435 107 14.55 1.235 
34 141 15.68 1.433 107 11.41 0.993 
35 140 18.48 1.572* 107 9.77 0.778 
36 140 17.83 1.418 107 12.57 0.925 
Statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
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Table 8-10 L S E long-term cumulative returns (HGSC) 
The table shows the results of average market returns (ARt) and the cumulative average market adjusted returns (CARt) for the 36 
months after floatation, excluding the initial returns for VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The Hoare Govett Small 
Companies value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The average market returns are computed as described in 
equation [5-6]. The CARs are described in equation [5-7]. The t-statistic is computed as described in equation [5-11] where Var 
is the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months and Cov is the first order auto-covariance of the average series. The Var 
and Cov of VC-backed IPOs are 0.016489 and 0.00106 respectively. These values are 0.015933 and 6.322E-05 respectively for 
non-VC backed IPOs. 
VC-backed IPOs non VC-backed IPOs 
Month Satnple 
HGSC 
AR. CARt t-CAR Sample A 
HGSC 
CARt t-CAR 
1 167 0.91 0.91 0.9072 113 2.81 2.81 2.3644** 
2 167 -0.76 0.15 0.1018 113 0.32 3.12 1.8584* 
3 167 -0.37 -0.23 -0.1284 113 0.09 3.21 1.5567* 
4 167 0.17 -0.07 -0.031 113 -0.05 3.16 1.3302 
5 167 0.69 0.63 0.2805 113 2.56 5.72 2.1487** 
6 167 -1.16 -0.54 -0.2175 113 0.66 6.37 2.1847** 
7 167 -0.62 -1.16 -0.4354 113 -0.61 5.77 1.8315* 
8 167 0.04 -1.12 -0.3933 113 -2.16 3.61 1.073 
9 167 -0.57 -1.68 -0.5583 113 0.65 4.26 1.1929 
10 166 1.29 -0.4 -0.1255 113 0.13 4.38 1.1635 
I I 166 -1.33 -1.73 -0.5154 113 -0.16 4.23 1.0703 
12 164 -0.96 -2.68 -0.7671 113 -0.18 4.05 0.9819 
13 164 -0.6 -3.28 -0.8974 113 0.48 4.52 1.0538 
14 163 0.04 -3.24 -0.8517 113 -0.89 3.64 0.8174 
15 162 1.17 -2.08 -0.527 110 1.36 4.99 1.068 
16 162 -1.5 -3.57 -0.8757 109 0.84 5.82 1.2004 
17 161 1.09 -2.49 -0.5872 109 4.1 9.92 1.9838** 
18 159 -0.16 -2.64 -0.6058 109 1.8 11.72 2.2774** 
19 159 2.36 -0.29 -0.0626 109 -0.28 11.44 2.1641** 
20 157 0.45 0.16 0.0345 109 1.13 12.57 2.317** 
21 155 0.27 0.43 0.0883 109 1.36 13.93 2.5056** 
22 154 0.82 1.24 0.2518 109 1.48 15.41 2.7074** 
23 153 0.82 2.06 0.4079 108 -2.03 13.38 2.2895** 
24 152 -0.17 1.89 0.3669 107 -2.01 11.38 1.8973* 
25 151 1.07 2.96 0.5615 107 -1.32 10.07 1.6447* 
26 151 2.45 5.4 1.0005 107 0.19 10.25 1.6421* 
27 149 1.57 6.97 1.2661 107 2.14 12.39 1.9472* 
28 149 1.19 8.16 1.4408 107 -1.15 11.24 1.7349* 
29 146 -0.5 7.66 1.3293 107 -0.58 10.66 1.6171* 
30 146 -1.16 6.5 1.0976 107 0.19 10.85 1.618* 
31 143 -0.1 6.41 1.0566 107 -1.13 9.73 1.4271 
32 141 -1.42 4.99 0.8106 107 -1.79 7.95 1.1477 
33 141 -0.61 4.39 0.701 107 -1.34 6.62 0.9411 
34 141 -0.16 4.23 0.6637 107 -1.41 5.21 0.7305 
35 140 0.23 4.46 0.6895 107 -0.98 4.24 0.586 
36 140 -1.65 2.81 0.4282 107 1.86 6.09 0.8299 
Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
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Table 8-11 L S E Long-term buy and hold returns (HGSC) 
The table shows the results of the buy and hold average market adjusted returns (BHARt) for 36 months after 
floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The 
H G S C is used as benchmark. The buy and hold average returns are computed as described in equation [5-9]. 
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* Statistically significant at the 5% and 10% 
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8.12 Appendix 12 Results of IPOs floated on the A I M market 
Table 8-12 A I M long-term cumulative returns 
The table shows the resuhs of the average market returns (ARt) and the cumulative average market adjusted returns (CARt) for the 36 months 
after floatation for IPOs floated in the AIM market, e}xluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The 
Hoare Govett Small Companies value weighted all shares is used as market benchmark. The average market retiuTis are computed as described in 
equation [5-6]. The CARs are described in equation [5-7]. The t-statistic is computed as described in equation ]5-11 ] where Var is the averags 
cross-sectional variance over 36 months and Cov is the fu^t order auto-covariance of the average series. The Var and Cov of VC-backed IPOs are 
1.12489 and 0.00200 respectively. These values are 0.062762 and 0.005051 respectively for non-VC backed IPOs. The Wilcoxon one sample test 
(Z-test) for monthly average returns is also reported 
VC-backed IPOs Non-VC backed IPOs 
HGSC HGSC 
IVIonth Sample Z test CARt t -CAR Sample AR, Z-test C A R t t -CAR 
1 24 -3.68 50*** -3,68 -0.1698 31 2,77 194 2.77 0.614 
2 24 3.1 166 -0,59 -0.019 31 6,39 179 9.15 1.3832 
3 24 3.54 195 2.96 0,0789 31 -2.15 156 7.01 0.854 
4 24 2.52 180 5.48 0,1262 31 -3.15 150 3.86 0.4051 
5 24 -1,2 126 4.28 0,0883 31 1.02 226 4,88 0.4563 
6 24 -3.86 103 0.43 0,008 31 -3.08 196 1,8 0,1534 
7 23 -1.35 123 -0,92 -0,0157 31 2.33 197 4,13 0,3245 
8 23 -0.67 141 -1,59 -0,0254 30 4.8 221 8.92 0.6454 
9 23 -1,5 121 -3,09 -0,0465 30 -4.79 156 4.13 0.2815 
10 23 -0,64 86 -3.72 -0,0531 30 -2.2 170 1.94 0.1252 
11 23 -1,79 67 -5,5 -0,0749 30 1.21 165 3.14 0.1934 
12 23 -5,97 88 -11,47 -0,1495 30 1 196 4.14 0.2434 
13 23 -0,18 90 -11,65 -0,1458 29 -10.3 50 -6.17 -0.3429 
14 23 -6,31 62 -17.95 -0,2166 29 -4.98 84 -11.15 -0.5972 
15 23 -2,4 86 -20.35 -0,2372 29 -4.88 130 -16,03 -0.8291 
16 23 -3,08 55 -23.43 -0,2644 29 -3.68 48 -19.7 -0.9868 
17 23 -5,4 62 -28.82 -0,3155 27 -7.26 73 -26,% -1.2637 
18 23 -4,23 49 -33.04 -0,3516 27 -2.84 133 -29.79 -1.3569 
19 23 4.38 96 -28.67 -0,2969 27 -2,36 133 -32.15 -1,425 
20 18 3.84 67 -24.83 -0,2218 27 -0,99 70 -33,14 -1.4311 
21 18 -0,47 61 -25,3 -0,2205 26 2,32 78 -30,82 -1.2745 
22 17 1.72 71 -23,59 -0.1952 26 -4,34 75 -35,16 -1.4201 
23 17 -1,29 54 -24.87 -0.2013 26 4,44 92 -30,72 -1.2135 
24 16 -8,61 31 -33.48 -0.2573 26 -2,64 93 -33,35 -1.2897 
25 16 -1,43 29 -34,9 -0,2628 26 -0.42 81 -33,77 -1.2792 
26 16 -3,19 23 -38,09 -0.2812 26 -0,96 31 -34,73 -1,2898 
27 16 5,84 55 -32.25 -0.2337 26 6,94 49 -27,79 -1.0128 
28 16 -6,25 19 -38.49 -0.2739 26 -8,91 23 -36,69 -1.3131 
29 16 -6,4 10 -44.89 -0.3138 26 -4,03 37 -40,72 -1.4318 
30 17 -3,81 35 -48.69 -0.345 26 -0,41 89 -41,13 -1.4216 
31 17 -3,05 29 -51.73 -0.3606 26 2,97 109 -38.16 -1.2976 
32 17 -0,89 19 -52.62 -0,361 26 5.5 69 -32.67 -1.0932 
33 17 3.92 36 -48.71 -0.3291 26 28.57 123 -4,11 -0.1353 
34 17 16.1 52 -32.61 -0,217 26 -1.14 104 -5,24 -0.1701 
35 17 -3,88 42 -36.48 -0.2393 26 2.39 57 -2,86 -0.0913 
36 17 -2,57 16 -39.05 -0,2526 26 0.76 74 -2.1 -0.0662 
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Table 8-13 A I M Long-term buy and hold returns 
The table shows the results of the buy and hold average market adjusted returns ( B H A R t ) for 36 months after 
floatation, excluding the initial returns for both samples, VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-backed IPOs. The 
H G S C is used as benchmark. The buy and hold average returns are computed as described in equation [5-9]. The 
Wilcoxon one sample test for the significance (Z-Test) is also reported. 
VC-backed IPOs Non-VC-backed IPOs 
HGSC HGSC 
Month Sample BHAR , Z-Test Sample BHAR , Z-test 
1 24 -16.26 29** 31 -27.6 105** 
2 24 -9.32 101 31 -9.74 135** 
3 24 -1.52 155 31 -6.04 J42** 
4 24 -0.21 174 31 -9.52 138** 
5 24 -1.48 187 31 -7.12 168 
6 24 -2.16 174 31 -3.35 193 
7 23 -3.87 141 31 2.45 236 
8 23 -4.96 143 30 5.92 246 
9 23 -3.5 154 30 3.4 216 
10 23 -5.01 146 30 2.36 224 
11 23 2.25 163 30 -2.19 193 
12 23 -4.81 117 30 -1.13 207 
13 23 -4.89 114 29 -5.64 196 
14 23 -7.92 98 29 -9.12 156 
15 23 -10.47 91 29 -11.82 151 
16 23 -12.34 86 29 -15.81 136* 
17 23 -12.23 82 27 -22.11 115** 
18 23 -15.06 79 27 -34.57 70** 
19 23 -9.52 78 27 -29.19 
20 18 -6.33 67 27 -33.25 
21 18 -6.14 68 26 -27.91 83** 
22 17 -1.89 67 26 -23.51 90 
23 17 1.23 67 26 -3.32 83 
24 16 -6.34 57 26 -1.86 75 
25 16 -7.18 38 26 0.72 67 
26 16 -15.25 29 26 -2.82 54 
27 16 -11.17 29 26 -5.42 52 
28 16 -11.62 29 26 -7.66 52 
29 16 -13.64 29 26 1.12 40 
30 17 -1.72 24 26 -4.32 30 
31 17 0.23 17 26 29.83 27 
32 17 -5.1 17 26 39.29 24 
33 17 -9.55 15 26 36.43 24 
34 17 -1.32 15 26 51.58 24 
35 17 -24.75 14 26 46.42 23 
36 17 -65.08 14 26 -42.99 23 
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